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INTRODUCTION
Congress has passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act of 1998 ("Uniform Standards Act"),' preempting securities fraud
class actions under the common law and statutes of all fifty states.2 As
a result, defrauded investors, with the exception of state and local gov-
ernments and their pension funds,3 will be barred from bringing class
1 Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (to be codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
2 A bill that would have preempted all private rights of action for securities fraud
under state law was introduced in the House of Representatives, but it did not proceed
further. See Securities Litigation Improvement Act of 1997, H.R. 1653, 105th Cong. § 16
(1997). Congressman Tom Campbell (R-Cal.), a Stanford Law School Professor, proposed
House Bill 1653 and ProfessorJoseph Grundfest of Stanford Law School had drafted it. See
The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997: Hearing on H.R. 1689 Before the Sub-
comm. on Fin. and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 15-17
(1998) [hereinafter May 19, 1998, House Uniform Standards Act Hearing] (statement of Rep.
Tom Campbell).
3 See S. 1260, 105th Cong. § 3(f) (1998), reprinted in 144 CONG. REC. S4811 (May 13,
1998) (agreeing to Amendment No. 2397 exempting suits brought by "a State or political
subdivision thereof or a State pension plan" on its own behalf or as a member of a class
comprised solely of similar entities); H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. § 16(d) (2) (1998), reprinted in
144 CONG. REC. H6053 (July 21, 1998) (same, except providing that exempted class mem-
bers must have "authorized participation[ in such action"). The Uniform Standards Act
incorporated the House language.
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actions in state court or under state law. Because most plaintiffs find
litigation outside of a class action impractical and uneconomical, 4 the
vast majority of investors will be left with only federal remedies-the
express remedies created by the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act") 5
and the remedies that the federal courts have implied under the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"). 6 Preemption now occurs
even though the 1933 and 1934 Acts expressly preserved state causes
of action,7 and the courts that subsequently interpreted federal reme-
dies under these statutes assumed that alternative state remedies were
available.8 Ironically, the Congress that now preempts these state
remedies has been committed to federalism in almost every other area
of legislation.9
4 For a discussion of the economics of class action litigation, see infra Part VA.
5 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994 & Supp. 111996).
6 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78e-78mm. The 1934 Act contains
express remedies in section 9 for market manipulation, see id. § 78i (1994), and in section
18 for false statements in filings with the SEC. See id. § 78r. Section 9, however, is limited
to enumerated acts of market manipulation and does not generally reach misrepresenta-
tions made to purchasers of securities. See id. § 78i. Section 18 requires a showing that
each plaintiff relied on the defendant's misrepresentations in its SEC filings. See id.
§ 78r(a). Because reliance turns on different questions of fact for each plaintiff (many of
whom never read SEC filings), class actions under section 18 are virtually impossible. Most
plaintiffs instead use the implied private right of action under section 10(b) of the 1934
Act, see id. § 78(j). This implied right of action is discussed more fully below. See infra note
47; infra text accompanying notes 410-27.
7 See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 16, 48 Stat. 74, 84 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7 7p
(1994)) ("The rights and remedies provided by this [Act] shall be in addition to any and
all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity."); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, ch. 404, § 28(a), 48 Stat. 881, 903 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)
(Supp. 111996)) ("The rights and remedies provided by this [Act] shall be in addition to
any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity. ... ).
8 For example, the Supreme Court stated in Marine Bank v. Weaver: "[W] e are satis-
fied that Congress, in enacting the securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad fed-
eral remedy for all fraud." 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982) (holding that a privately negotiated
arrangement promising a share of a borrower's profits in return for a loan guarantee was
not a security for purposes of section 10(b)); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738 n.9 (1975) (holding that a plaintiff has no standing to sue under
section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act unless the plaintiff was an actual purchaser or seller of securi-
ties, and pointing out that disadvantages imposed on investors by this seemingly arbitrary
restriction are "attenuated to the extent that remedies are available to nonpurchasers and
nonsellers under state law"). Blue Chip and other holdings narrowly construing federal
private rights of action are discussed infra text accompanying notes 410-37.
9 Welfare reform, health care, and environmental regulation are a few examples of
areas in which the 104th and the 105th Congresses preferred to leave power with the states.
See infra notes 444-49 and accompanying text. A notable exception was tort reform. See
Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act of 1996, H.1. 956, 104th Cong. (1996). This
Act would have limited punitive damage claims in most product liability cases. See id. § 201.
However, President Clinton vetoed House Bill 956. See Message to the House of Represent-
atives Returning Without Approval Product Liability Legislation, PUB. PAPERS 681 (May 2,
1996) (WilliamJ. Clinton). Congress failed to override the veto by a vote of 258 to 163. See
142 CONG. REc. H4764 (daily ed. May 9, 1996).
In 1998 bills were introduced in the House and the Senate that would have expanded
federal courts' jurisdiction over class action litigation. Representative Henry Hyde (R-1l.)
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The reasons why this sweeping preemption of state law succeeded
in the 105th Congress are rooted in a seminal piece of legislation of
the 104th Congress: the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 ("1995 Reform Act"). 10 The 1995 Reform Act, which sought to
curb frivolous class action litigation in the federal courts," amended
federal law to implement among other measures: heightened plead-
ing requirements, a stay of discovery pending motions to dismiss, a
safe harbor for forward-looking statements, provisions for the judicial
appointment of a lead plaintiff that has a significant economic interest
in the litigation, and heightened judicial scrutiny of settlement
terms. 12
Soon after Congress enacted the 1995 Reform Act, however,
many of its supporters discovered that a "loophole" in the legislation
allowed plaintiffs' lawyers to avoid the new restrictions by filing suits
under state law. 13 Professors Joseph Grundfest and Michael Perino of
Stanford Law School compiled statistics suggesting that, following the
1995 Reform Act, state court litigation increased during 1996, mostly
in California.14 In turn, the high technology companies of Silicon Val-
introduced House Bill 3789 on May 5, 1998, see H.R 3789, 105th Cong. (1998), and Sena-
tors Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) and Herb Kohl (D-Wis.) introduced Senate Bill 2083 on May
14, 1998, see S. 2083, 105th Cong. (1998). The bills sought to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(providing for federal jurisdiction in cases where there is diversity of citizenship) to pro-
vide for federal jurisdiction wherever any member of a plaintiff class is a citizen of a state
different from any defendant. See H.R. 3789 §2(a); S. 2083 § 3. Neither bill progressed
beyond committee in 1998.
10 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-1, 77z-1 to z-2, 78u-4
to u-5, 78j-1 (Supp. II 1996)).
11 SeeJoint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. CoNF. REP.
No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730 [hereinafter 1995 Re-
form Act Joint Explanatory Statement] ("The private securities litigation system is too im-
portant to the integrity of American capital markets to allow this system to be undermined
by those who seek to line their own pockets by bringing abusive and meriless suits.").
12 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (pleading requirements); id. §§ 77z-1 (b), 78u-4(b) (3) (B)
(stay of discovery); id. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5 (safe harbor for forward-looking statements); id,
§§ 77z-1 (a) (3), 78u-4(a) (3) (lead plaintiff provisions); id. §§ 77z-1 (a) (7), 78u-4(a) (7) (ju-
dicial scrutiny of settlement terms). See infra Part III.A
13 See 144 CONG. RIc. S4781 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (statement of Sen. D'Amato on
Senate Bill 1260) ("The problem to which I refer is a loophole that strike lawyers have
found in the 1995 [Reform Act] . .. ."); see also The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1997-S. 1260: Hearings on S.1260 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing Housing and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. (July 24, 1997) (forthcoming) (transcript at
23) [hereinafterJuly 24, 1997, Senate Uniform Standards Act Hearing] (prepared statement of
Joseph Polizzotto, representative of the Securities Industry Association) (discussing how
plaintiffs and their lawyers are exploiting the state court "loophole."); Kenneth J.
Blackwell, Securities Loophole in Need of Repair, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1997, at A13 ("Closing
a loophole is exactly what Congress must do to make sure its 1995 bid to protect investors
from abusive securities lawsuits works as intended.").
14 See The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997-S. 1260: Hearings on S.
1260 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs,
105th Cong. 24-26 (1997) [hereinafter October 29, 1997, Senate Uniform Standards Act Hear-
ing] (testimony of Michael A. Perino, Professor of Law); Implementation of the Private Securi-
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ley, one of the largest defendant groups in securities fraud class ac-
tions,15 made substantial political contributions and lobbied for
preemption.' 6 Consumer groups, public finance officials, and plain-
ties Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Hearings, Serial No. 105-59 Before the Subcomm. on Fin. and
Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 40-44 (1998) [hereinafter
Oct. 21, 1997, House 1995 Reform Act Implementation Hearing] (testimony and prepared state-
ment of Michael A. Perino, Professor of Law); July 24, 1997, Senate Uniform Standards Act
Hearing, supra note 13 (transcript at 44) (prepared testimony ofJoseph A. Grundfest and
Michael A. Perino, Professors of Law); Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting
Private State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 302-14 (1998) (reciting
statistics showing an increase in state court filings after the 1995 Reform Act); JOSEPH A.
GRUNDFEST & MICHAEL A. PERINO, SECURmES LITIGATION REFORM: THE FIRST YEAR'S EXPE-
RIENCE 3 (John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ. Working Paper No. 140, 1997) (same).
Many of the statistics cited by Professors Grundfest and Perino are from Stanford Law
School's Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, a World Wide Web site launched in De-
cember 1996 that publishes court papers in class action lawsuits. The Stanford Web site is
funded in part by private industry. See Securities Class Action ClearingHouse (visited Sept. 10,
1998) <http://securities.stanford.edu/about/caveat.html> [hereinafter Securities Class Ac-
tion Website]. According to the Clearinghouse's homepage:
George Roberts [a founding partner of Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts and Co.]
provided the 'seed capital' for this venture; the National Center for Auto-
mated Information Research . .. provides the largest source of ... sus-
taining support; Netscape Communications . .. donated the software for
the site; and Sun Microsystems and Apple Computer... donated the hard-
ware for this site.
Id. Several of these sponsors are not entirely disinterested in securities litigation.
The same month that Stanford launched this Website, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California proposed Rule 23.3, requiring complaints, settle-
ments, and other filings in securities fraud class actions to be posted on a designated Web-
site. The San Francisco Bar Association's board of directors voted to oppose the proposed
rule. See Todd Woody, Not the Year in Review, but Some Year-End Stars, LEGAL TIms, Jan. 13,
1997, at 45. The Statement of Managers for the Uniform Standards Act noted the utility of
Stanford's database and urged other federal district courts to adopt rules similar to those
of the Northern District of California. See H.R. CoNF. Rap. No. 105-803 (1998), reprinted in
144 CONG. Rc. 11,021 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1998).
15 According to a survey by National Economics Research Associates, roughly 23% of
all securities class action suits filed in federal court from January 1991 through October
1996 were filed against high technology firms. See DENISE N. MARTIN ET AL., NAT'L ECON.
RESEARCH Assoc., RECENT TRENDS IV: WHAT EXPLAINs FILINGS AND SErI..MENTS IN SHARE-
HOLDER CLASS AcrtiONS? iii, tbl.10c (1996) [hereinafter NERA 1996 STUDY]. Data recorded
by Professors Grundfest and Perino found that high technology companies represented
roughly 34% of all issuers named as defendants in federal actions both before and after the
1995 Reform Act. See GRUNDFESr & PERINO, supra note 14, at 23 & tbl.8.
16 The Technology Network, a newly formed political action committee in Palo Alto,
California, amply demonstrates Silicon Valley's political influence:
Spurred byJohn Doerr, a Menlo Park venture capitalist credited with
raising $40 million against Proposition 211, TechNet was formed as a full-
fledged political action committee inJuly. Jim Barksdale, CEO of Netscape
Communications Corp. in Mountain View, was named co-chairman with
Doerr.
TechNet has been host of nine fund-raising events for leading Demo-
crats, including an $800,000 dinner for the DNC in San Francisco that fea-
tured President Clinton.
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tiffs' lawyers stood on the opposing side.17 Over two dozen securities
law professors also urged Congress not to preempt state causes of
action.18
In 1997 Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), asked Congress to postpone preemption of
state causes of action until more was known about the impact of the
1995 Reform Act on litigation in state and federal courts.19 However,
in 1998, as the proponents of preemption gained the upper hand,
Chairman Levitt and two other SEC commissioners decided to en-
dorse the Uniform Standards Act in return for certain assurances with
respect to federal law. They wanted both the legislative history and
the Senate floor debate to reflect that Congress had not intended the
1995 Reform Act to preclude suits for reckless misrepresentation in
the sale of securities, 20 an issue that has been a source of confusion in
TechNet also has organized monthly meetings with Vice President Al
Gore-known as 'Gore-Techs'-and two dozen issues briefings with state
and federal Democratic legislators, including Clinton.
The Republican side of TechNet has held a dozen issues briefings and
been host of four fund-raising events.
In a week-long trip to Washington, industry leaders met privately with
the cream of Republican congressional leadership, including House
Speaker Newt Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott.
In all, TechNet has raised more than $2 million in campaign funds-
roughly $1 million each for Democrats and Republicans.
Mark Simon, How Tech Leaders Talk Politics: Silicon Valley Approach Confuses Washington, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 13, 1997, at A19.
17 Consumer groups and public finance officials wrote Congress in opposition to pre-
emption of state securities fraud causes of action. See infra notes 279-83 and accompanying
text. Securities plaintiffs' lawyers also opposed preemption, and like other plaintiffs' law-
yers, made substantial political contributions. See infra notes 161-63.
18 See 144 CONG. REc. S4784 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (letter from Ian Ayres et al.,
Securities Law Professors, to Senators and Members of Congress (Jan. 23, 1998)). Addi-
tionally, 23 professors signed another, longer letter to Senators and Members of Congress,
also dated January 23, 1998, that specified in more detail the reasons the signatories op-
posed preemption of state securities fraud causes of action: Ian Ayres, Stephen M. Bain-
bridge, Douglas M. Branson, William W. Bratton, John C. Coffee, Jr., James D. Cox,
Charles M. Elson, Theresa A. Gabaldon, Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, James J. Hanks, Jr.,
Fred S. McChesney, Lawrence E. Mitchell, Donna M. Nagy, Jennifer O'Hare, Richard W.
Painter, William H. Painter, Margaret V. Sachs, Joel Seligman, D. Gordon Smith, Marc I.
Steinberg, Robert B. Thompson, Manning G. Warren III, and Cynthia A. Williams. See
Letter from Ian Ayres et al., Securities Law Professors, to Senators and Members of Con-
gress (Jan. 23, 1998) (on file with author). The author of this Article wrote both of these
letters.
19 See July 24, 1997 Senate Uniform Standards Act Hearing, supra note 13 (transcript at
15) (prepared statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC); see also Oct. 21, 1997, House
1995 Reform Act Implementation Hearing, supra note 14, at 31 (testimony of Arthur Levitt,
Chairman, SEC) (responding to questions concerning the 1995 Reform Act's efficacy by
stating that more time is needed to get a "clearer picture," and concluding that Congress
should postpone preemption of state causes of action).
20 See May 19, 1998, House Uniform Standards Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 21 (pre-
pared statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC) (stating that "[t]he Commission was
able to support S. 1260 only upon receiving assurances that legislative history would be
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the federal district courts.2 ' One commissioner, Norman Johnson,
dissented, stating that preemption was unnecessary.2 2 The Clinton
Administration followed the majority of the SEC commissioners and
promised to support the legislation, provided members of Congress
made the requisite statements concerning suits for reckless misrepre-
sentation under federal law.23 Clarifying statements regarding the
recklessness issue were made in the Senate Floor debate on May 13,
1998.24 The text of the Uniform Standards Act, however, does not
address the issue of recklessness under federal law.2 5
Although Congress thus has abolished most securities fraud class
actions under state law, a subsequent Congress could reinstate the
right to bring such suits. Meanwhile, state law continues to provide
remedies for plaintiffs suing in an individual capacity and in class ac-
tions brought by state and local governmental entities and their pen-
sion funds.2 6 Thus, state private rights of action for securities fraud
will continue to play a significant, albeit much reduced, role in U.S.
securities regulation.
This Article evaluates, from both an economic and a political per-
spective, the arguments for and against preemption of state securities
fraud causes of action. This Article also develops, for the benefit of
scholars and future Congresses, a methodology for determining
inserted into the record making clear that the [1995] Reform Act was not meant to define
or alter the state of mind requirements for securities fraud liability [under federal law]").
21 The current state of the recklessness standard under federal law is discussed fur-
ther infra note 181. See also Michael B. Dunn, Note, Pleading Scienter After the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act: Or, a Textualist Revenge 84 CORNELL L. REV. 193, 221-37 (1998)
(analyzing thirty-one district court cases and highlighting their varied interpretations of
the 1995 Reform Act's heightened pleading standard).
22 See 144 CONG. REc. S4786 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (letter from Norman SJohnson,
SEC Commissioner, to Sen. Alfonse M. D'Amato, Sen. Phil Gramm, and Sen. Christopher
J. Dodd (Mar. 24, 1998)) ("I share in the views of 27 of this country's most respected
securities and corporate law scholars who have urged you and your colleagues not to sup-
port S. 1260 or any other legislation that would deny investors their right to sue for securi-
ties fraud under state law."). Commissioner Carey did not participate in the Commission's
decision concerning endorsement of the preemption legislation.
23 See id. at S4781 (letter from Bruce Lindsey, Assistant to the President and Deputy
Counsel, and Gene Sperling, Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, to Chairman
D'Amato, Chairman Gramm, and Sen. Dodd (Apr. 28, 1998)) ("[1]t is particularly impor-
tant to the President that you be clear that the federal law to be applied includes reckless-
ness as a basis for pleading and liability in securities fraud class actions.").
24 The prearranged colloquy on the recklessness issue took place between Senators
Dodd and D'Amato. See id. at S4798-99 (floor debate on Senate Bill 1260); infra text ac-
companying notes 308-23 (discussing the colloquy itself and the exchange of letters be-
tween the SEC and the sponsors of S.1260 that led to this arrangement).
25 See infra text accompanying notes 314-25 (discussing the Uniform Standards Act in
its final form).
26 See H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. § 16(d) (2) (1998), reprinted in 144 CONG. RMc. H6053
(July 21, 1998) (exempting suits by state and local governments and their pension funds);
S. 1260, 105th Cong. § 3(f) (1998), reprinted in 144 CONG. RPc. S4811 (May 13, 1998)
(same).
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under what circumstances, and in what manner, state causes of action
for securities fraud should be preempted.
First, do the benefits of preempting state causes of action out-
weigh the costs? In answering this question, this Article assumes that
both state laws and federal laws strike an "efficient" balance between
the interests of plaintiff investors and defendant issuers. 27 This Article
concludes that the purported benefits of requiring securities fraud
claims to be litigated under federal law are ephemeral, in part because
plaintiffs will continue to litigate fiduciary breach claims under state
corporate law. Although Congress could create a more efficient litiga-
tion system by requiring plaintiffs to litigate both securities and corpo-
rate law claims under federal law,28 the Uniform Standards Act does
not establish a federal corporate law, and convincing arguments favor
leaving corporate law to the states. 29 Congress could have taken the
opposite approach and abolished federal securities causes of action
that have counterparts under state law. Absent such a step, which
presents its own difficulties, 30 preemption does little to enhance the
efficiency of the litigation system and instead reinforces, with jurisdic-
tional barriers, the already cumbersome distinction between corpo-
rate and securities law.
27 Professor Stout described this balancing of interests in the litigation system in
terms of two types of error: Type I error (the "false positive," in which an innocent defen-
dant is found liable in, or forced to settle, a suit for securities fraud), and Type II error
(the "false negative," in which a guilty defendant escapes liability). See Lynn A. Stout, Tpe I
Error, Type lError, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 AIz. L. Rxv. 711 (1996).
See infra notes 359-68.
28 Many of the efficiencies that could be realized by making corporate and securities
issues subject to the law of a single jurisdiction can be described under the rubric of "net-
work externalities." See infra text accompanying notes 82, 347-58. For example, in cases
against issuers incorporated in the same state in which they sell most of their securities,
state causes of action allow a plaintiff to bring corporate and securities law claims under
the law of one jurisdiction. Federal preemption of state securities law removes this option
and instead requires plaintiffs to litigate these two interconnected causes of action under
the laws of two separate jurisdictions.
29 See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985); infra text accompanying notes 61-66. But see Lucian Ayre
Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate
Law, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1435 (1992) (arguing that manager opportunism and externalities
may lead states to enact socially undesirable corporation laws that reduce shareholder
value). See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUc-
TURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) (discussing various facets of corporate law in which state
law promotes efficiency).
30 Whether replacing federal causes of action with state causes of action would be
beneficial overall depends in part upon whether the states would have sufficiently strong
private rights of action to provide the optimal level of deterrence of securities fraud. In its
political analysis, this Article asserts that the federal government may be more prone to
bias in favor of issuers and other defendants than to bias in favor of plaintiffs. See infra Part
V.B.2. Preserving both federal and state causes of action may be the best way to reduce the
impact of pro-defendant bias and provide optimal deterrence of fraud.
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Second, this Article analyzes an important political question:
whether the foregoing assumption that state and federal law strike an
efficient balance between the interests of plaintiffs and defendants is
true, or whether federal or state law is likely to embody an inefficient
bias in favor of one interest or the other. To date, state law has not
demonstrated significantly more bias in favor of plaintiffs than has
federal law. The statistical evidence that plaintiffs fled to state courts
following the 1995 Reform Act is at best ambiguous. Other statistical
evidence, including studies prepared by National Economics Research
Associates 31 and Price Waterhouse L.L.P.,3 2 suggests that the 1996 in-
crease in state court litigation was temporary and that the number of
state court securities class actions filed in 1997 returned to pre-1995
levels.33
Developments in California, the site of the majority of securities
fraud class action suits brought under state law,3 4 also do not indicate a
state-law bias in favor of plaintiffs. California voters rejected ballot initia-
tives proposed by both sides of the securities litigation debate,3 5 and the
California Supreme Court has yet to decide whether litigation on behalf
of a nationwide class of plaintiffs can proceed under California law.3 6
Developments in other states further demonstrate that state law gov-
erning class action securities litigation was moving in the same, decidedly
pro-defendant direction that the 1995 Reform Act had taken federal law,
even before preemption became an issue on Capitol Hill.3 7 Finally, a
31 See DENISE N. MARTIN ET AL., NAT'L ECON. RESEARCH Assoc., FEDERAL SHAREHOLDER
CLASS ACTION FILINGS RISE TO PRE-REFORM ACT LEVELS AS STATE FILINGS FALL 1-2, tbl.2
(1997) [hereinafter NERA 1997 STUDY] (reporting 23 state court securities class action
filings in the first five months of 1995, 53 in the first five months of 1996, and 21 in the first
five months of 1997).
32 See PRICE WATERHOUSE L.L.P., PRICE WATERHOUSE SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 1
(1998) [hereinafter PRICE WATERHOUSE STUDY] (reporting 67 securities class actions filed
in state court in 1994, 52 in 1995, 66 in 1996, and 44 in 1997). The Price Waterhouse
Study was discussed extensively in the February 1998 Senate hearing on Senate Bill 1260.
See Appendix A (discussing the Price Waterhouse Study in detail).
33 In addition to state court filings returning to pre-1995 Reform Act levels, the
number of federal filings in 1997 approached pre-1995 Reform Act levels. See NERA 1997
STUDY, supra note 31, at tbl.1 (reporting 69 federal court securities class action filings in the
first five months of 1995, 47 in the first five months of 1996, and 78 in the first five months
of 1997); PRICE WATERHOUSE STUDY, sup a note 32, at 1 (reporting 219 securities class ac-
tions filed in federal court in 1994, 164 in 1995, 112 in 1996, and 171 in 1997).
34 See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
35 See Retirement Savings and Consumer Protection Act, Prop. 211, 1995-96 Reg.
Sess., 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. No. 10, at A-20 (West) (defeated in general election of Novem-
ber 5, 1996); Shareholder Litigation Reform Act, Prop. 201, 1995-96 Reg. Sess., 1996 Cal.
Legis. Serv. No. 2, at A-22 (West) (defeated in general election of March 26, 1996); infra
Part III.B.1.
36 See, e.g., Diamond Multimedia, Inc. v. Superior Court, No. H016376 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 17, 1997), review granted, No. S058723 (Cal Mar. 27, 1997); infra Part III.B.2.
37 See Oct. 21, 1997, House 1995 Reform Act Implementation Hearings, supra note 14, at 25
& n.27 (prepared statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC) (noting that states other
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public choice theory analysis of trends in state law predicts that most
states would continue to favor issuers that base operations or sell securi-
ties within their state, although pro-plaintiff interests could dominate a
few smaller states.38
By contrast, there is some reason for concern that the federal system
could embody too much bias in favor of defendants, particularly if efforts
to limit plaintiffs' causes of action go further than they already have
gone.39 Much substantive federal securities law is based on a narrow ju-
dicial construction of implied rights of action, which Congress never ex-
pressly bestowed in the 1934 Act,40 and much procedural federal
securities law is rooted in the pro-defendant 1995 Reform Act.41 More-
over, voting patterns in Congress indicate that legislators casting "swing
votes" are pursuing a strategy of maximizing political support from both
trial lawyers and businesses. They have voted against legislation that
would hurt plaintiffs in consumer product litigation, while they have sup-
ported legislation that limits plaintiffs' right to sue for securities fraud.42
Preserving state private rights of action becomes particularly important
in light of this possibility that political factors could create an inefficient
bias in the federal system by favoring defendants.
Part I of this Article begins with an analogous debate, which
culminated in the late 1970s, over proposals to enact a federal corporate
law in place of the existing "federalist" system in which states enact laws
and businesses choose where to incorporate. Proponents of a federal
corporate law observed a "race to the bottom" in which corporate man-
agers, with the aid of lawyers, induce state legislatures to impose minimal
fiduciary duties on managers in an effort to attract corporate charters. 43
Proponents of the federalist system responded that market forces steer
capital toward businesses incorporated in states that efficiently balance
shareholder and manager interests. 44 Part I briefly reviews the literature
evaluating these arguments and discusses the insights that public choice
theory provides into the reasons why Congress declined to federalize cor-
porate law.
than California have enacted provisions similar to those of the 1995 Reform Act and citing
ARiz. REv. STAT. §§ 44-2081-2087; 1997 MONT. LAws 468; OHIo Rxv. CODE ANN.
§§ 1707.432-438)).
38 See infra notes 389-92 and accompanying text.
39 See Stout, supra note 27, at 714-15; infra Part V.B.2.
40 See infra text accompanying notes 410-27.
41 See infra Part III-k
42 Compare infra notes 177-78 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's successful
override of President Clinton's veto of the 1995 Reform Act), with infra notes 447-48 and
accompanying text (discussing Congress's failure to override President Clinton's veto of
the Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, which would have im-
posed limits on punitive damages in product liability cases).
43 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 55-60.
44 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 61-66.
[Vol. 84:1
UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT
Part II explains how the law governing the purchase and sale of se-
curities has developed along a very different evolutionary path than did
corporate law. This Part discusses common law remedies for securities
fraud, the origins of state blue sky laws, the introduction of federal regu-
lation in 1933 and 1934, and the reasons Congress allowed dual federal
and state regulation of securities sales and dual forum litigation of secur-
ities law claims. Part II then turns to an explanation of how changing
conditions in more recent years led to dissatisfaction with the dual-regu-
lation framework and to 1996 legislation preempting state "merit review"
of most securities offerings.
Part III introduces the battle over class action securities litigation, in
which two colossal interest groups have injected rhetoric and money into
the political process. The plaintiffs' bar has urged an expansion of liabil-
ity, and issuers, underwriters, and accountants have urged contraction of
private rights of action. At stake is the mechanism by which plaintiffs'
attorneys act as "private attorneys general" and represent defrauded in-
vestors in suits brought under: (1) the express remedies in Sections 1145
and 1246 of the 1933 Act; (2) the implied remedies in Sections 10(b) 47
45 Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
46 Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 77(l) (Supp. II 1996).
47 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 780) (1994). Section 10(b)
provides, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange -
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
Id.
Promulgated under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, SEC Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998). An implied private right of action under section 10(b) and
SEC Rule lOb-5 was first recognized in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-
14 (E.D. Pa. 1946), but was not explicitly acknowledged by the Supreme Court until 1970.
See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life 8c Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-14 (1971); see also
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (declaring that the private
right of action under Rule lOb-5 is "simply beyond peradventure"); SEC v. National Sec.,
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and 1448 of the 1934 Act; and (3) state common law and blue sky laws.4 9
The 1995 Reform Act amended both the 1933 and 1934 Acts to curtail
meritless federal suits, but it did nothing to preempt litigation under
state law. State causes of action thus became the object of new battles
over securities litigation reform, and Part III focuses on developments in
California, the state that became the most important battleground.
Part IV turns to the debate over preemption. Part IV begins with an
evaluation of the empirical data used to support claims that securities
litigation migrated from federal courts to state courts when plaintiffs'
attorneys sought to avoid the strictures of the 1995 Reform Act. Part IV
next discusses the bills that became the Uniform Standards Act and the
hearings on these bills before the House of Representatives and Senate
in 1997 and 1998.
Part V contains much of this Article's economic and political analy-
sis of the relationship between federal and state causes of action. Propo-
nents of preemption essentially made a race-to-the-bottom argument all
over again, but this time they described the mirror image of the scenario
that proponents of federal corporate law had described in the 1970s.
This time they asserted that special interests-in this case plaintiffs' law-
yers-will induce state legislatures to create havens for frivolous suits that
expose corporate managers to unmeritorious claims by disgruntled
shareholders. Part V concludes that this argument is unpersuasive and
that Congress should have postponed preemption of state causes of ac-
tion until more information about developments at both the federal and
state levels became available.
Part VI suggests steps that Congress could have taken to preempt
state law more narrowly, thereby only affecting circumstances in which
securities litigation is most likely to be abusive. For example, Congress
could have provided that class actions can only be filed under state law
against issuers that are incorporated or do substantial business in the
state or that sell a substantial portion of their securities (e.g., 20%)
within the state. If necessary, Congress also could have preempted state
law that conflicts with the 1995 Reform Act's safe harbor for forward-
looking statements, and it could have enacted measures to prevent plain-
tiffs from using state court discovery proceedings to circumvent the fed-
Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969) (stating that section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 "may well be the
most litigated provisions in the federal securities laws").
48 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994); SEC Rule
14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1998). See generallyJ. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-33
(1964) (approving of a shareholder's private right of action for false or misleading proxy
statements under section 14(a) even though Congress did not create an express private
right of action).
49 Section 410 of the Uniform Securities Act and the express private rights of action
under the laws of various states are discussed infra note 369-72 and accompanying text.
Express private rights of action under California law are discussed infra text accompanying
notes 186-226.
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eral discovery stay.50 Part VI also addresses a critical question that the
Supreme Court raised in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein,51 but
that the Uniform Standards Act neglected: when is it appropriate for
representative parties to settle federal securities claims on behalf of a
class as part of a global settlement of corporate law claims brought in a
state court? The Matsushita holding could undermine the ability of fed-
eral courts to scrutinize state court settlements for inadequate represen-
tation and possible collusion between plaintiffs' counsel and defendants.
As Professor Coffee has suggested, a solution to this problem is over-
due,52 and the Uniform Standards Act should have addressed it.
This Article concludes that for two main reasons, Congress should
have taken the initial advice offered by Chairman Levitt in 199753 and
refrained from preempting state law in this area. First, many of the argu-
ments in favor of preemption did not rest on proven statistical evidence
or a complete evaluation of political developments likely to occur at the
state level. Second, it is still unclear how federal courts will interpret the
1995 Reform Act. Instead of enacting sweeping legislation that closes
the doors of state courts to almost all class action plaintiffs, Congress
should have drafted a more narrow statute designed to address the
problems that dual-forum class action litigation does create.
By making the federal remedy for securities fraud the only remedy
available to so many plaintiffs, Congress has imposed on itself the bur-
den of protecting investors in the future. If the federal regime-much
of which is based on judicial interpretation of private rights of action
that Congress never expressly bestowed 54 -becomes too hostile to de-
frauded investors, Congress either will have to rewrite the federal cause
of action or will have to reevaluate the flawed logic behind federal
preemption.
I
TiE FEDERALISM DEBATE IN CoRPoRATE LAw
Justice Brandeis first described the competition among states for
corporate charters as a "race to the bottom" toward laxity in enforce-
50 The Uniform Standards Act does contain a provision authorizing federal courts to
enjoin discovery in state court suits that are not preempted. See infra text accompanying
note 317.
51 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
52 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Actions: Interjurisdictional Warfare, N.Y.LJ., Sept. 25,
1997, at 5, 35 [hereinafter Coffee, Class Actions] (suggesting that state courts' power to
approve settlements of federal claims should be curtailed); John C. Coffee, Jr., State Securi-
ties Preemption: The Hidden Issues, N.Y.L.J., May 28, 1998, at 2 [hereinafter Coffee, Securities
Preemption] (suggesting that preemption of state securities class actions could be designed
to "solve the 'Matsushita problem'").
53 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
54 See supra text accompanying notes 405-27. -
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ment of fiduciary duties. 55 Professor and former SEC Chairman Wil-
liam Cary, Professor Richard Jennings, and consumer activist Ralph
Nader expressed this concern again in the 1970s.5 6 Professor Cary
posited that corporate managers choose where to incorporate and will
select ajurisdiction with rules favorable to themselves and detrimental
to shareholders.57 The states, in turn, will compete among themselves
to attract corporate charters and revenue from corporate franchise
taxes by enacting corporation codes that please the corporate manag-
ers. 58 Professor Cary observed that Delaware was winning this race
toward laxity, and he argued that Delaware's lawyers and judges
helped shape law that allowed managers to extract value from share-
holders.59 To solve this problem, Cary suggested Congress enact fed-
eral "minimum corporation law provisions" that would "remove much
of the incentive to organize in Delaware or its rival states. '60
The "corporate federalists" rejected the race-to-the-bottom the-
ory. They believed that Delaware had "'achieved its prominent posi-
tion because its permissive corporation law maximizes, rather than
minimizes, shareholders' welfare."' 6 1 Frank Easterbrook,6 2 Ralph
Winter, 63 Daniel Fischel, 64 and Roberta Romano, 65 among others, ar-
55 See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("The race [is] one not of diligence but of laxity.").
56 See RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 60 (1976) ("The entire
function of state corporate law has been reduced to reflecting the preferences of the man-
agers of the largest corporations."); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974) (suggesting that lax regulation enables corpo-
rate managers to "operate with minimum interference"); Richard W. Jennings, Federaliza-
tion of Corporation Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 Bus. LAW. 991, 992-93 (1976) (suggesting
Delaware's laws that are highly beneficial to corporations have prompted more corpora-
tions to incorporate in Delaware than in states with less favorable laws).
57 See Cary, supra note 56, at 664-70, 696.
58 See id. at 664-66.
59 See id. at 668-70 (describing the primacy of Delaware); id. at 690-92 (describing
links between Delaware's legislature, judiciary, and bar).
60 Id. at 702.
61 SeeJonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Grop Theory of Dela-
ware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REv. 469, 476 (1987) (quoting Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to
the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw.
U. L. REv. 913, 919-20 (1982)).
62 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 29; Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers'Discre-
lion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540 (1984); see also Fred S.
McChesney, Positive Economics and All That, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 272 (1992) (reviewing
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 29).
63 See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corpora-
tion, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
64 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 29; Fischel, supra note 61.
65 SeeROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW.v 14 (1993) (charac-
terizing the competition among states for corporate charters as a race for the top); Ro-
mano, supra note 29, at 227-32 (same); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in
Corporate Law, 8 CARDozo L. REv. 709, 710-17 (1987) (reviewing the literature on state
competition for corporate chartering).
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gued that markets for capital, executive compensation, and corporate
control, "limit managers' ability to pursue their own wishes at the ex-
pense of their shareholders." 66
The corporate federalists won in the political arena, and the initi-
ative to enact a federal corporate law failed. 67 Congress never en-
acted, nor even seriously considered enacting, a federal corporate law.
Congress's regulation of tender offers under the Williams Act 68 repre-
sents the closest that it has come to encroaching on substantive corpo-
rate law, and to this day the Act continues to have an uneasy
coexistence with the state corporation laws that govern voting rights of
shareholders, fiduciary responsibilities of corporate managers, and
other internal corporate affairs. 69 In 1984 the SEC proposed a bill
that would have expanded the reach of the Williams Act by federaliz-
ing much of the substantive law governing poison pills, golden
parachutes, and other antitakeover devices used to entrench corpo-
rate management.70 Although the SEC insisted that the bill would not
make an unwarranted intrusion into state law,71 the Reagan Adminis-
tration disagreed,72 and the bill never reached a vote. Congress con-
66 Macey& Miller, supra note 61, at 477; see also CHARLES R. O'KtLLEYJR. & ROBERT B.
THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 155 (1992) ("[E]conomic
theory suggests that shareholders would demand a premium to invest in corporations with
laws that allowed management excessive room to act opportunistically."); Barry D. Bays-
inger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firn, 28 J.L. & ECON.
179 (1985) (arguing that "state corporation laws... should differ and that firms will select
their state of incorporation adaptively").
67 Nonetheless, the academic debate continues. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 29, at
1499-1507 (discussing reasons why federal corporate law should be expanded to limit state
chartering competition).
68 Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1994)). The Williams Act requires certain disclosures in con-
nection with a tender offer and that shareholders be given adequate time to consider an
offer. See id.
69 See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 86-87, 94 (1987) (holding
that Indiana's Control Shares Acquisition Act, which limited the voting rights of sharehold-
ers acquiring in excess of a stated percentage of an Indiana corporation's stock, was consti-
tutional under the Commerce Clause and was not preempted by the Williams Act); Edgar
v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 626-27, 646 (1982) (holding that Illinois's Business Takeover
Act, which imposed a 20-day "precommencement period" after announcement of a tender
offer and required a tender offer for a corporation with a significant number of Illinois
stockholders to undergo a "substantive fairness" hearing before the Secretary of State, im-
posed an unacceptable burden on interstate commerce and therefore violated the Com-
merce Clause).
70 See Tender Offer Reform Act of 1984, H.R. 5693, 98th Cong. (1984).
71 See Letter of SEC Chairman John S.R. Shad to Congressman Timothy E. Wirth,
[1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,630, at 86,879 (May 21, 1984) (stat-
ing that House Bill 5693 would "enhance shareholder protection without unduly intruding
into state corporate law").
72 See Katherine B. Raup, Note, Has Ohio Avoided the Wake of MITE? An Analysis of the
Constitutionality of the Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act, 46 OHIO ST. LJ. 203, 222 n.204
(1985) (quoting Letter from Donald T. Regan to John D. Dingell, Chairman of the Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce (Sept. 25, 1984) which stated that House Bill 5693 would
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sidered similar legislation in 1987,73 but it thus far has declined to
enact any such proposal.
Why has corporate federalism prevailed? First, the corporate fed-
eralist argument has merit. Judicial rulings have limited the race to
the bottom to the extent that it does occur. With regard to hostile
tender offers, for example, the Delaware Supreme Court has balanced
the interests of stockholders against the discretion of directors.74 The
Delaware Supreme Court's holding in Smith v. Van Gorkum75-that di-
rectors can be held liable for gross negligence event absent a conflict
of interest 76-also demonstrates its willingness to hold managers ac-
countable. The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado77 gives Delaware courts more latitude in scrutinizing
board-appointed "special litigation committees" than courts in other
important jurisdictions such as New York have. 78 Furthermore,
though changes in Delaware law occasionally have been pro-manage-
ment, they have been, for the most part, less pro-management than
"'intrude unnecessarily into State law, and constitute an unwarranted step toward imposi-
tion of a substantive federal corporation law'").
73 See Tender Offer Reform Act of 1987, H.R. 2172, 100th Cong. (1987). The Tender
Offer Reform Act would have barred "greenmail" payments, mandated a one-share, one-
vote rule for certain publicly traded securities, restricted "golden parachutes," and re-
quired shareholder approval of certain takeover defenses. See generally Robert A. Prentice,
The Role of States in Tender Offers: An Analysis of CTS, 1988 COLUM. Bus. REV. L. 1, 83-86
(1988) (describing features of House Bill 2172 and predicting its effect on corporate law);
Bruce Ingersoll, Dingell, Markey Seek To Limit Raids Via Open Marke WALL ST. J., Apr. 27,
1987, at 2 (describing features of House Bill 2172).
74 See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42-
48 (Del. 1994) (holding that Revlon-auction duties were triggered when Paramount's direc-
tors agreed to a transaction which had the effect of shifting control from public stockhold-
ers to a controlling entity, Viacom); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571
A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. 1989) (holding that directors satisfied Unocal test when Paramount's
tender offer arguably threatened Time's corporate culture and a preexisting plan to form
a business combination with Warner); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506
A.2d 173, 182, 185 (Del. 1986) (holding that once a corporation is up for sale, directors
have a fiduciary duty not to obstruct sale to the highest bidder); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985) (holding that before directors adopt meas-
ures to oppose a hostile tender offer they must undertake a reasonable investigation, rea-
sonably perceive a threat to the corporation, and pursue a reasonable plan in relation to
the threat posed).
75 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
76 See Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d at 873, 893. But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (7)
(Supp. 1996) (permitting provision in a corporation's certificate of incorporation excul-
pating directors from liability to the corporation in certain circumstances).
77 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
78 Compare id. at 789 (holding that a reviewing court should exercise its own business
judgment in deciding whether to overrule a special litigation committee's recommenda-
tion that a derivative suit against a corporation be dismissed), with Auerbach v. Bennett,
393 N.E.2d 994, 1002-03 (N.Y. 1979) (holding that the reviewing court may only inquire
into the independence and procedures of the committee).
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similar changes made to the ABA's Model Business Corporation Act.7 9
This trend suggests that pro-management bias in corporate law is at-
tributable in part to a political dynamic other than competition
among states to attract corporate charters.80 The 1995 Reform Act
and the federal courts' securities law decisions also demonstrate that
the creation of rules favoring managers can have nothing to do with
competition for corporate charters. In fact, passage of the 1995 Re-
form Act and the Uniform Standards Act suggests that shareholders
might fare better if Congress continues to stay away from corporate
law.8'
Furthermore, both managers and shareholders find Delaware
corporate law attractive because it is extensive and because Delaware
courts have developed a thorough understanding of corporate gov-
ernance. As Professor Klausner observed, valuable "network externali-
79 MODEL Bus. Corn'. Aar (1991). For example, section 102(b) (7) of Delaware's Gen-
eral Corporation Law permits a corporation to include in its certificate:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the
corporation or its stockholders . .. for breach of fiduciary duty[, except]
liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to
the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good
faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law;
(iii) [for unlawful payment of dividends, stock purchase, or stock redemp-
tion]; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an im-
proper personal benefit.
DEL. CODE ANN,. tit. 8, § 102(b) (7).
This provision is a decidedly pro-management rule, as it allows corporations to excul-
pate their directors for negligence, but the exculpation rule in the ABA's Model Business
Corporation Act goes even further. The ABA rule allows a corporation's articles of incorpo-
ration to include
a provision eliminating or limiting the liability of a director to the corpora-
tion or its shareholders for money damages for any action taken, or any
failure to take any action, as a director, except liability for (A) the amount
of a financial benefit received by a director to which he is not entitled; (B)
an intentional infliction of harm on the corporation or the shareholders; (C) a
violation of section 8.33 [concerning dividends and share repurchases]; or
(D) an intentional violation of criminal law.
MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar § 2.02(b) (4) (emphasis added).
Both the Delaware statute and the Model Act allow corporations to exculpate directors
from liability, arguably at the expense of shareholders, but the ABA, which has no interest
in tax revenues from corporate charters, clearly outran Delaware in this particular race to
the bottom.
80 The American Law Institute's ("ALL") work in some instances has been shaped by
participating lawyers who, consciously or unconsciously, incorporate the views of corporate
clients in drafting and in voting on proposed drafts. On at least one occasion the ALI's
President objected to this practice, stating that the ALI should not be a "forum for power
plays by clients," and that "the precept of leaving one's client at the door must be honored
if we are to preserve our integrity as an organization." 68 A.LI. PROC. 10 (1991) (remarks
of Roswell B. Perkins, President). "Any member who [does] not have the stomach for
voting in a way that an important client would not like, simply should not vote." Id.
81 See infra Part III.A (describing the 1995 Reform Act). But see Bebchuk, supra note
29, at 1500-07 (discussing several reasons why federal corporate law would eliminate biases
that afflict state laws and would not be worse than that of the states).
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ties" have developed around Delaware law, including interpretive case
law, common business practices, cost effective legal services, and the
heightened marketability of securities that results from the depth and
specifity of Delaware law.8 2 These network externalities may assure
the dominance of Delaware's rules, even in situations in which the
rules are not inherently more efficient than an alternative, but un-
tested, set of rules.8 3
Public choice theory suggests other reasons for federal deference
to state regulation entirely apart from the corporate federalists' argu-
ments centered around the merits of efficient rules and network ex-
ternalities. Professor Jonathan Macey identified three conditions in
which Congress will "franchise" the right to regulate in a particular
area to the states:
(1) when a particular state has developed a body of regulation that
comprises a valuable capital asset and federal regulation would dissi-
pate the value of that asset; (2) when the political-support-maximiz-
ing outcome varies markedly from area to area due to the existence
of spatial monopolies, variegated local political optima, and varia-
tions in voter preferences across regions; and (3) [when] Congress
can avoid potentially damaging political opposition from special-in-
terest groups by putting the responsibility for a particularly contro-
versial issue on state and local governments.8 4
Describing the first of these conditions, Professor Macey observed
that Delaware corporate law represents a valuable capital asset, as it
generates professional fees and tax revenues for the state.85 Indeed,
the Delaware bar has appropriated much of the value of Delaware cor-
82 See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L.
REv. 757, 772-79 (1995) (discussing how, apart from the "efficient" contract terms identi-
fied by the contractarian paradigm, network externalities cause businesses to prefer to in-
corporate in Delaware). For a general discussion of network externalities, see Michael L.
Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL.
ECON. 822 (1986); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 424 (1985). "Path dependence" is a term sometimes used
to describe a similar phenomenon. See MarkJ. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Econom-
ics, 109 HARv. L. REv. 641 (1996). As Professor Roe explains, if a fur trader built a curved
road to circumvent a wolves' den, or other dangers, and developments are later created
alongside the road, the road is not likely to be straightened once the initial obstacles that
induced the fur trader to choose a curved road disappear. See id. at 643-44. Roe goes on to
note that "society, having invested in the path itself and in the resources alongside the
path, is better off keeping the winding road on its current path than paying to build an-
other[; however,] occasionally the path-dependent road becomes so costly that a society
rips it up and builds a new one." Id.
83 See Klausner, supra note 82, at 815 ("The danger of [a locked-in] equilibrium is
greatest if a [legal] term with high network benefits has a long history during which time
its value may have declined relative to that of alternative terms.").
84 Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. Rxv. 265, 268-69
(1990).
85 See id. at 277-80.
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porate law in the form of profits from the litigation that flourishes in
Delaware courts.8 6 Notwithstanding this appropriation by lawyers, the
value inherent in Delaware's corporate law remains significant, and
the federalization of corporate law would dissipate this value and thus
would face formidable opposition.
Professor Macey's discussion of the second condition builds on
previous observations of Professor Gary: local interest groups,
spearheaded by the Delaware bar, have established what amounts to a
"spatial monopoly" over Delaware corporate law.87 Elsewhere, the
political-support-maximizing solution to corporate law issues-
whether related to fiduciary duties or procedures for handling deriva-
tive litigation-will vary from state to state, depending on the relative
political strength of interest groups such as lawyers, investment bank-
ers, corporate managers, or shareholders.
Finally, corporate law satisfies a third condition under which Con-
gress would rather defer to the states: the "national political-support-
maximizing course is not apparent."88 Corporate managers often give
important support to politicians, but legislation favoring managers
over shareholders risks incurring the wrath of voters.8 9 It is more con-
venient for Congress to delegate corporate law issues to the states,
where at least one of these constituencies-the shareholders-has lit-
de direct impact on the political process. (Most shareholders of Dela-
ware corporations do not live or vote in Delaware, though many of the
lawyers who represent them in derivative suits do.)
However, putting aside Professor Macey's arguments, perhaps the
most important "political" reason for Congress's avoidance of a fed-
eral role in corporate governance has been the resurgence of concern
about states' rights and the concomitant antipathy to federal regula-
tion. The election of President Ronald Reagan made Professor Cary's
proposal for some federalization of corporate law90 a dead letter.91
Even after President Clinton's election in 1992, political winds contin-
86 Macey & Miller, supra note 61, at 502-06 (discussing the interests of the Delaware
bar with respect to Delaware corporation law). Some developments in Delaware corporate
law can even be explained by a desire to create just enough ambiguity to foster litigation
and increase the profits of Delaware lawyers. See id. at 505-06. Delaware law, however, can
only go so far in shifting wealth from managers and shareholders to lawyers without under-
mining Delaware's ability to attract the corporate charters that give Delaware law so much
significance in the first place. See id.
87 See id. at 506-09 (explaining why the Delaware bar interest group is the most likely
to remain galvanized in their efforts and why other interest groups struggle to compete
against the bar). See also Cary, supra note 56, at 690-92 (discussing the influence of the
Delaware bar over Delaware corporate law).
88 Macey, supra note 84, at 286.
89 See id. at 284-85.
90 See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
91 Even the ALI's proposed Federal Securities Code, which would have clarified the
law in an already heavily regulated area failed to pass Congress in the 1980s. For a discus-
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ued to favor federalism in areas as far reaching as welfare, health care,
and environmental regulation.92 Furthermore, to the extent that
Congress has shown more sympathy for corporate managers than for
investors,93 shareholder advocates have little reason to promote a fed-
eral corporate law. Indeed, recent academic criticism has been aimed
not at a race to the bottom among the states, but instead at a per-
ceived race in Congress to accommodate corporate managers. 94 Law-
yers participating in the work of the American Bar Association and
American Law Institute-the same organizations that would advise
Congress if it were to enact a federal corporations statute-also have
been accused of racing to accommodate corporate clients.95
II
FEDERALISM IN SECURITIES LAW
A. Sales of Securities Under Common Law and State
Blue Sky Laws
Private rights of action, at common law and in equity, for persons
injured in securities transactions preceded state statutes regulating
the sale of securities, and many of those remedies still exist. Contract
remedies include breach of warranty96 and rescission, 97 and the latter
sion of the Code and its political fate, see 1 Louis Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN, SECUP rias REGU-
LATION 278-85 (3d ed. 1989).
92 See infra notes 445-46 and accompanying text.
93 See infra notes 398-99 and accompanying text.
94 See sources cited infra note 179.
95 See, e.g., supra note 80. Professor Cary once observed that "[b] ecause the Model Act
has been endorsed by leaders of the corporate bar and is itself an American Bar Associa-
tion committee product, it too accelerated the trend toward permissiveness." Cary, supra
note 56, at 665.
96 "Breach of warranty is the most limited of all nonstatutory remedies in the securi-
ties field." 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 91, at 4124. As stated in the U.C.C.:
A person who transfers a certificated security to a purchaser... warrants...
that:
(1) the certificate is genuine and has not been materially altered;
(2) the transferor... does not know of any fact that might impair the
validity of the security;
(3) there is no adverse claim to the security;
(4) the transfer does not violate any restrictions on transfer;
(6) the transfer is otherwise effective and rightful.
U.C.C. § 8-108(a) (1995). Thus, a plaintiff can base a breach claim upon only a few war-
ranties. Moreover, oral promises and representations made in connection with the secur-
ity sale will usually be subject to the parol evidence rule. See 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note
91, at 4125.
97 "The elements of rescission, in a nutshell, are 'misrepresentation' of 'material'
'fact' on which the buyer justifiably 'relied.'" 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 91, at 4126.
The knowledge, or intent, of a seller is irrelevant, except that a plaintiff often does not
have to show materiality when the underlying misrepresentation was fraudulent rather
than negligent or unintentional. See id. at 4126 n.9. A causal connection between the
seller's misrepresentation and damage to the buyer need not be shown, but suit for rescis-
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can be stated in an affirmative action for restitution or as a defense to
a suit on a contract.98 The principal tort remedy is the cause of action
for deceit.99 Some states also recognize a cause of action for equitable
fraud, which does not require proof of the defendant's scienter.100
Kansas passed the first blue sky law, a state statute regulating the
sale of securities, in 1911.101 By 1933 every state but Nevada had en-
acted a statute regulating securities sales.10 2 Most of these statutes
preserved common law remedies,10 3 and with the notable exception
of New York's Martin Act,10 4 a majority also contained civil liability
provisions.'05 Many of these liability provisions have been expanded
in more recent times. 10 6
The modem class action suit also has its genesis in actions
brought under the common law, the corporate law, and later the se-
curities law of the states. As Professor Abram Chayes pointed out,
"[iun the United States in the 19th and early 20th centuries, class ac-
tions were used mostly as a vehicle for adjudicating relationships
among unincorporated associations and rights of security-holders
sion is inappropriate if the buyer is unable to restore the seller to the status quo by re-
turning the securities. See id. at 4126-27.
98 See id. at 4123.
99 A suit in tort for deceit, like a suit for rescission of a contract, must establish both
the materiality of the defendant's misrepresentation and the plaintiffs reliance thereon,
but in tort a plaintiff must additionally establish the defendant's scienter (intent or knowl-
edge of the misrepresentation) and causation (that the plaintiff suffered damages as a
result of the misrepresentation). See id. at 4128. Also unlike a suit for rescission, a suit for
deceit does not require privity of contract, although the defendant must have made his
misrepresentation either to the plaintiff or with the intent of influencing the plaintiff. See
id. at 4128.
100 At equity, a "defendant d[oes] not have to know or believe that his statement was
false or to have proceeded in reckless disregard of the truth." Stephenson v. Capano Dev.,
Inc., 462 A.2d 1069, 1074 (Del. 1983).
101 See Louis Loss & EDWARD M. CoW-rr, BLUE SKY LAw 5-7 (1958).
102 See 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 91, at 194-99 & n.58. For a history of the emer-
gence of these statutes, see VINCENT P. CARosso, INVESTMEN BANKING IN AMERICA 156-64
(Ralph W. Hidy ed., 1970); Loss & Cowrr, supra note 101, at 10-13.
103 See 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 91, at 4121 & n.1 (citing UNIFORM SECURITIES
Aar § 410(h) (1956) and 43 state and territorial statutes).
104 See id. at 4134-35.
105 See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-NINTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 200 (1929) (reprinting
the liability provision, section 16, of the Uniform Sale of Securities Act adopted in 1929 by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws); see also Loss & CoWE-Tr,
supra note 101, at 129-61 (outlining and discussing various provisions of the blue sky laws,
including civil liability provisions). See generally LEONARD L. CowAN, MANUAL OF SECURITIES
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1923) (compiling all states' blue sky laws);JOHN M. EuiOrr,
THE ANNOTATED BLUE SKY LAWs OF THE UNITED STATES (1919) (reproducing several state
securities statutes).
106 Most state statutes are now based on the Uniform Securities Act, which this Article
discusses in comparison to federal civil liability provisions infra notes 369-72 and accompa-
nying text.
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against corporate managers or in corporate reorganizations.' 0 7 For
example, in 1924 New York permitted joinder of common law fraud
claims that 193 investors had brought against promoters who sold
stock by use of a misleading prospectus. 08 Today, many class actions
filed in state court allege similar claims, either under common law
fraud or more frequently, under statutes prohibiting false statements
intended to induce the purchase of securities.109 Plaintiffs also can
bring class action suits under corporate law when they allege that di-
rectors or controlling shareholders breached their fiduciary duties, in-
cluding the duty of disclosure, owed to minority shareholders." 0
These state laws purported to protect investors from fraud, but
the blue sky statutes resulted in part from pressure by banks, farmers,
and small businessmen to limit competition for capital by restricting
securities sales."' Arguably, these laws were also ineffective. For ex-
107 Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the
Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. REv. 4, 26 n.130 (1982); see also Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice
Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. REV. 684, 687-88 (1941)
(discussing the advantages of class action suits overjoinders).
108 See Akely v. Kinnicutt, 144 N.E. 682 (N.Y. 1924) (finding that New York civil proce-
dure statute permitted joinder because common questions of law and fact predominated
among the plaintiffs).
109 See, e.g., Diamond Multimedia, Inc. v. Superior Court, H016376 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan.
17, 1997), review granted, No. S058723 (Cal. 1997). The plaintiffs in Diamond Multimedia
sued in part under Section 25400 of the California Corporations Code, which creates a
cause of action for misrepresentations made in selling securities. See id. This case is dis-
cussed infra Part III.B.2.
110 See, e.g., Zirn v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1053 (Del. 1996) (discussing how plain-
tiff brought suit for breach of fiduciary duties, "on behalf of a class of similarly situated
stockholders," against VLI Corporation and its directors claiming that disclosures dissemi-
nated by VLI in connection with American Home Products Corporation's tender offer for
VLI's outstanding shares "were materially misleading absent further, related disclosures,"
and that the misleading statements "impeded the stockholders' ability to make an in-
formed decision as to the merits of the VLI-AHP transaction"); In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc.,
634 A.2d 319, 331-32 (Del. 1993) (discussing class action brought on behalf of former
minority stockholders of Tri-Star against defendants, including Tri-Star's directors and
controlling shareholder, Coca-Cola, that alleged breach of fiduciary duty, including the
duty of disclosure, for conduct including dissemination of misleading proxy materials in
order to gain approval of a business combination between Tri-Star and Coca-Cola Com-
pany). The Ti-Star court concluded: "[h]ad plaintiffs been fully informed of all material
facts relating to this transaction, the required number of votes may not have been ob-
tained.... Thus, by its alleged breaches of the duty of disclosure, Coca-Cola materially and
adversely affected the minority class' right to cast an informed vote." Id.
Earlier versions of the Uniform Standards Act would have preempted, in addition to
state securities fraud causes of action, these types of actions brought under state corporate
law. See infra text accompanying notes 262 and 314.
"' SeeJonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 Tx. L.
REv. 347, 364-70 (1991) (analyzing anti-competitive rationale for enactment of state blue
sky laws). Macey and Miller observed that
while frequent complaints about 'fraudulent' securities sales persisted in
the first decade of the twentieth century, it appears that many of the securi-
ties offerings objected to were not so much fraudulent as merely highly
speculative. The rhetoric of the times did not distinguish between a secur-
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ample, because state securities commissioners could not extend their
authority across state lines, state securities laws could not control two
major waves of securities frauds, which took place from 1917 to 1920
and in the late 1920s.112
B. The Federal Securities Laws
1. The Legislation of 1933 and 1934
Shortly after taking office in March of 1933 President Franklin
Roosevelt sent a message to Congress proposing that the federal gov-
ernment regulate securities sales in light of state laws' inability to de-
ter fraud.113 Although the 1933 Act itself does not contain a general
statement of legislative purpose, the legislative history of the Act
clearly expresses dissatisfaction with the then-existing system in which
the states alone regulated securities sales." 4 The 1934 Act, by con-
trast, specifically enumerates the reasons Congress chose to regulate
securities transactions. 115 The 1934 Act includes among these reasons
the fact that securities transactions are carried out across state bound-
aries, are an important part of interstate commerce, involve issuers
engaged in interstate commerce, and affect the financing of activities
in interstate commerce." 6 Although the 1934 Act does not state that
blue sky laws inadequately address these concerns, the legislative his-
ity sold through actual fraud and one so highly speculative as to be of ques-.
tionable value.
Id. at 350.
112 See 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 91, at 199.
113 See S. REP. No. 73-47, at 6-7 (1933) (message of the President, Mar. 29, 1933); H.R.
REP. No. 73-85, at 1-2 (1933) (same). President Roosevelt's letter stated that "[i]n spite of
many State statutes [,] the public in the past has sustained severe losses through practices
neither ethical nor honest on the part of many persons and corporations selling securi-
ties." Id. at 1.
114 See 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 91, at 148-52 (discussing the inadequacy of state
regulation and citing Federal Securities Act: Hearings on H.A. 4314, Before House Comm. on
Interstate &Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 87, 100 (1933)). Put simply, "the basic reason for
the inadequacy of state legislation is the increasingly interstate nature of modem business."
Id. at 149; see alsoJoel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure Sys-
tem, 9 J. CoRP. L. 1, 20-24 (1983) (discussing the securities fraud waves that precipitated
federal intervention).
115 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994) ("For the reasons
hereinafter enumerated, transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities
exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest which
makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions and of prac-
tices and matters related thereto . . ").
116 See § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78b(1). Congress also stated that national regulation was
necessary for the following reasons: prices established and offered in securities transactions
are quoted throughout the United States and form the basis for computing income tax
liability and collateral for bank loans, see § 2(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78b(2), fluctuations in securi-
ties prices due to market manipulation affect the volume of credit available, see § 2(3), 15
U.S.C. § 78b(3), and economic downturns are "precipitated, intensified and prolonged by
manipulation and sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security prices and by exces-
sive speculation on such exchanges and markets." § 2(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78b(4).
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tory indicates that, in fact, Congress was concerned about the effec-
tiveness of state regulation. In particular, Congress worried about the
possibility that listing requirements of exchanges would deteriorate in
a race to the bottom if the exchanges were governed by only their own
rules and state law.1 17
However, as enacted, both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act explic-
ity allowed for concurrent securities regulation by the states. Section
18 of the 1933 Act provided that "[n] othing in this title shall affect the
jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or office per-
forming like functions) of any State or Territory of the United States,
or the District of Columbia, over any security or any person."118 Fur-
thermore, the 1933 Act bestowed concurrent jurisdiction on state and
federal courts and even prohibited the removal of state cases to fed-
eral court.119
The 1934 Act also contained specific language protecting, state
blue sky laws from federal preemption. 120 Although section 27 of the
1934 Act departed from the concurrent jurisdiction approach of the
1933 Act and gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over 1934 Act
claims, 121 section 28 specifically stated that "[t] he rights and remedies
117 The following passage is indicative of the legislative sentiment in 1934:
"Although the exchanges have endeavored to bring about an improvement
in the type of financial reports filed by corporations, they have been ham-
pered by the terms of the listing contracts made with issuers, which they
have not considered themselves entitled to modify without the consent of
such issuers. Progress in this direction has been further retarded by the
unwillingness of issuers to furnish adequate information, supported by the
threat of withdrawal of their listings, and by the potential competition of
exchanges having more lenient standards. Such impediments could not ex-
ist so far as a Federal regulatory body is concerned."
Dennis S. Corgill, Insider Trading Price Signals, and Noisy Information, 71 IND. L.J. 355, 363
n.26 (1996) (quoting S. REP. No. 73-792, at 5 (1934)); see also H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 11
(1934) (reporting that "responsible officials of the leading exchanges" recognized the im-
portance of accurate corporate reporting but remained "handicapped by [a] lack of legal
power" to effect change).
118 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 18, 48 Stat. 74, 85 (codified as amended in 15
U.S.C. § 77r (Supp. II 1996)). Congress amended section 18 of the 1933 Act when it en-
acted the National Securities Improvement Act of 1996. See infra notes 150-55 and accom-
panying text. The 1933 Act also stated: "The rights and remedies provided by this title
shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in
equity." Ch. 38, § 16, 48 Stat. 74, 84 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 7 7p (1994)).
119 See Securities Act of 1933 § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1996).
120 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 28(a), 48 Stat. 881, 903 (codified as
amended in 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (Supp. II 1996)). Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act stated
that, except as otherwise specifically provided, "[n]othing in this title shall affect the juris-
diction of the securities commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions)
of any State over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provi-
sions of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder."
121 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 27, 48 Stat. 881, 902 (codified as
amended in 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1994)). This provision has been much criticized. See, e.g.,
FEDERAL SECURTMES CODE § 1822 (1980) (providing for concurrent jurisdiction, but with-
out the 1933 Act's nonremoval provisions); 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 91, at 4186 n.7
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provided by this title shall be in addition to any and all other rights
and remedies that may exist at law or in equity."'1 22 As the Supreme
Court recognized in 1979, this provision sought "to protect, rather
than to limit, state authority."'123 The only limitation on state actions
in the 1934 Act was a bar to double recovery. 124
Congress thus chose not to preempt state law with respect to
either the registration of securities or private suits for securities fraud.
However, as the ABA correctly discerned in 1986, over fifty years later,
it is unclear whether either the 1933 or 1934 Congress "had any sys-
tematic understanding of what the relations of state and federal secur-
ities regulations should be, how regulatory responsibilities should be
allocated, or how federal disclosure regulation and state merit regula-
tion should be accommodated to each other."1 25
2. Why Not Preemption?
Dean Seligman has suggested three reasons why state blue sky
laws survived the enactment of federal legislation.126 First, in 1933
and 1934 "political sentiment favored retention of a state role."127
(noting that concurrent jurisdiction is bestowed by "all the SEC statutes except the 1934
Act (which has given rise to most of the private actions)"); see also AMERICAN LAW INSTI-
TUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
§ 1311(b), at 183-84 (1969) (noting that there is no compelling reason for section 27's
grant of exclusive jurisdiction); MatthewJ. Press, Note, Arbitration of Claims Under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934: Is Exclusive Jurisdiction Still Justified2, 77 B.U. L. REV. 629, 630-31
(1997) (recommending repeal of exclusive jurisdiction).
122 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 28(a), 48 Stat. 881, 903 (codified as
amended in 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1994)).
123 Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182 (1979).
124 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 28(a), 48 Stat. 881, 903 (codified as
amended in 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1994)) ("[N]o person permitted to maintain a suit for
damages under the provisions of this title shall recover, through satisfaction ofjudgment in
one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act
complained of."). According to the legislative history of the 1934 Act, section 28(a)
"reserves rights and remedies existing outside of those provided in the act, but limits the
total amount recoverable to the amount of actual damages." H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 28
(1934).
125 Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Securities
Committee, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 Bus. LAW. 785, 793
(1986) [hereinafter ABA Report].
126 SeeJoel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the Evolving
Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 MiGH. L. REv. 649, 675-77 (1995).
127 Id. at 675. As Dean Seligman observes:
Far from preempting a field when interstate commerce is involved, Con-
gress in this case affirmatively yielded to local regulation by inserting a
number of intrastate exemptions even when the mails or facilities of inter-
state commerce are used and more broadly adopted provisions generally
"preserving the jurisdiction of the state securities commissions."
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting 1 Loss & SEIGMAN, supra note 91, at 272).
Dean Seligman states further that "[t]he states' enthusiasm for these laws can in part
be traced to the fact that blue sky laws, like corporation statutes, are implicitly tax statutes"
that raise revenues for the states through filing fees. Id.
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Second, the state-law burden imposed on issuers has been reduced in
the years after passage of the federal legislation because the "state stat-
utes have generally been rewritten to reduce compliance burdens at
the state level when a securities issuance is registered at the federal
level." 128 Third, several states actively have maintained their securities
laws and "have performed a significant enforcement role with respect
to fraud in local securities offerings."' 29 However, Dean Seligman
notes that today "the most significant augmentative aspect of the state
blue sky laws may well be [that they provide] broader private relief in
many instances than do the federal securities laws."'u 0 In the two
years since Dean Seligman made this observation, preemption propo-
nents have made this "augmentative aspect" of state blue sky laws the
target of their federal preemption initiative. These efforts culminated
in the Uniform Standards Act.
Public choice theory also provides some insights into why Con-
gress initially chose to retain a system of dual regulation. The relevant
inquiry resembles Professor Macey's identification of the circum-
stances in which Congress will "franchise" an area of regulation to the
states by avoiding federal involvement entirely, as Congress has done
in corporate law. 131 First, a strong case can be made for the proposi-
tion that by the 1930s several states had developed in their blue sky
laws a body of regulation that comprised a valuable capital asset.132
Indeed, Congress appropriated part of this asset's value when it used
state blue sky laws as a model for drafting the 1933 and 1934 Acts.' 3 3
In particular, New York's Martin Act "was repeatedly called to Con-
gress' attention as an example for federal legislation to follow.' 34
One draft of the 1933 Act passed by the House directly sought to in-
128 Id. at 675-76; see also UNIFORM SECURITIES Acyr § 303 (amended 1985), 7B U.L.A.
559 (1985) (providing for registration by coordination with federal filings when securities
are registered under the 1933 Act).
129 Seligman, supra note 126, at 677. Dean Seligman also points out that California has
been responsible for a substantial number of the criminal convictions for securities fraud.
See id. However, Dean Seligman clarifies that "results vary significantly from state to state.
In many jurisdictions, parsimonious state budgets have meant understaffing of state securi-
ties law programs." Id.
130 Id. at 678.
131 See Macey, supra note 84, at 268-69.
132 See id. at 268 (discussing a states' development of "a body of regulation that com-
prises a valuable capital asset" as a condition in which Congress will "franchise" the right to
regulate to the states).
133 See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 711 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part) (discussing how state blue sky alws were used in drafting the federal securi-
ties laws).
134 Id. at 711 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also Harry Shul-
man, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 243 (1933) (stating that the liabil-
ity provision in section 12(1) of the 1933 Act "for the sale of unregistered securities or for
the use of nonconforming prospectuses is merely that commonly imposed by state Blue Sky
laws for similar violations").
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corporate state regulations by prohibiting the sale of securities in any
state if the sale violated that state's blue sky laws. 135 Because the ongo-
ing development of state securities law would inform federal courts
and the SEC in interpreting the new federal legislation, immediate
preemption of state blue sky laws would have diminished the value of
this important body of regulation. 136
Second, differing "political-support-maximizing" outcomes in dif-
ferent regions137 may explain the varying approaches to merit regula-
tion-the process by which some states preclude the sale of
"worthless" or "unmeritorious" securities within their borders-in the
blue sky laws of different states. Early drafts of the 1933 Act included
a "merit review" process,138 but perhaps because legislators had diffi-
culty determining a political-support-maximizing position on federal
merit review, they abandoned this merit-based approach. 39 As Profes-
sor Lowenstein observed, Congress "may have decided to keep the
135 See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 25 (1933); Federal Securities Act: Hearings on H.R. 4314
Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73rd Cong. 117 (1993) [hereinafter
House Federal Securities Act Hearings] (statement of Oliver M. Butler, Foreign Service Div.,
Dept. of Commerce) (stating that the purpose of this provision was "to assure the States
that [the 1933 Act] was not an attempt to supplant their laws, but an attempt to supple-
ment their laws and to assist them in enforcing their laws in those cases where they have no
control"). As Professor Karmel points out, the Senate later deleted this clause and re-
placed it with section 18 of the Act. See Roberta S. Karmel, Blue-Sky Merit Regulation: Benefit
to Investors or Burden on Commerce?, 53 BROoY. L. REv. 105, 108-09 (1987).
136 For example, until 1991 most federal courts determined statutes of limitations for
implied federal private rights of action for securities fraud by borrowing limitation periods
from analogous state statutes. The Supreme Court, however, finally imposed a uniform
statute of limitations borrowed from express rights of action elsewhere in the federal secur-
ities laws. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 362-64
(1991). For further discussion of Lampf see infra text accompanying notes 416-18.
137 See Macey, supra note 84, at 268 (stating that a second condition in which Congress
will "franchise" the right to regulate to the states is when the "political-support-maximizing
outcome varies markedly from area to area due to the existence of spatial monopolies,
variegated local political optima, and variations in voter preferences across regions").
138 SeeJames M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933,28 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 29, 30-32 (1959). See generally House Federal Securities Act Hearings, supra note 135, at
21-23, 42-51, 133-45, 240-43 (debating the need for a form of federal merit review); JOEL
SEUGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND Ex-
CHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 39-72 (1982) (reviewing the testi-
mony on the 1933 Act and recounting events taking place while Congress was considering
the legislation).
139 President Roosevelt was skeptical of the merit-based approach. See H.R. REP. No.
73-85, at 1-2 (1933) (message of the President, Mar. 29, 1933). President Roosevelt stated:
"Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not take any action which might
be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound in the
sense that their value will be maintained or that the properties which they represent will
earn profit." Id. at 2; see also House Federal Securities Act Hearings, supra note 135, at 52-55,
140-44 (discussing merit review). Then-professor William 0. Douglas criticized the aban-
donment of merit review in the federal legislation. See William 0. Douglas, Protecting the
Investor, 23 YALE REv. 521, 524 (1934) (noting that most investors have neither "the time,
money, nor intelligence to assimilate the mass of information in the registration
statement").
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1933 Act as a disclosure statute precisely because the state blue sky
laws were already in place.' 4 °
Lastly, by establishing a disclosure-oriented regime that benefit-
ted Wall Street professionals 141 and leaving the politically charged is-
sue of merit review to the states, Congress could "avoid potentially
damaging political opposition from special-interest groups by putting
the responsibility for a particularly controversial issue on state and lo-
cal governments.' 42 More importantly, by enacting only a limited
number of express private rights of action and leaving state private
rights of action intact, Congress also could avoid some of the blame
for having created civil liability.
All three of these conditions steering Congress away from pre-
emption of state law were salient in 1933 and 1934. However, the first
condition-that state blue sky laws provide a valuable capital asset-
has become far less compelling with the development of a wide body
of case law interpreting the federal securities laws. Moreover, the sec-
ond condition-that state blue sky laws allow for varying political-sup-
port-maximizing outcomes-has become less important with the
declining importance of merit review to the state regulation of securi-
ties sales.' 43 Finally, the third condition-that Congress could escape
damaging political opposition from special interest groups by allowing
the states to take the lead in particularly controversial areas of securi-
ties regulation-is now outweighed by the vast benefits that federal
140 Louis Lowenstein, Shareholder VotingPRghts: A Response to SEC Rule 19c-4 and toProfes-
sor Gilson, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 991 (1989).
141 Professor Roberta Romano observes that
[t]he targets of the SEC's disclosure policy are primarily corporate issuers,
and most corporations oppose the regulation. However, foes of the SEC,
applying the insight of the capture theory, perceive the regulatory scheme
to benefit security analysts, lawyers, and accountants, and neither investors
nor firms. In this regard, the private institutions that bridge the informa-
tion gap could be the principal beneficiaries and supporters of the disclo-
sure laws.
Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. RFv. 923, 1003 (1984)
(footnote omitted).
142 See Macey, supra note 84, at 268-69 (discussing this as a third condition in which
Congress will "franchise" an area of regulation to the states). With responsibility for merit
regulation, however, state and local governments of course get the opportunity to reap
political support. See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic
Theory of Regulation, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 101-03 (1987) (positing that political actors can
extract "rents" from the private sector because they have the power to impose burdensome
regulation unless they receive payments from regulated entities). Federal preemption leg-
islation, such as the Uniform Standards Act, should have the opposite effect of steering
political support toward federal actors. Today, this political support is manifested mostly
clearly in campaign contributions. See supra note 16.
143 See Therese H. Maynard, Commentary: The Future of California's Blue Sky Law, 30 Loy.
L . L. REv. 1573, 1589 (1997) (arguing that "piecemeal regulatory reform efforts over the
last fifteen years by [California Department of Corporations] commissioners, both past and
current, do implicitly recognize that merit review is of declining importance").
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legislators who monopolize a field of regulation can reap in campaign
contributions when they take sides in politically charged debates be-
tween special interest groups. The dual regulation framework that
made political sense in 1933 and 1934 thus become increasingly out-
dated in later years.
3. The Federalism Debate Revisited
The debate over state blue sky laws,144 particularly state merit reg-
ulation, resulted in few legislative changes prior to 1996. The Small
Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980145 recognized the burdens
that the dual-registration regime imposed on small businesses, yet
stopped short of preempting state registration requirements. The Act
added section 19(c) (3) (C) to the 1933 Act,' 46 which allows for "a uni-
form exemption from registration for small issuers which can be
agreed upon among several States or between the States and the Fed-
eral Government" and provides that the SEC "shall have the authority
to adopt such an exemption as agreed upon for Federal purposes."'147
However, the next sentence explicitly provides that "[n] othing in this
[Act] shall be construed as authorizing preemption of State law."'148
In 1984 Congress preempted state regulation of mortgage-backed se-
curities when it enacted the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhance-
ment Act of 1984.149 These Acts constituted Congress's only
encroachments on the dual-registration regime prior to 1996.
However, in 1996 much of the dual-registration regime was dis-
mantled by a Republican controlled Congress committed to reducing
the regulatory burden on business. Pursuant to the National Securi-
144 Opponents of state merit regulation included Harold Bloomenthal, Rutheford
Campbell, Jr., and Roberta Karmel. See Harold S. Bloomenthal, Blue Sky Regulation and the
Theory of Overki, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 1447 (1969); Rutheford B. Campbell,Jr., An Open Attack
on the Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 10J. Corn'. L. 553 (1985); Karmel, supra note 135, at
107 ("State merit regulation is a burden on interstate commerce and stands as an obstacle
to the achievement of the SEC's statutory goals of facilitating capital formation and the
establishment of a national market system.") Supporters of merit regulation included Con-
rad Goodkind, Hugh H. Makens, and Manning Warren. See Conrad G. Goodkind, Blue Sky
Law: Is There Merit in the Merit Requirements2, 1976 Wis. L. Rnv. 79; Hugh H. Makens, Who
Speaks for the Investor? An Evaluation of the Assault on Merit Regulation, 13 U. BALT. L. Ray.
435 (1984); Manning G. Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case
Against Preemption, 25 B.C. L. REv. 495 (1984).
145 Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
146 See Securities Act of 1933 § 19(c) (3) (C), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c) (3) (C) (1994).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat.
1689 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). For a further discussion of
section 106, 15 U.S.C. § 77c-1 (1994 & Supp. II 1996), which is the preemption provision,
see 1 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 91, at 40 n.36.
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ties Markets Improvement Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"), 15 0 state blue sky
laws requiring registration or merit qualification no longer apply to
"covered securities" or securities that will become "covered securities,"
upon completion of a transaction. The 1996 Act defines the term
"covered securities" to include nationally traded securities,15 ' securi-
ties of investment companies, 152 securities sold to certain qualified
purchasers, 153 and securities sold pursuant to certain exempt offer-
ings.154 Although the 1996 Act places "covered securities" beyond the
150 Pub. L. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). For a
discussion of various provisions of the 1996 Act, see JAmEs HAMILTON, SECuarrIEs REFORi:
NATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS IMPROVEMENT Acr OF 1996--LAW & EXPLANATION (1996);
Rutheford B. Campbell,Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional Preemption Failure, 22J.
CoP. L. 175 (1997).
151 See Securities Act of 1933 § 18(b) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (1) (Supp. 111996). This
section of the 1933 Act as amended by the 1996 Act provides:
A security is a covered security if such security is-
(A) listed, or authorized for listing, on the New York Stock Exchange
or the American Stock Exchange, or listed on the National Market System
of the Nasdaq Stock Market (or any successor to such entities);
(B) listed, or authorized for listing, on a national securities exchange
(or tier or segment thereof) that has listing standards that the Commission
determines by rule (on its own initiative or on the basis of a petition) are
substantially similar to the listing standards applicable to securities de-
scribed in subparagraph (A); or
(C) is a security of the same issuer that is equal in seniority or that is a
senior security to a security described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
Id.
152 See § 18(b) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (2). This section provides:
A security is a covered security if such security is a security issued by an
investment company that is registered, or that has filed a registration state-
ment, under the Investment Company Act of 1940.
Id.
153 See § 18(b) (3), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (3). This section provides:
A security is a covered security with respect to the offer or sale of the
security to qualified purchasers, as defined by the Commission by rule. In
prescribing such rule, the Commission may define the term "qualified pur-
chaser" differently with respect to different categories of securities, consis-
tent with the public interest and the protection of investors.
Id.
154 See § 18(b) (4), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (4). This section provides:
A security is a covered security with respect to a transaction that is ex-
empt from registration under [the 1933 Act] pursuant to-
(A) paragraph (1) or (3) of section 77d of this title, and the issuer of
such security files reports with the Commission pursuant to section 78m or
78o (d) of this title;
(B) section 77d(4) of this title;
(C) section 77(c) (a) of this title, other than the offer or sale of a secur-
ity that is exempt from such registration pursuant to paragraph (4) or (11)
of such section, except that a municipal security that is exempt from such
registration pursuant to paragraph (2) of such section is not a covered se-
curity with respect to the offer or sale of such security in the State in which
the issuer of such security is located; or
(D) Commission rules or regulations issued under section 78(d) (2) of
this title, except that this subparagraph does not prohibit a State from im-
posing notice filing requirements that are substantially similar to those re-
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reach of state blue sky laws, it specifically preserves states' rights to
prosecute fraud and to collect filing fees, 55 and furthermore, it does
nothing to impair private rights of action for fraud under state law.
Congress also has amended the 1934 Act on occasion to preempt
state laws that interfere with the uniform regulation of securities trad-
ing. For example, in 1982 Congress amended section 28 of the 1934
Act to preempt state regulation of options contracts under state an-
tigambling laws,156 and in 1990 Congress added section 17A(f), which
gives the SEC the authority to preempt state laws that impede uniform
settlement procedures. 157 Despite these isolated changes, Congress's
1934 scheme for parallel federal and state regulation of the purchase
and sale of securities generally remained intact prior to the Uniform
Standards Act.
III
THE BATT=E OVER SECURrrIFs LTIGATION
The debate over state law registration requirements, like the de-
bate over mandatory disclosure in general, 158 was part of a broader
debate over the proper role of government regulators in the market-
quired by rule or regulation under section 4(2) that are in effect on
September 1, 1996.
Id.
155 See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 102(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77r(c) (1)-(2) (Supp. II 1996) (amending Securities Act of 1933 §§ 18(c) (1), (2)).
156 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (Supp. II 1996). Sec-
tion 28 states that state laws on wagering or gaming, or the operation of "bucket shops,"
shall not invalidate, or regulate activity connected with, any put, call, straddle, option, privi-
lege, or other security that is traded pursuant to the rules of a self-regulatory organization
registered with the SEC. See id. Bucket shop laws generally are not intended to regulate
the trading of bona fide securities, but rather to prohibit contracts based on security prices
when the parties do not actually intend to purchase or sell the underlying security, but
instead plan to "gamble" on securities' prices by using market quotations. Congress be-
lieved that "options contracts approved for trading by the SEC pursuant to the rules of
national securities exchanges ... should not be prevented from trading by state laws which
were historically designed to prevent unregulated gambling activities." H.R. REP. No. 97-
626, at 9 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2780, 2787.
157 See Market Reform Act of 1990 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(f). This Act gave the SEC
authority to preempt state investor-protection statutes governing clearance and settlement
of securities transactions when the SEC finds that "in the absence of a uniform rule, the
safe and efficient operation of the national system for clearance and settlement of securi-
ties transactions will be, or is, substantially impeded." Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 17A(f) (2) (A) (ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (f) (2) (A) (ii).
158 Compare EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 29, at 280-83 (arguing that disclosure
rules do not need to be mandatory), withJohn C. Coffee,Jr., Market Failure and the Economic
Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717, 737-51 (1984) (critiquing Easter-
brook and Fishel's theory and arguing in favor of mandatory disclosure), and Paul G. Ma-
honey, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CH. L. Rxv. 1047, 1048
(1995) (presenting an "alternative efficiency justification for mandatory disclosure").
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place. 15 9 By contrast, the debate over federal and state securities liti-
gation is part of a broader debate over the proper role of courts in
adjudicating relationships between private parties in the marketplace,
whether buyers and sellers of consumer products 160 or issuers and in-
vestors. In the securities arena, this debate often escalates into a "bat-
tie," as plaintiffs' lawyers accuse issuers, underwriters, and accountants
of pervasive fraud, and they, in turn, charge plaintiffs' lawyers with
greed and opportunism. 16 1 In support of their diametrically opposed
viewpoints, these colossal interestgroups direct their influence, 162 and
with it large amounts of money,163 at the legislative process.
A. The 1995 Securities Litigation Reform Act
Following the 1994 congressional elections, securities issuers, un-
derwriters, and accounting firms clearly had gained the upper hand in
Congress. Within a year Congress enacted the 1995 Reform Act,' 64
which imposed fundamental changes on federal securities fraud litiga-
159 Compare RALPH NADER ET AL., supra note 56 (arguing for more extensive regulation
in the context of corporate chartering), with PHILIP K. HowARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON
SENSE (1994) (arguing for repeal of excessively detailed and burdensome regulation).
160 See, for example, supra note 9 for a discussion of Congress's passage, and President
Clinton's veto, of the Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R.
956, 104th Cong. (1996), which would have limited punitive damages in product liability
cases.
161 For a discussion of the economic factors motivating the plaintiffs' attorney in secur-
ities class action, see John C. Coffee,Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications
of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 669 (1986);Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's
Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform,
58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1991).
162 One very influential plaintiffs' lawyer is William Lerach of Milberg, Weiss, "a securi-
ties lawyer who is widely viewed as the king of shareholder litigation." Dan Morain, Meet the
Attorney That Proposition 201 Backers Love To Hate; Election: Securities Laryer Bill Lerach Says the
Initiative Is One More Attempt by Corporate Bosses To Have Their Own Way, LA. TIMEs (Orange
County ed.), Mar. 24, 1996, at A42, available in LEXIS, News Library, U.S. News Combined
File. "As the [1995 Reform Act] awaited the president's signature, Lerach spoke to Clinton
at a White House dinner. Four days later, Clinton vetoed it." Id.
163 Plaintiffs' lawyers have long made substantial political contributions. See July 24,
1997, Senate Uniform Standards Act Hearing, supra note 13 (transcript at 22) (prepared state-
ment ofJoseph Polizzotto, representative of the Securities Industry Association). By con-
trast, defense lawyers, for whom more litigation means more billable hours, usually remain
neutral toward litigation reform, although the battle over Proposition 211 in California, see
infra Part III.B.1, prompted their involvement. See Bill Ainsworth, Firms Chip in $500,000 To
Beat 211: Securities Measure Prods Defense Attorneys to Rare Display of Political Activism, RE-
CORDER, Oct. 4, 1996, at 1. Harvey Schloss, Vice President of Finance for Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati, a Palo Alto-based law firm, reported that the firm donated $150,000 to
oppose Proposition 211 and that "individual attorneys will probably be making additional
contributions." Id. Political contributions made by the Technology Network, a political
action committee based in Palo Alto, California, amply demonstrate the influence of Wil-
son Sonsini's Silicon Valley clients. See supra note 16.
164 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-1, 77z-1 to z-2, 78u-4
to u-5, 78j-1 (Supp. II 1996)).
[Vol. 84:1
UNIORM STANDARDS ACT
tion. The more significant provisions include the following: a "safe
harbor" provision, which precludes suits alleging that certain forward-
looking statements are materially misleading; 65 a provision that erects
heightened pleading standards by requiring plaintiffs to plead specific
facts in support of fraud allegations; 66 a provision that stays discovery
while courts decide motions to dismiss;' 67 a provision that requires
courts to presume that the "lead plaintiff' (i.e., the plaintiff control-
ling the class action) will be the issuer's largest shareholder, rather
than the first shareholder to file suit;168 a provision, useful for ac-
countants and other collateral participants in securities transactions,
under which defendants found not to have knowingly committed
fraud are proportionately liable, rather than jointly and severally lia-
ble for plaintiffs' damages; 69 a provision that requires heightened ju-
dicial scrutiny of settlement terms to ensure that lawyers' fees are not
excessive in proportion to damages awarded to a plaintiff class;' 70 a
provision that instructs courts to make a written determination of
whether parties have complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and to impose sanctions on parties and their counsel if they
violate Rule 11;171 and a "90-day bounce back" provision that reduces
damages if the issuer's stock recovers in the period following disclo-
sure. 172 In enacting these changes, Congress made clear its belief that
165 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 102, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5
(Supp. 111996) (amending 1933 and 1934 Acts to include safe harbor provisions for for-
ward-looking statements). There is some debate over whether the federal safe harbor has
induced issuers to make forward-looking statements. The most recent study, conducted by
business school professors at Stanford University and the University of Michigan, con-
cludes that in 1996 the number of forward-looking statements by issuers in the high tech-
nology sector increased. See Marilyn Johnson et al., The Impact of Securities Litigation
Reform on the Disclosure of Forward-Looking Information by High Technology Firms 23
(Jan. 2, 1998) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (surveying issuers in the com-
puter, software, and drug industries and finding, with respect to the first two industries,
"that there was a significant post-J1995 Reform] Act increase in both the frequency of
firms issuing forecasts and the mean number of forecasts issued").
166 See § 101 (b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (amending 1934 Act section 21D).
167 See § 101, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 (b), 78u-4(b) (3) (B) (amending 1933 Act section 27(b)
and 1934 Act section 21D(b)).
168 See § 101, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 (a) (3), 78u-4(a) (3) (amending 1933 Act section 27(a)
and 1934 Act section 21D(a)).
169 See § 201, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(f), 78u-4(g) (amending 1933 Act section 11 (f) and 1934
Act section 21D). Another provision of the 1995 Reform Act, which Congress inserted in
return for this reduced liability exposure, requires auditors to disclose illegal acts by an
issuer to the SEC. See § 301(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (amending 1934 Act to include § 10A).
170 See § 101, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 (a) (4)-(7), 78u-4(4)-(7) (amending 1933 Act section
27(a) and 1934 Act section 21D).
171 See § 101, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(c), 78u-4(c) (amending 1933 Act section 27(c) and
1934 Act section 21D).
172 See § 101 (b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (amending 1934 Act section 21D). This provi-
sion is unlikely to reduce damages in more than a handful of cases. SeeJonathan C. Dickey
& Marcia Kramer Mayer, Effect on Rule 10b-5 Damages of the 1995 Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act: A Forward-Looking Assessment, 51 Bus. LAw. 1203, 1214-19 (1996).
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opportunistic trial lawyers were undermining the securities litigation
system and were the primary target of the legislation.173
Many of the issues that the 1995 Reform Act addressed, such as
appointment of lead plaintiffs in class actions and sanctions against
counsel and parties for meritless claims, previously had fallen within
the discretion of the courts. 174 Congress also explicitly encroached on
an area previously delegated to the SEC when it created the statutory
safe harbor for forward-looking statements by issuers. 175 The SEC
nonetheless supported the final version of the bill,176 albeit reluc-
tantly, which Congress, despite President Clinton's veto, 177 enacted
into law in a rare override. 178
173 See 1995 Reform ActJoint Explanatory Statement, supra note 11, at 31 ("The private
securities litigation system is too important to the integrity of American capital markets to
allow this system to be undermined by those who seek to line their own pockets by bringing
abusive and meritless suits.").
174 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (authorizing, but not requiring, a federal court to
impose sanctions on lawyers and parties who file pleadings without basis in law or fact);
ElliottJ. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Inves-
tors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2062 & n.41 (1995)
(describing how, before the 1995 Reform Act, courts usually appointed as lead counsel the
first lawyer to file a class action complaint claiming open-market fraud).
175 See Rule 175, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1998). The House-Senate Conference Report
for the 1995 Reform Act specifically stated that the SEC's Rule 175 "has not provided com-
panies meaningful protection from litigation." 1995 Reform ActJoint Explanatory State-
ment, supra note 11, at 49 n.29.
176 The SEC's support "appeared to be a change in direction for an agency that in the
past had zealously defended the utility of private litigation as an aid to enforcement." Ed-
ward A. Fallone, Section 10(b) and the Vagaries of Federal Common Law: The Merits of Codifying
the Private Cause of Action Under a Structuralist Approach, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 71, 79.
177 See Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, PUB. PAPERS 1912 (Dec. 19, 1995) (WilliamJ.
Clinton). In his veto message the President stated:
I made clear my willingness to support the bill passed by the Senate with
appropriate "safe harbor" language, even though it did not include certain
provisions that I favor-such as enhanced provisions with respect to joint
and several liability, aider and abettor liability, and statute of limitations.
Specifically, I object to the following elements of this bill. First, I believe
that the pleading requirements of the Conference Report with regard to a
defendant's state of mind impose an unacceptable procedural hurdle to
meritorious claims being heard in Federal courts. I am prepared to support
the high pleading standard of the ... Second Circuit .... [but] I am not
prepared to [go beyond that].
Second, remove the language in the Statement of Managers that waters
down the nature of the cautionary language that must be included to make
the safe harbor safe. Third, restore the Rule 11 language to that of the
Senate bill.
Id.
178 On December 20, 1995, the House voted to override the veto by a vote of 319 to
100, see 141 CONG. REC. H15,223-24 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995), and two days later, on De-
cember 22, the Senate voted to override by a vote of 68 to 30, see 141 CONG. REc. S19,180
(daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995).
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The 1995 Reform Act deters the filing of some frivolous suits in
federal court, but it also makes litigation on behalf of defrauded inves-
tors more difficult. 79 The Act's full impact on securities litigation
also remains uncertain, in part due to the lack of case law interpreting
the legislative language. 80 For example, how federal courts will inter-
pret the 1995 Reform Act's heightened pleading standards remains
uncertain.' 81 District courts also have disagreed over whether the
1995 Reform Act changed the scienter standard under section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act by precluding suits for recklessness absent an intent to
defraud.182
179 SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why
the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. LAW. 975, 995 (1996) (observing that the 1995 Re-
form Act favors defendants "at virtually everyjuncture"). In 1997 the SEC prepared a Staff
Report on the impact of the 1995 Reform Act on securities litigation. See Report to the
President and the Congress on the First Year of Practice Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,931 (Apr. 30, 1997)
[hereinafter Staff Report]. For further discussion of the Staff Report, see infra text accom-
panying notes 255-57. A series of Arizona Law Review articles extensively discussed the pro-
jected impact of the 1995 Reform Act on securities litigation. SeeJill E. Fisch, Class Action
Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 Aiuz. L. REv. 533 (1997); Symposium, Securities
Litigation: The Fundamental Issues, 38 ARiz. L. REv. 473 (1996); Richard H. Walker et al., The
New Securities Class Action: Federal Obstacles, State Detours, 39 Aiuz. L. REv. 641 (1997); Elliott
J. Weiss, Comment: The Impact to Date of the Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, 39 ARiz. L. REv. 561 (1997).
180 As SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt observed:
there has been only limited experience with the Act's key provisions in the
short time since its passage. In particular, the appellate courts have had
virtually no opportunity to interpret the Act. No case has made its way to a
jury, relatively few motions to dismiss have been decided, and there have
been even fewer reported settlements.
Oct. 21, 1997, House 1995 Reform Act Implementation Hearing, supra note 14, at 19 (prepared
statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
181 Some district courts have held that plaintiffs may meet the scienter standard by
pleading facts supporting a strong inference that the defendants had both a motive and an
opportunity to commit fraud. See In reWellcare Mgmt. Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 964 F. Supp.
632, 638-39 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying the "motive and opportunity" standard); Rehm v.
Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1253-55 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (same); Zeid v. Kimberley,
930 F. Supp. 431,438 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (same); Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm.
Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1310 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding "that the 'motive and opportu-
nity' test has not been discarded [by the 1995 Reform Act]"). Other courts have held that
pleading motive and opportunity to commit fraud is insufficient, and that plaintiffs must
plead specific facts showing either conscious misrepresentations or omissions, or deliber-
ate recklessness. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 757 (N.D. Cal.
1997) (holding that motive and opportunity "may provide some evidence of intentional
wrongdoing, but are not alone sufficient to support scienter"); Norwood Venture Corp. v.
Converse Inc., 959 F. Supp. 205, 208-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (rejecting "the motive and oppor-
tunity" standard); Friedberg v. Discreet Logic Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42, 48-49 (D. Mass. 1997)
(observing that Congress considered and rejected language that would have codified the
"motive and opportunity" standard).
182 Some confusion exists as to whether the changes in the pleading standards pre-
clude liability premised on recklessness alone. Compare In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp.
238, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (including recklessness as a sufficient basis for liability), with
Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 757 (holding that knowing or intentional misconduct in-
cludes deliberate recklessness), Discreet Logic 959 F. Supp. at 49 (suggesting that pleading
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B. The Battle in California
The enactment of the 1995 Reform Act shifted the battle over
securities litigation to the states, and both issuers and trial lawyers
have devoted most of their attention to the developments in one state:
California. California has been the site of an overwhelming majority
(probably more than two-thirds) of class action suits for securities
fraud that plaintiffs have brought under state blue sky laws.' 83 High
technology companies, many based in California's Silicon Valley,
make up a substantial portion of the defendants named in these suits
and in securities suits generally.' 84 Although developments in other
states are important, particularly to the extent that they allow "strike
suits" by relatively small plaintiff classes,' 85 California predictably be-
came the crucial battleground over state securities fraud litigation af-
ter the 1995 Reform Act.
California law governing private suits for securities fraud is not
remarkably different from federal law as it existed prior to the 1995
Reform Act. California's most significant departure from federal law
occurred in Mirkin v. Wasserman.'8 6 In Wasserman, the California
Supreme Court held that plaintiffs in a tort action for deceit could not
use the "fraud-on-the-market doctrine," 187 approved of by the United
States Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson s88 as a substitute for
showing each class member's actual reliance on a defendant's misrep-
resentations. However, the Wasserman court specifically recognized
recklessness may not be sufficient), and Norwood Venture, 959 F. Supp. at 208-09 (same). As
Judge Rakoff recognized in Baesa, the law in this area is murky indeed:
While some of the language in these cases suggests that Congress rejected
"recklessness" as sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement, the cases may
also be read as simply reinforcing the requirement that recklessness in this
context include a conscious component. Other cases, addressing the same
legislative history, have concluded that Congress in no way disavowed
"recklessness."
Baesa, 969 F. Supp. at 241 n.1. As for the SEC, it filed an amicus brief in Silicon Graphics
protesting the district court's departure from the recklessness standard. See Brief of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, Concerning Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the Amended Complaint at 13-14, 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (C96-0930
FMS).
183 The Staff Report noted that the SEC's staff obtained and reviewed 55 complaints
filed in securities class actions under state law since passage of the 1995 Reform Act. Of
these cases, 43 (or 78%) had been filed in California. See Oct. 21, 1997House 1995 Reform
Act Implementation Hearing, supra note 14, at 23 (prepared statement of Arthur Levitt, Chair-
man, SEC).
184 See supra note 15.
185 See infta text accompanying notes 460-63.
186 858 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1993).
187 Id. at 584.
188 See 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988).
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that actions brought against the sellers of securities under California's
Corporations Code do not require reliance.' 8 9
Since the passage of the 1995 Reform Act, the differences be-
tween California law and federal law have become more significant.
Most of the key provisions of the 1995 Reform Act, including the statu-
tory safe harbor for forward-looking statements, the heightened plead-
ing standards, the lead plaintiff provision, and the limitation on
damages under the "90-day bounce back" rule, 190 have no counterpart
under California law. However, California law arguably applies only
to securities transactions that take place in California,191 which makes
it very difficult for a plaintiff's attorney to assemble a nationwide class
of plaintiffs in a California state court.' 92
Perhaps most importantly, California does not automatically im-
pose a stay of discovery while motions to dismiss are pending. This
difference might allow information obtained from discovery proceed-
ings in a California action to be used in a parallel federal action. De-
spite this possibility, some California courts have imposed stays on
discovery in circumstances where federal courts also would have im-
posed stays. For example, in Milano v. Auhl, 193 in which the plaintiff
brought both state and federal claims, the court stayed discovery
pending a motion to dismiss.' 94 Similarly, in Sperber v. Bixby,195 in
189 See Wasserman, 858 P.2d at 580. The Court observed that the law does not require
reliance in an action brought under California Corporations Code §§ 25,400 and 25,500
(the relevant text of these provisions appears infra notes 191 and 214). See id.; see also
Christopher Boffey, Mirkin v. Wasserman: The Supreme Court of California Rejects the Fraud-on-
the-Market Theory in State Law Deceit Actions, 49 Bus. LAW. 715, 735 (1994) (arguing that the
California Supreme Court incorrectly applied California law in Wasserman).
190 See supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
191 See CGA. CORP. CODE § 25,400(d) (West 1977). Most securities fraud class actions
filed in California are brought under this section, which provides the following:
It is unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, in this state
(d) If such person is a broker-dealer or other person selling or offering for
sale or purchasing or offering to purchase the security, to make, for the
purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others, any
statement which was, at the time and in the light of the circumstances
under which it was made, false or misleading with respect to any material
fact, or which omitted to state any material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, and which he knew or had reasonable ground
to believe was so false or misleading.
Id. (emphasis added) Arguably, the "in this state" language requires that the securities
transaction, as well as the false or misleading statement, occur in California. See infra Part
III.B.2.
192 See infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
193 No. SB 213476 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 1996).
194 See Milano, No. SB 213476, slip op. at 8 (ruling on motion to stay discovery pending
decision on demurrers); GRUNDFEST & PEPINO, supra note 14, at 40 (discussing Milano v.
Auhlo.
195 No. 699812 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 25, 1996).
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which the plaintiff brought only state claims, the defendants success-
fully argued that the court should look to federal law as persuasive
authority for deciding whether to impose a stay.196 In Marinaro v. Su-
perior Court,19 7 the California Supreme Court ordered an appellate
court to reconsider a motion for a stay of discovery because the plain-
tiffs apparently sought discovery to gain an advantage in parallel ac-
tions in federal court.' 98 Although these decisions do not bode well
for plaintiffs seeking to use California courts to evade the discovery
stay mandated by the 1995 Reform Act, other decisions have demon-
strated a more liberal attitude.' 99 Ultimately, the California Supreme
Court will have to resolve this issue.200
1. Propositions 201 and 211
The battle of the California ballot initiatives began in March 1996
with Proposition 201.201 This measure, sponsored by industry groups
in and around Silicon Valley, would have instituted a "loser pays" sys-
tem for securities litigation and required plaintiffs to post a bond for
expenses. 20 2 California voters defeated the measure by a margin of
59.5% to 40.5%.203 Several California state legislators responded by
proposing bills that would enact various provisions of the 1995 Re-
form Act into California's blue sky laws. 20 4 Thus far, none of these
proposed bills have become law.
The plaintiffs' bar responded in November 1996 with Proposition
211, which would have revised California's blue sky laws to accommo-
date a broad range of class actions that had theretofore been unsuc-
cessful. 20 5 Proponents of Proposition 211 spent $15 million to
196 See Sperber, No. 699812, slip op. at 2 (granting defendants' motion for a protective
order staying all discovery); GRUNDFEST & PERINO, supra note 14, at 40 (discussing Sperber v.
Bixby).
197 1996 Cal. LEXIS 6105 (Oct. 30, 1996).
198 See Marinaro, 1996 Cal. LEXIS 6105, at *1; GRUNDFEST & PERINO, supra note 14, at
40 (discussing Marinaro).
199 See Oak Tech. v. Superior Court, No. H016141, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Ct App. Aug. 14,
1997) (denying stay of discovery in three separate class actions).
200 See StorMedia, Inc. v. Superior Court, H016376 (Cal. Ct. App. June 24, 1997), review
granted, No. S062661 (Cal. Aug. 20, 1997).
201 Shareholder Litigation Reform Act, Prop. 201, 1995-96 Reg. Sess., 1996 Cal. Legis.
Serv. No. 2, at A-22 (West) (defeated in general election of March 26, 1996).
202 See id. § 3(c)-(e).
203 See Dan Bernstein, More Legal Reform Votes?: Defeats of Three Measures Likely to Slow
Campaigns, SACRAMENTo BEE, Mar. 28, 1996, at A16.
204 For example, California State Senate Bill No. 35, introduced by California State
Senators John Vasconcellos (D) and Jim Brulte (R) on December 2, 1996, would have
incorporated 1995 Reform Act provisions into California law. See Legislative Briefs, 28 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1523 (Dec. 13, 1996).
205 See Retirement Savings and Consumer Protection Act, Prop. 211, 1995-96 Reg.
Sess., 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. No. 10, at A-20 (West) (defeated in general election of Novem-
ber 5, 1996). In sum,
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support the measure, and opponents spent over $35 million in their
campaign to defeat it.206 These huge sums of money made Proposi-
tion 211 the most expensive campaign over a ballot initiative in Cali-
fornia history.20 7  In the end, both the SEC 208 and President
Clinton 20 9 opposed Proposition 211, and California voters rejected
the measure by a three-to-one margin.210
2. Diamond Multimedia and StorMedia
In Pass v. Hyung Hwe Huh,21' Joanne Pass filed a class action in
California state court alleging that insiders at Diamond Multimedia
Systems, Inc. purposely had inflated the price of Diamond Mul-
timedia's stock and then profited by selling four million of their own
shares before the stock price dropped sharply.212 The plaintiffs sued
under the California Corporations Code sections 25,400213 and
25,500,214 which impose liability for misrepresentations in securities
sales, and under the antifraud provisions in California Civil Code sec-
tions 1709215 and 1710.216 The defendants demurred, claiming that
[t]he measure would have, among other things, created an Exchange Act
Section 10(b) type action at the state level expressly allowing: private rights
of action, aiding and abetting, punitive damages, the fraud-on-the-market
theory, no indemnification of officers and directors, joint and several liabil-
ity for all defendants, and no caps on attorney's fees.
Walker et al., supra note 179, at 683.
206 See Walker et al., supra note 179, at 683.
207 See id.
208 See July 24, 1997 Senate Uniform Standards Act Hearing, supra note 13 (transcript at 9,
on file with author) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC) (criticizing the proposi-
tion as an effort to "undo the federal law.").
209 See Glenn Burkins, Clinton Opposes Measure To Make It Easier for Shareholders To Sue,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1996, at B2.
210 See Intel up on Bullish Outlook, U.P.I., Nov. 7, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Wires File.
211 No. CV758927 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 26, 1996). The facts of this case are discussed
in Oak Technology v. Superior Court, No. H016186 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 1997), which con-
solidates three cases including Diamond Multimedia on a discovery issue.
212 See Oak Tech., No. H016186, slip op. at 4 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 1997).
213 CAL. CORP. CODE § 25,400 (West 1977). For relevant portions of this statute, see
supra note 191.
214 Id. § 25,500. This section of the statute provides that:
Any person who willfully participates in any act or transaction in viola-
tion of Section 25400 shall be liable to any other person who purchases or
sells any security at a price which was affected by such act or transaction for
the damages sustained by the latter as a result of such act or transaction.
Such damages shall be the difference between the price at which such
other person purchased or sold securities and the market value which such
securities would have had at the time of his purchase or sale in the absence
of such act or transaction, plus interest at the legal rate.
Id.
215 This section provides that "[o]ne who willfully deceives another with intent to in-
duce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he
thereby suffers." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1709 (West 1998).
216 This section provides that:
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the plaintiffs had not alleged transactions occurring "in this state" of
California, as required by sections 25,400 and 25,500.217 The trial
court overruled the defendants' demurrer,218 and the defendants
then appealed the case to the California Supreme Court in Diamond
Multimedia, Inc. v. Superior Court.21 9 The California Supreme Court
has not yet decided this case.
Another important case also awaits a decision from the California
Supreme Court. In StorMedia v. Superior Court,2 20 plaintiffs in a class
action similar to Diamond Multimedia alleged that corporate officers of
StorMedia, a manufacturer of computer hard drive parts, sold their
own shares in the company to unsuspecting investors based on false
projections. The trial court overruled the defendants' demurrer on
the grounds that the defendants could not be sued for securities trans-
actions that had not taken place in California.221 The California
Supreme Court granted a petition for review in August 1997.222
These pending cases raise two critical issues: who can sue, and
who can be sued, for securities fraud under the California Corpora-
tions Code. 223 A ruling against the plaintiffs may make it virtually im-
possible for plaintiffs to form a nationwide class in a securities suit
brought under California law, even when the defendant is a Califor-
nia-based company.224 This result would make class action litigation
A deceit, within the meaning of the last section, is either:
1. The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not
believe it to be true;
2. The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no
reasonable ground for believing it to be true;
3. The suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives
information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communi-
cation of that fact; or
4. A promise, made without any intention of performing it.
Id. § 1710.
217 See Hyung Hwe Huh, No. CV758927 (order of Dec. 26, 1996). Section 25,500 incor-
porates section 25,400 by reference. See text of section 25,400 in supra note 191.
218 See id. (overruling defendants' demurrer to cause of action for violation of Califor-
nia Corporations Code §§ 25,400 and 25,500).
219 Diamond Multimedia, Inc. v. Superior Court, No. H016376 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 17,
1997), review granted, No. S058723 (Cal. Mar. 27, 1997).
220 Werczberger v. StorMedia, Inc., No. CV760825, slip op. at 1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar.
21, 1997).
221 See id. (order of Mar. 21, 1997).
222 See StorMedia, Inc. v. Superior Court, No. H016376 (Cal. Ct. App. June 24, 1997),
review granted, S062661 (Cal. Aug. 20, 1997).
223 On September 5, 1997, ChiefJustice Ronald George signed an order in StorMedia
requesting the parties to "assist the court in deciding whether this case and/or Diamond
Multimedia should be treated as the lead case for the issues presented." StorMedia, No.
S062661 (order of Sept. 5, 1997). See also Bill Kisliuk, Airight Now, Which Case Is More Prece-
dential?, REcoRDER, Sept. 16, 1997, at 4 (discussing the two cases).
224 Even if the California Supreme Court does rule in favor of the plaintiffs in these
cases, the Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution might impede formation of nationwide classes in state court, particularly
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under state law far less profitable for lawyers225 and steer most securi-
ties fraud class actions into federal court, irrespective of whether they
are preempted by the Uniform Standards Act. Even without the Uni-
form Standards Act, wholesale migration of litigation from federal to
state court would be far less probable if the California Supreme Court
finds that nationwide classes of plaintiffs cannot be assembled in Cali-
fornia courts.226
IV
THE PREEMPTION DEBATE
In October 1997 Senator Chris Dodd (D-Conn.) explained the
rationale for preemption of state securities fraud causes of action:
In general, I believe that the 1995 Reform Act ... is working
pretty well. In fact,... it's working so well on the Federal level that
weaker claims have migrated from Federal courts to State courts....
-a development that threatens . . . the success that we have
achieved to date in this general area.
Moreover, without a national standard for liability, the poten-
tial threat is always there that one State will change its laws in such a
way as to become the haven for litigation. This almost happened in
California last year with Proposition 211. The potential remains it
could successfully happen elsewhere in the future.227
Senator Dodd and other supporters of the Uniform Standards Act228
thus premised their argument for preemption on two assertions.
First, their argument relied on an empirical claim that weaker securi-
ties claims migrated to state court after the 1995 Reform Act. Second,
their argument projected that one or more states will enact laws decid-
edly more favorable to plaintiffs than federal law. The first section of
against out-of-state defendants. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22
(1985) (holding that a forum state "must have a 'significant contact or significant aggrega-
tion of contacts' to the claims asserted by each member of the plaintiff class, contacts 'cre-
ating state interests,' in order to ensure that the choice of [the forum state's] law is not
arbitrary or unfair" (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981))). The
fact that a defendant's principal place of business was in California would probably be
sufficient to satisfy this standard, even if the defendant was incorporated elsewhere.
225 Attorneys' fees are tied to the dollar amount of recovery which is tied to the size of
the plaintiff class. See Macey & Miller, supra note 161, at 22-27 (describing the increasing
popularity of the percentage-of-recovery method of calculating attorneys' fees in common
funds cases and comparing that method with the lodestar method based on attorney hours
expended, hourly rate, and risk).
226 With the stakes so high, particularly before the Uniform Standards Act, it is not
surprising that, in both StorMedia and Diamond Multimedia, the country's most prominent
plaintiffs' law firm, Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach LLP, represents the plaintiffs
and Silicon Valley's largest and most prominent law firm, Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich &
Rosati, represents the defendants.
227 Oct. 29, 1997, Senate Uniform Standards Act Hearing, supra note 14, at 15 (opening
statement of Sen. Christopher J. Dodd).
228 See, e.g., Perino, supra note 14, at 321-22, 338.
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this Part addresses the first of these assertions by examining the statis-
tical data available through late 1997.229 Section V.B.1 later will ad-
dress the likelihood that, absent federal preemption, one or more
states would have become the haven for litigation that Senator Dodd
predicted, and if this prediction was correct, whether large or small
states would have been the most likely candidates.
A. Migration of Litigation to State Court
Proponents of preemption have echoed Senator Dodd's assertion
that, after the 1995 Reform Act, plaintiffs increasingly resorted to state
court to avoid the 1995 Reform Act's requirements. 230 First, statistical
data purportedly show that plaintiffs filed claims in state court that the
1995 Reform Act made difficult to litigate in federal court (the "substi-
tution effect"). 231 Second, proponents of preemption argue that
other groups of plaintiffs filed suits simultaneously in state and federal
court ("parallel claims") in order to evade the 1995 Reform Act's dis-
covery stay.23 2
The statistical data, however, do not provide strong evidence of
either a lasting substitution effect or a substantial increase in the
number of parallel claims filed after 1995. The data compiled at Stan-
ford Law School's Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, show that
plaintiffs sued 110 companies in federal court in all of 1996, and
eighty-three companies in the first six months of 1997 (an increase on
an annual basis).233 Another study (the "Grundfest-Perino study") re-
ports that plaintiffs sued seventy companies in state court in all of
1996, and twenty-four companies in the first six months of 1997 (a
decrease on an annual basis).234 The Stanford database does not in-
clude pre-1996 state court filings. Nonetheless, the Grundfest-Perino
study compared the 1996 and 1997 figures with the number of filings
before 1996 and "speculated that these figures represented an increase
229 Although data for early 1998 were available at the time of this Article's publication,
those data are not used because levels of state filings in 1998 were almost certainly influ-
enced by the impending passage of the Uniform Standards Act.
230 See July 24, 1997, Senate Uniform Standards Act Hearing, supra note 13 (transcript at
44) (prepared statement of Joseph A. Grundfest and Michael A. Perino, Professors of
Law); Oct. 29, 1997, Senate Uniform Standards Act Hearing, supra note 14, at 68-69, 77-79
(prepared statement of Michael A. Perino, Professor of Law); GRUNDEEsr & PERINO, supra
note 14, at ii, 7-9; Perino, supra note 14, at 302-14.
231 See Oct. 29, 1997, Senate Uniform Standards Act Hearing, supra note 14, at 69 (pre-
pared statement of Michael A. Perino, Professor of Law); GRUNDFEST & PERINO, supra note
14, at ii, 7.
232 See Oct. 29, 1997, Senate Unifonn Standard Act Hearing, supra note 14, at 69 (prepared
statement of Michael A. Perino, Professor of Law).
233 See Perino, supra note 14, at 302 tbl.1.
234 See id. at 310 tbl.IV. The post-Reform Act data also "may not reflect all activity at
the state court a level, due to the difficulty in compiling data on state class actions, but the
extent of this problem remains unclear." Id. at 302.
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in state court filings, based on anecdotal reports that securities class
action litigation was rarely filed in state court prior to the [1995] Re-
form Act. '235 The speculative nature of this conclusion did not keep
it from taking on a life of its own and eventually making its way into
the Findings section of the Uniform Standards Act 236 as well as the
House-Senate Conference Committee's Joint Explanatory Statement
of the Committee of Conference ("Statement of Managers") for that
legislation.23 7
National Economics Research Associates, Inc. ("NERA"), a New
York-based economics consulting firm, conducted a separate study in
November 1996.238 This study showed that class action securities suits
filed in federal court decreased between 1994 and 1996, with 185 suits
filed in the first ten months of 1994, 127 in the first ten months of
1995, and only 104 in the first ten months of 1996.239 However, the
NERA study indicated that state court filings increased during this
same time period, rising from fifty-two and forty-eight suits filed in the
first ten months of 1994 and 1995 respectively, to seventy-eight suits
filed in the first ten months of 1996.240 In aJuly 1997 Report, 24' how-
ever, NERA concentrated on the first five months of each year and
found that this trend had reversed itself, and by mid-1997 both federal
and state filings had returned to pre-1995 Reform Act levels. While
235 Id. at 303 (emphasis added); see also GRUNDFEST & PERINO, supra note 14, at 5-6
(discussing the difficulties in obtaining accurate pre-1995 Reform Act state court filing
data).
236 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, § 2(2), 112 Stat. 3227, 3227
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a) ("The Congress finds that... (2) since enactment of
[the 1995 Reform Act], considerable evidence has been presented to Congress that a
number of securities class action lawsuits have shifted from Federal to State courts.... ."). A
close reading of this sentence, however, suggests an awareness on the part of Congress that
the statistical evidence was tenuous. Congress only refers to "a number" of suits having
shifted from federal to state court and fails to state whether this "number" was substantial
or even significant.
237 See H.R- CONF. REP. No. 105-803, at 14, reprinted in 144 CONG. REc. H 1,021 (daily
ed. Oct. 15, 1998) (noting a shift of securities litigation from federal to state court and an
increase in parallel filings, and observing that "[p]rior to the passage of the [1995] Reform
Act, there was essentially no significant securities class action litigation brought in State
court." (citing GRUNDFEST & PERINO, supra note 14)).
238 NERA 1996 SruDy, supra note 15.
239 See id. at 34 tbl.1. The filing data consisted of all cases compiled by Securities Class
Action Alert (SCAA), a monthly newsletter published by Investors Research Bureau, Inc. in
Cresskill, New Jersey. NERA then supplemented the data with filings reported in Stan-
ford's Securities Class Action Clearinghouse and, for October 1996, with filings reported in
a database compiled by Bloomberg L.P. See id. at n.1.
240 See id. at 37 tbl.4. The filing data consisted of all cases compiled by SCAA, Stan-
ford's Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, and for September and October of 1996,
Bloomberg L.P. See id. at n.4. Professor Perino points out that the NERA study "likely
overcounts the amount of state court activity" prior to the 1995 Reform Act, in part be-
cause it includes "actions alleging breaches of officers' and directors' duties of loyalty, care,
or candor." See Perino, supra note 14, at 302 n.128.
241 NERA 1997 STUDY, supra note 31.
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there had been sixty-nine federal court filings in the first five months
of 1995 and only forty-seven in the first five months of 1996, the
number of federal court filings increased to seventy-eight in the first
five months of 1997.242 The NERA study further revealed that while
the number of state court filings increased from twenty-three in the
first five months of 1995 to fifty-three in the first five months of 1996,
it decreased to twenty-one for the first five months of 1997.243 A 1998
Study by Price Waterhouse reached similar conclusions. 244 (The Price
Waterhouse study is discussed in Appendix A.)
The upswing in class actions filed in state court in 1996 might
suggest that some plaintiffs found state court more hospitable after
passage of the 1995 Reform Act. However, this increase may also be
attributable both to temporary disenchantment with the federal fo-
rum and to incentives to file in state court created by the Supreme
Court's 1996 holding in Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Epstein245
that parties can settle federal class action claims as part of state class
actions. 246 Even if, as preemption proponents argue, the 1996 in-
crease properly can be attributed to plaintiffs attempting to avoid the
strictures of the 1995 Reform Act, NERA's 1997 statistics suggest two
reasons why it would be a mistake to rely solely on 1996 statistics: first,
plaintiffs' lawyers may have found state court litigation more cumber-
some than they expected; and second, they may have found the 1995
242 See id. at tbl.1. The NERA study reported that the number of federal filings for
1996 totalled 123, down from 163 for 1995, and an annual average from 1991 to 1995 of
179. See id. Most of the drop in 1996, however, was attributable to an acceleration of
federal filings in December 1995, followed by a lull for the first three months of 1996. The
difference between filings in the next six months of 1996, and filings in prior years, is
statistically insignificant. See id.
243 See id. at tbl.2. The NERA study reported that the number of state court filings in
1996 totalled 110, more than double the annual average from 1991 to 1995 of 52. See id.
However, the 19 state court filings for the first four months of 1997 "project to a total of 57
filings for this year, approximating the 1991 to 1995 average." See id. at 2.
244 See PRICE WATERHOUSE STUDY, supra note 32, at 1 (reporting 67 securities class ac-
tions filed in state court in 1994, 52 in 1995, 66 in 1996, and 44 in 1997 from data supplied
by SCAA). Preemption opponents cited the Price Waterhouse Study along with the NERA
1997 Study in the February 23, 1998 Hearing. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 1260, The Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. (forthcoming) (transcript at 9) (1998)
[hereinafter Feb. 23, 1998 Senate Unform Standards Act Hearings] (prepared statement of
Richard W. Painter, Professor of Law); id. (transcript at 49-50) (colloquy between Sen. Phil
Gramm and Prof. Painter).
245 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
246 See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 369; Perino, supra note 14, at 310 (acknowledging that
the Matsushita holding is one of the "reasons unrelated to attempts to avoid the provisions
of the [1995] Reform Act" that may make a state forum "appear to be more desirable than
a federal forum"). The Matsushita holding is discussed in detail infra text accompanying
notes 485-503.
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Reform Act to be less onerous than they expected.247 Whether the
1997 trend toward lower levels of state court litigation would have con-
tinued absent preemption by the Uniform Standards Act would have
depended, in part, on the federal courts' interpretation of the 1995
Reform Act.2 48 Conflicting case law interpreting the 1995 Reform
Act's new pleading standards249 and inconclusive statistics on the suc-
cess of post-1995 Reform Act motions to dismiss250 suggest that it may
be some time before plaintiffs have a clear understanding of the legal
landscape awaiting them in federal court.
At the time that Congress passed the Uniform Standards Act, it
also remained to be seen how hospitable state courts would have been
to discovery requests made in order to circumvent the 1995 Reform
Act.25 1 Some state courts had imposed stays on discovery in circum-
stances when federal courts would do likewise, thus frustrating plain-
tiffs who filed parallel claims in order to use state discovery
proceedings to their advantage.2 52 Furthermore, as previously dis-
cussed, the California Supreme Court has not yet decided this issue.
Nor has it decided an even more critical issue that will shape the fu-
ture of class action litigation in California: the scope of the permissi-
ble plaintiff class in suits against California-based issuers. 253
247 See NERA 1997 STUDY, supra note 31, at 1 ("'These results are consistent with anec-
dotal evidence reported by plaintiffs' attorneys who recently have been more upbeat in
their response to the Act, believing that they are bringing stronger cases resulting in larger
recoveries.'" (quoting Dr. Frederick Dunbar, NERA Senior Vice President)).
248 There has thus far been little chance for appellate review of the 1995 Reform Act's
provisions. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
249 See supra note 181.
250 SeeJoe Niedzielski, State Class-Action Securities Suits Down, NAT'L UNDERWVRER, Sept.
15, 1997, at 11, 80. This article pointed out that
according to figures available from the Palo Alto, Calif.-based law firm of
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, in 23 decisions since passage of the re-
form act, eight motions to dismiss were granted with prejudice and two
were granted in part, while six motions were granted with leave to amend
(meaning that plaintiffs were able to refile the case with more informa-
tion), and the remaining seven denied the main defendants' motion.
Id.
251 This problem is partially solved by provisions of the Uniform Standards Act that
give federal courts authority to stay discovery in state court proceedings in aid of their
jurisdiction in federal cases, see H.IL 1689, 105th Cong. § 101 (a) (2) (1998), reprinted in 144
CoNG. Rxc. H6053 (daily ed. July 21, 1998) (amending section 27(b) of the 1933 Act and
section 21D(b) (3) of the 1934 Act). Plaintiffs, however, can still file suit individually, or as
part of a class consisting solely of state and local governments and pension funds, and
obtain discovery in state court before a federal suit is filed.
252 See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text.
253 See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing Diamond Multimedia and StorMedia). Even after the
Uniform Standards Act, a decision for the plaintiffs in these cases would open the door to
nationwide classes of state and local governments and pension funds in California courts.
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B. State Court Litigation and the Federal Safe Harbor
Preemption proponents also argued that issuers would be unwill-
ing to use the 1995 Reform Act's safe harbor for forward-looking state-
ments so long as they remained exposed to suits under state laws
lacking a similar safe harbor.254 A 1997 SEC staff report mentioned
anecdotal evidence that many companies were not taking advantage
of the safe harbor and disclosing forward-looking statements, 255 but
the report failed to explain why. Little empirical work has been done
to ascertain whether these anecdotal reports are true, and in any
event, no study has established an empirical link between the failure
to use the federal safe harbor and litigation in state courts. Indeed,
the failure to use the safe harbor more likely results from continuing
uncertainty about how the federal courts eventually will interpret the
1995 Reform Act's safe harbor provision. 256 Because the exact scope
of the safe harbor remains unclear, many corporate managers may
prefer to "signal" information about their company's projected per-
formance through indirect mechanisms, such as dividend increases,
stock splits, and stock repurchases. 257
Furthermore, some evidence exists that issuers have used the fed-
eral safe harbor in the 1995 Reform Act. A 1998 study of companies
in the high technology industry, conducted by business school profes-
sors from Stanford University and the University of Michigan, found
an "increase in both the frequency of firms issuing forecasts and the
mean number of forecasts issued" following enactment of the 1995
Reform Act.258 Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati ("Wilson Son-
sini"), the law firm that advises many issuers in the Silicon Valley, ap-
parently continued to advise its clients throughout 1997 to use the
254 See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. S4781-82 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (comments of Sen.
D'Amato in floor debate on S. 1260) ("In addition, these lawsuits have a chilling, a chilling
effect on one of the most important provisions in the 1995 [Reform] Act and that is called
the safe harbor provision. Until this loophole is closed, no company can safely risk issuing
any forecast, even though the market desperately wants it.").
This exposure is reduced, but not eliminated, by the Uniform Standards Act, which
preempts most class actions, but not individual suits. See infra Part IV.C.
255 See Oct. 29, 1997 Senate Uniform Standards Act Hearing, supra note 14, at 43 (prepared
statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC) ("The Staff Report indicated that it appears
that companies are not using the safe harbor to make more forward-looking
information.").
256 As late as mid-1997, Arthur Levitt observed that the safe harbor's "'meaningful
cautionary language' requirement... ha[d] yet to be addressed at any stage of the litiga-
tion process." July 24, 1997, Senate Unform Standards Act Hearing supra note 13 (transcript
at 14) (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
257 See Robert M. Lawless et al., The Influence of Legal Liability on Corporate Financial
Signaling, 23J. CoRp. LAw 209, 218-24 (1998) (arguing that potential liability under securi-
ties laws causes managers to prefer signaling activity to direct disclosure of predictions
about future economic performance).
258 Johnson et al., supra note 165, at 23.
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federal safe harbor for forward-looking statements. 25 9 Although even
more issuers possibly would use the federal safe harbor absent the
threat of state court litigation, at least some issuers were using the safe
harbor prior to the enactment of the Uniform Standards Act.
C. The Preemption Legislation
In 1997 Representatives Rick White (R-Wash.) and Anna Eshoo
(D-Cal.) 260 introduced the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act of 1997 ("White-Eshoo bill") in the House of Representatives, 261
which amended section 16 of the 1933 Act to provide:
No class action based upon the statutory or common law of any
State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or Fed-
eral court by any private party alleging-
(1) an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or
(2) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or
sale of a covered security.262
The White-Eshoo bill made an almost identical amendment to section
28 of the 1934 Act.263 For purposes of both amendments, the bill de-
fined a "class action" very broadly:
259 See Boris Feldman, Financial Fraud in the Era of Securities Reform (visited Feb. 12,
1998) <http://vw.wsgr.com/resource/sec lit/recent/finfraud.htm> ("The safe harbor
will go far toward eliminating the classic fraud-by-hindsight suit filed when a company fails
to satisfy quarterly earnings expectations."); Boris Feldman, Navigating the Safe Harbor for
Foward-Looking Statements (visited Feb. 12, 1998), <http://wvv.wsgr.com/resource/seclit/
recent/navigate.htm>. Feldman states that:
[t]he safe harbor seeks to encourage public companies to disclose forward-
looking information by protecting them from suit if that information does
not come to pass. Corporate counsel and investor relations personnel will
want to review their companies' disclosure practices to ensure thorough
implementation of the safe harbor's requirements. The statute's protec-
tion is worth the effort.
Id.
All of the articles appearing on Wilson Sonsini's Web page were followed by a state-
ment that they are "not legal advice." Despite this disclaimer, the firm obviously intended
for the articles to be read by an audience comprised mainly of clients, potential clients,
and lawyers advising the firm's clients.
260 Money magazine reports that Congresswoman Eshoo "with Silicon Valley in her dis-
trict has received $78,296 from accounting, high-tech and securities firms." Ann Reilly
Dowd, Look Who's Cashing in on Congress, MoNEY, Dec. 1997, at 128, 136.
261 See 143 CONG. Rc. E1007 (daily ed. May 21, 1997) (statement of Rep. Anna G.
Eshoo) (introducing H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. (1997)).
262 H.R_ 1689, 105th Cong. § 2(a) (1) (1997) (amending Securities Act of 1933
§ 16(b)).
263 See id. § 2(b) (2) (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28). This provision
of the bill inserted into the 1934 Act a new subsection (f) entitled "Limitations on
Remedies."
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[A] ny single lawsuit, or any group of lawsuits filed in or pending in
the same court involving common questions of law or fact, in
which-
(A) damages are sought on behalf of more than 25 persons;
(B) one or more named parties seek to recover damages on a
representative basis on behalf of themselves and other unnamed
parties similarly situated; or
(C) one or more of the parties seeking to recover damages did
not personally authorize the filing of the lawsuit.264
A security was a "covered security" for purposes of the White-Eshoo
bill "if the issuer of the security had outstanding any security that satis-
fied the standard for a covered security specified in section 18(b) (1)
of [the 1933 Act]." 2 6 5 Section 18 of the 1933 Act, which was amended
by the 1996 Act to preempt state registration requirements for four
categories of "covered securities,"266 defines the first category of cov-
ered securities as securities listed for trading on a national exchange
or on the NASDAQ system.26 7 Although the White-Eshoo bill referred
to only the first of the four categories of covered securities specified in
the 1996 Act, a security was a "covered security" for purposes of the
bill if the issuer had outstanding any security falling into this category.
The White-Eshoo bill, furthermore, provided for the removal to fed-
eral court of "[a] ny class action brought in any State court involving a
covered security."268 Hearings on this bill were held in October 1997
and May 1998 before the House Commerce Committee's Subcommit-
tee on Finance and Hazardous Materials ("House Subcommittee")
(sometimes referred to as the "Cash and Trash Committee").269
Representatives Tom Campbell (R-Cal.), Scott Klug (R-Wis.) and
Calvin Dooley (D-Cal.) introduced a bill that would have gone even
further than the White-Eshoo bill and preempted state law for almost
all suits involving nationally traded securities-not just class action
suits.2 70 Stanford Law School Professors Joseph Grundfest and
Michael Perino assisted Representative Campbell in drafting this legis-
264 Id. § 2(a) (1) (amending Securities Act of 1933 § 16(d) (1)); id. § 2(b) (2) (amend-
ing Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28 to add subsection (f) (3) (A)).
265 Id. § 2(a) (1) (amending Securities Act of 1933 § 16(d) (2)); id. § 2(b) (2) (amend-
ing Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28 to add subsection (f) (3) (B)).
266 See Securities Act of 1933 § 18(b) (1)-(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (1) (4) (Supp. 111996);
supra text accompanying notes 150-54.
267 SeeSecurities Act of 1933 § 18(b) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (1); supra note 151 (setting
forth the first category of "covered security" in § 18(b) (1) of the 1933 Act).
268 H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. § 2(a) (1) (1997) (amending Securities Act of 1933
§ 16(c)); id. § 2(b) (2) (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28 to add subsection
(f) (2)).
269 See Oct. 21, 1997, House 1995 Reform Act Implementation Hearing, supra note 14; May
19, 1998, House Uniform Standards Act Hearing, supra note 2.
270 See H.R. 1653, 105th Cong. § 2(a) (1) (1997). This bill was called the Securities
Litigation Improvement Act of 1997. See id. § 1.
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lation.271 However, the bill failed to make significant headway in the
House.
In the Senate, Senators Phil Gramm (R-Tex.), Christopher Dodd
(D-Conn.), Peter V. Domenici (R-N.M.), and eleven co-sponsors intro-
duced their own version of the Securities Litigation Uniform Stan-
dards Act of 1997 ("Gramm-Dodd bill").272 This bill mirrored the
White-Eshoo bill except that it applied only to class action suits con-
cerning nationally traded securities and securities of investment com-
panies.273 The fact that an issuer has other securities outstanding that
fit the definition of "covered securities" was irrelevant under the
Gramm-Dodd bill. The Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs ("Senate Sub-
committee" or "Senate Banking Committee") held hearings on the
Gramm-Dodd bill in July 1997, October 1997, and February 1998.274
A number of different interest groups lobbied for and against the
White-Eshoo and Gramm-Dodd bills. InJuly 1997 the President of the
National Venture Capital Association testified before the Senate Sub-
committee in support of both bills. 275 The general counsel of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") also tes-
tified in support of the legislation.27 6 Perhaps more importantly, the
Technology Network, a new bipartisan political action committee
based in Palo Alto, California, 277 strongly supported the proposed pre-
emption legislation.278 A variety of consumer groups opposed the
271 See Oct. 29, 1997, Senate Uniform Standards Act Hearing, supra note 14, at 77 n.65
(prepared statement of Michael A. Perino).
272 See S. 1260, 105th Cong. (1997).
273 See id. § 2(a) (1) (amending Securities Act of 1933 § 16(d) (2) to read: "A security is
a 'covered security' if it satisfies the standard for a covered security specified in paragraph
(1) or (2) of section 18(b) of [the 1933 Act]"); id. § 2(b) (2) (amending, with identical
language, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to add subsection (f) (3) (B)). The first para-
graph of 1933 Act section 18(b) defines a "covered security" as any security listed for trad-
ing on a national exchange or on the NASDAQ system. See Securities Act of 1933
§ 18(b) (1), 15 U.S.C. 77(r) (b) (1) (Supp. II 1996). The second paragraph defines a "cov-
ered security" as any security of an investment company registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940. See id. § 18(b) (2), 15 U.S.C. 77(r) (b) (2).
274 See July 24, 1997, Senate Uniform Standards Act Hearing, supra note 13; Oct. 19, 1997,
Senate Untform Standards Act Hearings, supra note 14; Feb. 23, 1998, Senate Uniform Standards
Act Hearings, supra note 244.
275 See July 24, 1997, Senate Uniform Standards Act Hearing, supra note 13 (transcript at
28) (prepared testimony of Brian Dovey, President of the National Venture Capital
Association).
276 See id. (transcript at 25) (prepared Testimony of Richard I. Miller, General Counsel
and Secretary of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) ("The most im-
portant step that Congress could take to fully implement its reforms would be to pass
uniform standards legislation, ensuring that nationvide securities class actions replicating
federal lOb-5 lawsuits are brought and tried in federal court.").
277 See supra note 16.
278 See Technology Network Applauds U.S. Senate Introduction of The Securities Litigation Uni-
form Standards Act of 1997, Bus. WIRE, Oct. 7, 1997, available in, LEXIS, News Library, Wires
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preemption bills, including the Consumer Federation of America,279
the American Association of Retired Persons,280 and the Gray
Panthers.28' Organizations representing state and local governments
also opposed the legislation,28 2 and the Government Finance Officers
Association, a group of New York state and local public finance offi-
cials, urged Senate Banking Committee Chair Alfonse D'Amato to op-
pose the bills. 28 3 One notable organization, the North American
Securities Administrators Association ("NASAA"), did not take a posi-
tion, stating that "[t]here is no consensus in the states because [the
pending bills] would not affect their direct regulatory authority."284
File; David Braun, Hill Support for Securities Litigation Law Snowballs, CMP TEcHWIRE, Oct.
27, 1997, available in 1997 WL 18041555.
279 See Letter from Citizen Action, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers
Union, and Public Citizen's Congress Watch to Members of the U.S. House of Representa-
tives (Jan. 31, 1997) (on file with author) (expressing concern that "Representatives Tom
Campbell and Joseph Kennedy already have announced their intention to introduce bills
that would deprive many defrauded investors of their right to challenge securities fraud in
state court."); Letter from Citizen Action, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers
Union, and Public Citizen's Congress Watch to WiIliamJ. Clinton, President of the United
States (Feb. 4, 1997) (on file with author) (same).
280 See Letter from American Association of Retired Persons, Citizen Action, Consumer
Federation of America, Consumers Union, Public Citizen's Congress Watch, and U.S. Pub-
lic Interest Research Group to Members of Congress (June 23, 1997) (on file with author)
(asking members to refrain from signing as a co-sponsor House Bill 1689 or House Bill
1653).
281 The Gray Panthers opposed the 1995 Reform Act and, "[g]iven the fact that older
people are disproportionately victims of securities fraud," implored President Clinton to
oppose "H.R1 1689, H.R. 1653 and any similar Senate bill" that would preempt "proven
state laws." Letter from Tim Fuller, Executive Director, Gray Panthers, to William J. Clin-
ton, President of the United States (Sept. 11, 1997) [hereinafter Gray Panther letter] (on
file with author).
282 See, e.g., Letter from the National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors,
National Association of Counties, National Association of County Treasurers and Finance
Officers, Government Finance Officers Association, and Municipal Treasurers' Association
to ThomasJ. Bliley, Jr., Chairman of the House Committee on Commerce (Mar. 28, 1997)
(on file with author) ("We urge you to oppose any efforts to interfere with the ability of
states to protect their public investors through the preemption of private securities fraud
actions under state law .. ").
283 See Letter from the Government Finance Officers Association to Alfonse D'Amato,
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 1-2 (Oct. 3,
1997) (on file with author). This letter read, in part:
In many cases, state private rights of action now remain the only method of
obtaining recovery for defrauded investors by permitting liability for aiding
and abetting wrongdoing, joint and several liability, and reasonable statutes
of limitations for the filing of claims....
... We urge you to resist all efforts to interfere with the ability of states
to protect their public investors and their citizens through the preemption
of private rights of action under state law.
Id.
284 See Lynn Stevens Hume, NASAA Declines To Take Position on Planned Securities Litiga-
tion Reform, BOND BUYER, Aug. 1, 1997, at 5, available in LEXIS, News Library, US File.
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SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt testified in 1997 before both Senate
and House subcommittees, urging Congress to delay enacting pre-
emption legislation until it could clearly evaluate the impact of the
1995 Reform Act, as interpreted in the federal courts:
I do not oppose reform-only reform that is too sweeping and
reform that is too hasty. Let us not replace the race to the court-
house with a race to the Capitol. It will take more time to gauge the
effectiveness of the [1995] Reform Act. But on an important issue
like this, the study is well worth the effort.2 85
Professor Joseph Grundfest responded by observing that "delay can
only cause a proliferation of litigation" and will promote inconsistency
rather than clarity in state law.286 Professors Grundfest and Perino
also listed specific ways in which plaintiffs could use state securities
suits "to evade key provisions of federal law." 287 Congress could elimi-
nate such strategic uses of state court litigation, they argued, by pre-
empting state law causes of action for securities fraud.2 88
In the February 1998 hearing, the author of this Article testified
before the Senate Subcommittee that preemption was unnecessary be-
cause no substantial and sustained increase in state court litigation
had occurred, and in any event, California, the state where most state
suits were filed, was not treating plaintiffs more favorably than the fed-
eral law. 28 9 Several other witnesses, however, told the Senate Subcom-
mittee that litigation in state courts threatened to undermine the 1995
Reform Act. These witnesses included Michael Morris, the general
285 July 24, 1997, Senate Uniform Standards Act Hearing, supra note 13 (transcript at 29)
(prepared statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC); Oct. 21, 1997, House 1995 Reform Act
Implementation Hearing, supra note 14 (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEG).
286 July 24, 1997, Senate Uniform Standards Act Hearing, supra note 13 (transcript at 19)
(testimony of Joseph Grundfest, Professor of Law).
287 Id. (transcript at 19) (testimony of Joseph A. Grundfest, Professor of Law); Oct. 21,
1997, House 1995 Reform Act Implementation Hearing, supra note 14, at 52 (prepared state-
ment of Michael A. Perino, Professor of Law). Plaintiffs could take advantage of state court
litigation to,
(1) take discovery that would be prohibited by a federal stay;
(2) avoid defenses available pursuant to the federal forward-looking safe
harbor;
(3) plead cases where the facts alleged would be insufficient to avoid dismis-
sal in a federal court;
(4) avoid the need for the designation of a lead plaintiff, [and]
(5) avoid heightened scrutiny of settlement terms.
July 24, 1997, Senate Unform Standards Act Hearing, supra note 13 (transcript at 52) (pre-
pared statement ofJoseph A. Grundfest and Michael A. Perino, Professors of Law); Oct. 21,
1997, House 1995 Reform Act Implementation Hearing, supra note 14, at 53 (prepared state-
ment of Michael A. Perino, Professor of Law).
288 See July 24, 1997 Senate Unform Standards Act Hearing, supra note 13 (transcript at
53) (prepared statement of Joseph A. Grundfest and Michael A. Perino, Professors of
Law).
289 Feb. 23, 1998, Senate Uniform Standards Act Hearing, supra note 244 (transcript at 9-
12) (prepared statement of Richard W. Painter, Professor of Law).
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counsel of Sun Microsystems, 290 and Boris Feldman, a prominent se-
curities litigator at Wilson Sonsini, the law firm that defends many
class action securities suits. 29 1 Feldman told the Senate Subcommittee
that "[s]ince the [1995] Reform Act was passed, securities class ac-
tions-particularly cases premised on failed forecasts-have been mi-
grating to state courts. This appears to be a strategic response by the
plaintiffs' bar to the [1995] Reform Act, and it threatens to under-
mine that Act."292 Nonetheless, a short article by Feldman posted on
Wilson Sonsini's internet site for the benefit of the firm's attorneys
and clients, entitled The Securities Class Action Battlefield Circa 1998,293
had painted a decidedly more optimistic picture:
In my opinion, plaintiffs' state court gambit has been a failure
and is over.... I base that conclusion on three factors. First, plain-
tiffs' attempts to broaden dramatically state laws that have been on
the books for years have not worked....
Second, I believe that plaintiffs have come to realize that they
will not be permitted to use courts in a particular state (i.e. Califor-
nia) to litigate the claims of shareholders around the country...
Finally, plaintiffs have not had much success milking the state
cases for discovery that they can then use to file a federal
complaint.294
The Senate Subcommittee did not explore the reasons for Feldman's
two, very different views of the litigation landscape in California. 295
However, Senator Gramm, the Senate Subcommittee Chair, did dis-
tribute to the witnesses a letter sent the previous Friday by Price
Waterhouse to Senator D'Amato that restated the statistics in the Price
290 See id. (transcript at 13) (testimony of Michael Morris, Vice President and General
Counsel, Sun Microsystems).
291 See id. (transcript at 4) (written testimony of Boris Feldman, partner, Wilson
Sonsini).
292 ld. at 3. Feldman also stated that "this strategic maneuver is especially acute in
California, where Silicon Valley's high-technology companies have borne the brunt of the
state court actions." Id. He added that "[his] firm's experience over the last eighteen
months confirms this strategic shift from federal to state court, albeit, with ebbs and flows,
as the plaintiffs' bar has adjusted its tactics." Id. at 4.
293 Boris Feldman, The Securities Class Battlefield Circa 1998 (visited Feb. 12, 1998)
<http://wwv.wsgr.com/resources/sec-lit/recent/batfle.htm>.
294 Id.; see also Feb. 23, 1998, Senate Uniform Standards Act Hearings, supra note 244 (tran-
script at 10) (prepared statement of Richard W. Painter, Professor of Law) (quoting the
Feldman article). After the February 1998 Senate hearing, Feldman explained to Painter
that this article had been posted on Wilson Sonsini's Web page several months before the
hearing.
295 See id. (transcript at 49-50) (Gramm-Painter Senate colloquy). The exchange was as
follows:
Mr. Painter: .... And if Mr. Feldman wants to discuss what the difference is
between his article on Wilson Sonsini's Web page and anything he said
here .... Senator Gramm: Well, now, Mr. Feldman is not on trial here.
(Laughter) And he seems like a pretty good attorney if he were on trial.
[Vol. 84:1
UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT
Waterhouse Study to show precisely what proponents of preemption
wanted to show: an apparent increase in state court litigation in
1997.296 (Appendix A discusses the Price Waterhouse Study.)
In March 1998, Chairman Levitt changed course and, along with
SEC Commissioners Isaac C. Hunt, Jr. and Laura S. Unger, endorsed
the preemption legislation in return for one principal condition: in-
sertion in both the legislative history and the Senate floor debate of
statements that Congress had not intended the 1995 Reform Act to
preclude recklessness suits under federal law. Accordingly, on March
24, 1998, Senators D'Amato, Gramm, and Dodd wrote a letter to the
SEC specifically stating that:
[O]ur clear intent in 1995-and our understanding today-was
that the [1995 Reform Act] did not in any way alter the scienter
standard in federal securities fraud suits.... We intend to restate
these facts about the [1995 Reform] Act in both the legislative his-
tory and the floor debate that will accompany S. 1260, should it be
favorably reported by the Banking Committee. 297
Chairman Levitt, and Commissioners Hunt and Unger, responded the
same day with a letter stating that they would endorse the preemption
legislation provided that the Senators followed through with these as-
surances.298 Only Commissioner Norman Johnson dissented from his
colleagues' decision. He stated that the preemption legislation was
unnecessary.2 99
296 See Letter from Daniel V. Dooley, Partner, Price Waterhouse LLP, to Senator Al-
phonse [sic] M. D'Amato (Feb. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Price Waterhouse Letter] (on file
with author) (explaining that the Price Waterhouse Study did not measure "parallel fil-
ings" in both state and federal court, but other studies that did measure these filings noted
that parallel filings in state courts increased in 1996, and then fell by a smaller amount in
1997). The letter reported six state parallel cases were filed in 1994, five in 1995, 46 in
1996, and 22 in 1997. See id.; see also Feb. 23, 1998, Senate Uniform Standards Act Hearings,
supra note 244 (transcript at 41-43) (Gramm-Painter Senate colloquy) (discussing the im-
portance of parallel filings relative to other state court filings and the credibility of Price
Waterhouse's statistics in view of the obvious haste with which Dooley prepared his letter).
297 Letter from Sen. Alfonse M. D'Amato, Sen. Phil Gramm, and Sen. ChristopherJ.
Dodd to Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC (Mar. 24, 1998).
298 See Letter from Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., Commissioner, and
Laura S. Unger, Commissioner, to Sen. Alfonse M. D'Amato, Sen. Phil Gramm, and Sen.
ChristopherJ. Dodd (Mar. 24, 1998), reprinted in 144 CONG. REc. S4780 (daily ed. May 13,
1998) (endorsing Senate Bill 1260 and specifically stating "we were gratified by the lan-
guage in your letter of today agreeing to restate in S. 1260's legislative history, and in the
expected debate on the Senate floor, that the [1995 Reform Act] did not, and was not
intended to, alter the well-recognized and critically important scienter standard.").
299 See Letter from Norman S. Johnson, Commissioner, to Sen. Alfonse M. D'Amato,
Sen. Phil Gramm, and Sen. Christopher J. Dodd (Mar. 24, 1998), reprinted in 144 CONG.
Rxc. S4786 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) ("I share in the views of 27 of this country's most
respected securities and corporate law scholars who have urged you and your colleagues
not to support S. 1260 or any other legislation that would deny investors their right to sue
for securities fraud under state law."). Commissioner Carey did not participate in the
SEC's decision concerning endorsement of the preemption legislation.
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The House of Representatives held its final hearing on the White-
Eshoo bill on May 19, 1998. Chairman Levitt again testified before
the House Subcommittee. This time he stated that the SEC supported
preemption, but "only upon receiving assurances that legislative his-
tory would be inserted into the record making clear that the [1995]
Reform Act was not meant to define or alter the state of mind require-
ments for securities fraud liability [under federal law]."300 Professor
Jack Coffee also testified that day, and he told the House Subcommit-
tee of a glaring problem with both the White-Eshoo bill and the
Gramm-Dodd bill: the bills could preempt class actions brought under
state common law by bond holders on negotiated contractual cove-
nants in their bond indentures.30' Such covenants are often specifi-
cally designed to allow bondholders to sue for misrepresentations
contained in offering materials without meeting 1934 Act section
10(b)'s scienter requirement and the other elements of the federal
cause of action for fraud.30 2 Fortunately, the House Subcommittee
took Professor Coffee's suggestion and included in its final draft of
the bill a provision exempting from preemption any class action "that
seeks to enforce a contractual agreement between an issuer and an
indenture trustee.1303 Without this change, the Uniform Standards
Act could have obstructed the enforcement of contractual rights
under state law.
President Clinton, who had vetoed the 1995 Reform Act at the
urging of the plaintiffs' bar and consumer groups,30 4 revealed as early
300 May 19, 1998 House Uniform Standards Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 21 (prepared
statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC). Other "necessary changes" Chairman Levitt
listed in his testimony included a carve-out to preserve state jurisdiction over corporate law
claims in situations in which misleading statements are made to obtain shareholder ap-
proval of a transaction (the "Delaware carve-out"), changes in the definition of "class ac-
tion" (including increasing the 25 person threshold to 50), and use of the definition of a
"covered security" in Senate Bill 1260 rather than the broader definition in House Bill
1689. See id. at 20-24. These changes were incorporated into the final version of the Uni-
form Standards Act passed by both the House and Senate. See infra text accompanying
notes 314-25.
301 See id. at 59-61 (statement of Jack Coffee, Professor of Law).
302 See id. at 65 ("The point I'm trying to make is, they probably can sue under
10(b) (5) if they can prove scienter, but the reason these documents were negotiated, for
maybe weeks or months at a time is they wanted contractual protections that eliminated
the need to have to prove fraud."). The author of this Article testified after Professor
Coffee and reiterated the arguments made in two letters written by him and signed by 27
and 23 securities law professors, respectively, that federal preemption was unnecessary and
potentially harmful for investors. See id. at 73-82 (prepared statement of Richard W.
Painter, Professor of Law). In addition, this author expressed support for an amendment
proposed by Senator Sarbanes that exempted state and local governments and their pen-
sion funds from the bill's preemption provisions. See id. at 73, 78.
303 H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. § 101 (a) (1), (b) (1) (B) (1998), reprinted in 144 CONG. REC.
H6053 (daily ed. July 21, 1998) (amending Securities Act of 1933 section 16(d) (3) and
adding subsection (f) to section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
304 See supra notes 162, 177 and accompanying text.
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as July 1997 that he might support preemption legislation.305 Specifi-
cally, the President stated:
[T]he possibility of changes in one or more states' securities laws
similar to those proposed in California's Proposition 211 suggests
that there may be a need to reconsider the appropriate balance of
federal and state roles in securities law. As I said when I opposed
Proposition 211 last August, the proliferation of multiple and incon-
sistent standards could undermine national law.306
This statement no doubt pleased the political action committees of
Silicon Valley, 30 7 but it also effectively dissipated the negotiating lever-
age that the President could have used to improve the Uniform Stan-
dards Act. By early 1998, the Clinton Administration restated its
support for the legislation, provided the statements agreed upon with
the SEC concerning suits for recklessness under federal law appeared
in the legislative history and Senate floor debate.308 "[I] t is particu-
larly important to the President," the White House told the bill's spon-
sors, "that you be clear that the federal law to be applied includes
recklessness as a basis for pleading and liability in securities fraud class
actions."309
The prearranged colloquy between Senators Dodd and D'Amato
on the recklessness issue went as planned.310 Also as planned by the
bill's sponsors, the Senate did not amend the text of the bill to ad-
dress the issue of recklessness under federal law.31 1 Given the
305 See President Clinton Supports High-Tech's Call To Curb State Securities Litigation Suits;
President Opposes Multiple and Inconsistent Standards for Growth Companies, Bus. WiPE, July 24,
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
306 Id. Vice President Al Gore's staff were assigned the task of evaluating the pending
preemption legislation, and at least one member of the Vice President's staff, Lisa Brown,
suggested limiting Senate Bill 1260 to leave state causes of action intact for face-to-face
frauds. See Memorandum from Charles Rothfeld to Lisa Brown (Jan. 21, 1998) (on file
with author) (evaluating this and other proposed changes to the bill).
307 Vice President Gore, in particular, is known to have significant support among
Silicon Valley business interests. See Simon, supra note 16, at A23 (stating that TechNet, a
Silicon Valley political group, is "so closely tied to Gore that Washington insiders call it a
Gore connection").
308 See Letter from Bruce Lindsey, Assistant to the President and Deputy Counsel, and
Gene Sperling, Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, to Chairman D'Amato,
Chairman Gramm, and Sen. Dodd (Apr. 28, 1998), reprinted in 144 CONG. REc. S4781 (daily
ed. May 13, 1998).
309 Id.
310 See 144 CONG. REc. S4798 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (floor debate on S. 1260) The
colloquy progressed as follows:
MR. D'AmATo: ... My clear intent in 1995, and my understanding today, is
that the [1995 Reform Act] did not in any way alter the scienter standard in
federal securities fraud lawsuits....
MR. DODD: I agree with the comments of my colleague from New York. I
too, did not intend for the [1995 Reform Act] to alter the state of mind
requirement in securities fraud lawsuits ....
311 No amendment was introduced in either house of Congress that would have
amended 1934 Act section 10(b) to allow suits for recklessness. Proponents of the reckless-
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Supreme Court's hostility toward using subsequent legislative history
in interpreting section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,312 this colloquy and the
entire "quid pro quo" given by the supporters of preemption in return
for the support of the SEC and the Administration may be
meaningless.31 3
The final version of the legislation passed by both Houses incor-
porated several changes to the original versions of the White-Eshoo
and Gramm-Dodd bills. These changes included the following: a
carve-out provision that preserves state jurisdiction over corporate law
claims in situations when plaintiffs allege that corporate managers
made misleading statements in order to obtain shareholder approval
of a transaction (the so-called "Delaware carve-out");314 changes to the
ness standard, including the SEC, no doubt knew that such an amendment would have
failed and thus would have complicated the floor colloquy and legislative history on the
issue. Likewise, opponents of the recklessness standard, including political allies of the
Silicon Valley business interests defending the Silicon Graphics litigation, knew that they did
not possess the votes to remove recklessness from the federal scienter standard. They also
realized that the SEC and the Administration would withdraw support for preemption leg-
islation if they tried, and that their best hope lay in the courts, which would probably
ignore 1998 legislative history in interpreting statutes passed in 1934 and 1995. See infra
note 312.
312 The Supreme Court is unlikely to be receptive to arguments based on subsequent
legislative history in interpreting section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, which has not been
amended since its original enactment. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2214
n.11 (1997) (declining to address the government's argument that the legislative history in
a 1988 amendment to other 1934 Act provisions properly approved of the misappropria-
tion theory of insider trading under section 10 (b)); see also Central Bank v. First Interstate
Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994) (noting that "Congress has not reenacted the language of
§ 10(b) since 1934" and therefore refusing to apply the reenactment doctrine under which
the Court adheres to consistent judicial construction of statutory language that is
reenacted).
313 On the other hand, the argument that Congress intended the 1995 Reform Act to
alter the scienter standard to preclude suits for recklessness under federal law is also a
weak one. See Dunn, supra note 21, at 239-47.
314 See S. 1260, 105th Cong. § 101(a)(1) (1998), reprinted in 144 CONG. REc. S4779
(daily ed. May 13, 1998) (amending section 16(d) of the 1933 Act). Senate Bill 1260 read:
(d) (1) PRESERVATION OF CERTAIN AcrIONS.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-Notwithstanding subsection (b), a class action described
in paragraph (2) of this subsection that is based upon the statutory or com-
mon law of the State in which the issuer is incorporated (in the case of a
corporation) or organized (in the case of any other entity) may be main-
tained in a State or Federal court by a private party.
(2) PEmISSIBLE AcrIoNs-A class action is described in this paragraph if it
involves-
(A) the purchase or sale of securities by the issuer or an affiliate of the
issuer exclusively from or to holders of equity securities of the issuer; or
(B) any recommendation, position, or other communication with respect
to the sale of securities of the issuer that-
(i) is made by or on behalf of the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer to
holders of equity securities of the issuer; and
(ii) concerns decisions of those equity holders with respect to voting their
securities, acting in response to a tender or exchange offer, or exercising
dissenters' or appraisal rights.
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definition of a "class action," including an increase in the threshold
number of individual suits by named parties that could be treated in
the aggregate as a class action from twenty-five to fifty (the definition
of a "class action" still includes a suit on behalf of any number of un-
named parties); 15 and adoption of the Senate bill's definition of a
"covered security" rather than the broader definition in House Bill
1689.316 Congress also included in the final version of the Uniform
Standards Act a provision, added as an amendment to House Bill
1689, that enables federal courts to stay discovery in any private action
in state court while a federal action is pending. 317 Perhaps the most
important, and controversial, change to the legislation was an exemp-
tion added to the Senate bill in a floor amendment proposed by Sena-
tor Sarbanes. This amendment exempted from preemption suits
brought by states, their political subdivisions, and state pension plans,
either individually or as class actions comprised solely of such enti-
ties. 318 The House included a similar provision in its bill, although
the House added a requirement that class members affirmatively au-
thorize participation in an exempted class action.319
Id. Except for section renumbering, this section of the Uniform Standards Act is virtually
identical. See Appendix B.
315 See S. 1260, 105th Cong. § 101(a)(1) (1998), reprinted in 144 CONG. REC. S4779
(daily ed. May 13, 1998) (amending section 16(f)(2) of the 1933 Act).
316 See id., reprinted in 144 CONG. REC. S4779 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (amending sec-
tion 16(f) (3) of the 1933 Act). The SEC had strongly urged all of these changes. See May
19, 1998, House Uniform Standards Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 20-24 (prepared statement
of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
The Uniform Standards Act, however, apparently will not reach securities sold in ini-
tial public offerings if those securities are not traded on a national exchange on the date
that the alleged misrepresentation or omission occurred. Thus, the definition of a "cov-
ered security" may not include issuers accused of engaging in fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion in order to create a national trading market in their securities. The Act also excludes
debt securities sold in private placement from the definition of covered security.
317 See H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. § 101 (a) (2) (1998), reprinted in 144 CONG. REc. H6053
(daily ed.July 21, 1998) (amending section 27(b) of the 1933 Act and section 21D (b) (3) of
the 1934 Act) ("CIRCUMVENTION OF STAY OF DiscovERY-Upon a proper showing, a court
may stay discovery proceedings in any private action in a State court as necessary in aid of
its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments, in an action subject to a stay of
discovery pursuant to this subsection.").
318 See 144 CONG. REc. S4811 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes)
(seeking adoption of Amendment No. 2397 exempting suits brought by "a State or polit-
ical subdivision thereof or a State pension plan on its own behalf... or as a member of a
class comprised solely of [similar entities]"); see also Letter from Arthur Levitt, Chairman,
and Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., Commissioner, and Laura S. Unger, Commissioner, to Rep. W.J.
(Billy) Tauzin, Rep. Anna G. Eshoo, and Rep. Rick White (June 4, 1998), reprinted in May
19, 1998, House Uniform Standards Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 31-33 (expressing the SEC's
general support for the amendment and noting that states, political subdivisions thereof,
and their pension plans, may be more likely than other institutional investors to trigger the
.grouping" provisions of the Uniform Standards Act under which individual suits filed by
more than 50 investors can be treated as a single class action).
319 See H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. § 101 (a) (1) (1998), reprinted in 144 CONG. REC. H6053
(daily ed. July 21, 1998) (amending section 16(d) (2) (B) of the 1933 Act) (exempting suits
19981
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The Senate approved its version of the bill on May 13, 1998, by a
vote of seventy-nine to twenty-one. 320 The House then approved its
version of the bill on July 22, 1998, by a vote of 340 to eighty-three. 321
The House-Senate Conference Committee adopted the legisla-
tion as Senate Bill 1260 on October 9, 1998.322 In keeping with the
deal that the bill's sponsors had struck with the SEC and the Adminis-
tration, the Statement of Managers stated that "[i] t is the clear under-
standing of the managers that Congress did not, in adopting the
[1995] Reform Act, intend to alter the standards of liability under the
Exchange Act."3 23 On October 13, 1998, Senate Bill 1260 was passed
brought by "a State or political subdivision thereof or a State pension plan on its own
behalf... or as a member of a class comprised solely [of similar entities] ... that have
authorized participation, in such action" (emphasis added)). This provision, which was incor-
porated into the Uniform Standards Act, could narrow the scope of a class action consider-
ably in situations in which class members have no knowledge of the action and plaintiffs'
lawyers have no means of discovering who the class members are in order to seek their
consent.
320 See 144 CONG. REc. S4815 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (Senate Rollcall Vote No. 135).
321 See 144 CONG. REc. H6119-20 (daily ed. July 22, 1998) (House Rollcall Vote No.
318).
322 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-803 (1998), reprinted in 144 CONG. REC. H11,020-21
(daily ed. Oct. 15, 1998).
323 Id. at 15, reprinted in 144 CONG. REc. 11,021 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1998). In the State-
ment of Managers, a three paragraph discussion of the scienter issue follows this one sen-
tence statement. These paragraphs were erroneously dropped from at least one printed
version of the Statement of Managers, see Statement of Managers (Oct. 9, 1998) (on file
with author), and when the Statement of Managers was first inserted into the Congressional
Record See 144 CONG. Rc. H10,270 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998). On October 15, on the mo-
tion of Congressman Bliley (R-Va.), one of the bill's sponsors, the House inserted a com-
plete version of the entire Statement of Managers into the Congressional Record The three
paragraphs dropped from the misprinted version read in part as follows:
The managers understand, however, that certain Federal district courts
have interpreted the [1995] Reform Act as having altered the scienter re-
quirement. In that regard, the managers again emphasize that the clear
intent in 1995 and our continuing intent in this legislation is that neither
the Reform Act nor S. 1260 in any way alters the scienter standard in Fed-
eral securities fraud suits.
Additionally, it was the intent of Congress, as was expressly stated dur-
ing the legislative debate on the Reform Act, and particularly during the
debate on overriding the President's veto, that the Reform Act establish a
heightened uniform Federal Standard on pleading requirements based
upon the pleading standard applied by the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. Indeed, the express language of the Reform Act itself carefully pro-
vides that plaintiffs must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." The
[mlanagers emphasize that neither the Reform Act nor S. 1260 makes any
attempt to define that state of mind.
The managers note that in Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme
Court left open the question of whether conduct that was not intentional
was sufficient for liability under the Federal securities laws. The Supreme
Court has never answered that question....
144 CONG. REc. H11,021 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1998) (footnote omitted).
Immediately following the Statement of Managers, however, the Congressional Record
reproduces a well-footnoted speech by Mr. Bliley, stating that "[a]s Chairman of the Con-
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by unanimous consent in the Senate and by a vote of 319-82 in the
House.324 President Clinton signed the bill into law on election day,
November 3, 1998.325
ference Committee that considered the [1995] Reform Act and as the bill's author, respec-
tively, it is our view that non-intentional conduct can never be sufficient for liability under
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act." Id. (emphasis added). What Mr. Bliley meant by his
reference to "our view" is unclear as (1) he does not cite specifically the views of other
members of Congress, and (2) his speech was not a part the Statement of Managers for the
Uniform Standards Act. Clearly, he was expressing his own views (and perhaps those of
Professor Grundfest and Ms. Susan French of Stanford University who Mr. Bliley thanks in
a footnote for their guidance). See id. at H11,022 n.4. Despite the deal that the Uniform
Standards Act sponsors had struck with the SEC and the Administration on the scienter
issue, at least some individual members of Congress clearly intended that the legislative
history be as confusing as possible on the question of whether Congress had believed that
recklessness should give rise to a cause of action under Section 10(b) when it passed the
1995 Reform Act.
324 See 144 CONG. Rxc. S12,450, H10,800-01 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998).
325 See Statement by the President, U.S. Newswire, Nov. 3, 1998, available in 1998 WL
13607107. In his Statement, the President both stated his view of the legislative history of
the 1995 Reform Act (a curious step in view of the fact that he had vetoed that legislation)
and made it clear that he now signed the Uniform Standards Act "with the understanding"
that the 1995 Reform Act had not precluded suits for recklessness under federal law.
Although I supported the [1995] Reform Act's goals, I vetoed the Act
because I was concerned that it would erect procedural barriers and keep
wrongly injured persons from having their day in court. In particular, I
objected to certain statements in the 1995 Conference Report's Statement
of Managers that created ambiguity with respect to whether the bill was
adopting the pleading standard in private securities fraud cases of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit-the highest pleading standard of
any Federal circuit court and a standard that I support. When the bill re-
turned to the House and Senate floors after my veto, the bill's supporters
made clear that they did in fact intend to codify the Second Circuit stan-
dard. After this important assurance, the bill passed over my veto.
In signing the Uniform Standards Act, I do so with the understanding,
as reflected in the Statement of Managers for this legislation and numerous
judicial decisions under the Reform Act adopting the pleading standard of
the Second Circuit, that investors with legitimate complaints meeting the
Second Circuit pleading standard will have access to our Nation's courts.
This point was critical to my veto of the Reform Act in 1995; it was reaf-
firmed before ultimate passage of the 1995 Act over my veto; and its assur-
ance was a prerequisite to my signing this legislation today, as indicated in
the April 28, 1998, letter from my staff to Chairman D'Amato, Senator
Gramm, and Senator Dodd. Since the uniform standards provided by this
legislation state that class actions generally can be brought only in Federal
court, where they will be governed by Federal law, clarity on the Federal law
to be applied is particularly important. The Statement of Managers con-
firms that the Second Circuit pleading standard will be the uniform stan-
dard for pleading securities fraud. Thus, the uniform national standards
contained in this bill will permit investors to continue to recover losses.
fairly attributable to reckless misconduct. I am aware of and agree with the
expert views on this issue of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), which, along with my staff, worked hard in shaping this legislation.
With these assurances in the Statement of Managers that reckless con-
duct will continue to be actionable and that complaints meeting the Sec-
ond Circuit pleading standard will permit investors access to our Nation's
courts, I believe that the uniform national standards created by this bill will
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V
SHOULD CONGRESS HAVE PREEMPTED STATE CLAss ACrION
SECURITIES LITIGATION?
A. The "Economic" Equation: Is a Dual-Forum Class Action
Framework Cost Effective?
1. Costs of a Dual-Forum Class Action Framework
In their testimony before the Senate, Professors Grundfest and
Perino identified the costs to both issuers and investors of litigating
securities fraud suits in state and federal courts under different bodies
of law.326 In their view, "[n] eutral principles that apply whether or
not one supports the provisions of the [1995] Reform Act"327 led to
the conclusion that:
(1) National markets should, for reasons wholly unrelated to the
debate over the merits of the [1995] Reform Act, be governed by
uniform national standards;
(2) Under the doctrine of implied conflict preemption, many provi-
sions of the federal securities laws-including large portions of the
[1995] Reform act-can and should be interpreted as preempting
conflicting provisions of state law; and
(3) In order to promote certainty and efficiency in federal and state
courts, and in our national securities market, Congress should enact
legislation that makes it clear that federal antifraud standards pre-
vail in national markets.3 28
The first conclusion, that national markets should be governed by
uniform national standards, resembled the arguments made in sup-
port of the 1996 Act's preemption of state registration requirements
for certain "covered securities" sold in national markets. 3 29 This uni-
form standards argument was compelling in the registration context
because issuers incurred substantial costs complying with both the
SEC rules under the 1933 Act and the states' highly technical and
often dissimilar registration, exemption, disclosure, and (in some
states) merit review regulations. By contrast, issuers, underwriters,
and their counsel can understand federal and state antifraud statutes
far easier because conduct that constitutes fraud under federal law is
likely to constitute fraud under state law, and vice versa. Most of the
generate meaningful information for investors and further reduce frivolous
litigation without jeopardizing the critically important right of defrauded
investors to obtain relief.
Id.
326 See July 24, 1997, Senate Uniform Standards Act Hearing, supra note 13 (transcript at
45) (prepared statement ofJoseph A. Grundfest and Michael A. Perino, Professor of Law).
327 Id.
328 July 24, 1997, Senate Unforn Standards Act Hearing, supra note 13 (transcript at 53)
(prepared testimony of Joseph A. Grundfest and Michael A. Perino, Professors of Law).
329 See generally supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text (discussing the 1996 Act).
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differences between federal and state law concern remedies, burdens
of proof, and procedure, and not substantive definitions of prohibited
conduct. The most significant exception to the overall uniformity of
substantive antifraud law is the new federal safe harbor for forward-
looking statements, which issuers may be unwilling to use if states do
not incorporate a similar safe harbor into their laws. 330 If Congress
wants a national market standard protecting statements that fall
within the federal safe harbor, state antifraud laws may interfere.
Professors Grundfest and Perino's second conclusion was, in fact,
an opinion about the law preexisting the Uniform Standards Act: that
the 1995 Reform Act, and other provisions of the federal securities
laws, impliedly preempted conflicting provisions of state law. This ar-
gunment asserts a policy reason why Congress explicitly should have pre-
empted state law if the law was uncertain and resources would be
spent litigating over whether Congress had implied preemption.
However, prior to the enactment of the Uniform Standards Act, there
was little if any support for this argument that the 1995 Reform Act
preempted state antifraud statutes.331
330 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 102, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5
(Supp. II 1996). For a brief discussion of the safe harbor provision's efficacy, see supra
note 165.
331 The New York Court of Appeals decision in Guice v. Charles Schwab and Co., 674
N.E.2d 282 (N.Y. 1996), provides some insight into how courts approach preemption
arguments:
The pre-emption question is ultimately one of congressional intent. As re-
capitulated most recently in Barnett Bank, congressional preemptive intent
may be shown from express language in the Federal statute; it may also be
established implicitly because the Federal legislation is so comprehensive in
its scope that it is inferable that Congress wished fully to occupy the field of
its subject matter ("field preemption"), or because State law conflicts with
the Federal law. Implied conflict preemption may be found when it is im-
possible for one to act in compliance with both the Federal and State laws,
or when "the state law... 'stan[ds] as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'"
Id. at 285 (citations omitted) (quoting Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 116 S.Ct.
1103, 1108 (1997) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))) (alterations in
original). The Guice opinion, however, does not support the claim that the 1995 Reform
Act preempted state law. First, Guice specifically recognized that "[t ] he pre-emption ques-
tion is ultimately one of congressional intent," id., and there is no evidence that Congress
intended to preempt state law in 1995. Furthermore, Guice addressed a much narrower
issue: whether a state law requiring a broker to make "full and frank disclosure" to his
customer was partially preempted by 1975 amendments to the 1934 Act and by the SEC
implementing regulations. See id. at 284-87. The Guice court held that the federal statute
and regulations preempted state law to the extent that the state law interfered with the SEC's
ability to regulate the securities markets.
When, thus, a State's regulation, through the imposition of common-
law tort liability or otherwise, adversely affects the ability of a Federal ad-
ministrative agency to regulate comprehensively and with uniformity in ac-
cordance with the objectives of Congress, then the state law may be pre-
empted even though collision between the state and federal regulation may
not be an inevitable consequence.
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Professors Grundfest and Perino's third conclusion restated their
first, which they had made from the perspective of increasing effi-
ciency in the securities markets, from the perspective of increasing
efficiency in federal and state courts. Although state court litigation
against an issuer usually occurs in a single state,332 a claimant may still
file a parallel federal suit. Accordingly, this third conclusion posits
that it would be cheaper, other things being equal, for a claim to be
heard in either state or federal court, but not in both. As discussed
below, however, other things often are not equal-significant overall
benefits can be realized from the dual-forum class action
framework. 333
Moreover, even to the extent that state and federal class actions
need to be more efficiently coordinated procedurally, the sweeping
preemption of the Uniform Standards Act was drastic and unneces-
sary. Professor Geoffrey Miller has suggested several specific ways in
which federal courts can facilitate litigation of state and federal causes
of action in a single forum that afford substantially similar relief.33 4
With minor adjustments, many of Professor Miller's suggestions could
be implemented to facilitate litigation of federal and state causes of
action for securities fraud either in a single forum or in two fora that
maintain respect for each other's procedures.
First, Professor Miller suggested that federal courts should have
removal power authorizing them "to take over overlapping state class
Id. at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, the causes of action for securi-
ties fraud that have existed in the states for well over 100 years do not interfere with the
SEC's ability to regulate the securities markets. Indeed, in 1997 the Chairman of the SEC
opposed preemption of state cause of action. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
Finally, although state courts have imposed stays on discovery in deference to the congres-
sional purpose evidenced in the 1995 Reform Act, no reported holdings have found that
the 1995 Reform Act preempts state causes of action for securities fraud. Of course, the
Uniform Standards Act does preempt state law, but the argument that without its enact-
ment federal courts would have held that the 1995 Reform Act preempted state class ac-
tions is not well-founded.
332 The economics of class action litigation-the class size mustjustify expenditures on
litigation-make commencing a class action in every state in which securities are sold im-
practical. In fact, the overwhelming majority of state class actions have been filed in Cali-
fornia, the state in which the high technology companies often named as defendants base
their operations. See supra text accompanying notes 183-84.
333 See infra Part V.A.2. Costs of duplicate litigation could be reduced if the law re-
quired plaintiffs to elect between federal and state remedies, a less drastic approach than
complete preemption of state law. Requiring plaintiffs to choose between federal and state
remedies, however, would not end duplicate litigation (separate federal and state classes
could still be formed), and it might prejudice plaintiffs who lack the sophistication to eval-
uate competing "sales pitches" from lawyers soliciting them to join one class or the other.
Furthermore, the 1934 Act already discourages simultaneous litigation in state and federal
courts by limiting combined recovery to a plaintiff's actual damages. See Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (Supp. II 1996).
334 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 514, 540-46
(1996).
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action cases when the federal-court litigation offers the opportunity
for the complete and adequate resolution of the claims asserted in
state court.133 5 Prior to the Uniform Standards Act, if a plaintiff chose
to file a 1933 Act claim in state court, it could not be removed to
federal court.33 6 Amendment of the 1933 Act to permit, but not re-
quire, removal of such a claim,3 3 7 might have been enough to facili-
tate removal not only of the 1933 Act claim, but also of any related
state law claims as well. 338 Although 1934 Act claims, which must be
filed in federal court,339 did not present removal issues, Congress
could give federal courts the authority to take over state securities
fraud actions in which a plaintiff files an overlapping federal class ac-
tion under the 1934 Act.
Second, Professor Miller suggested that federal courts can "inter-
pret the Anti-Injunction Act to permit anti-suit injunctions against
overlapping state class actions" in situations when there is "a substan-
tial probability that the federal litigation will result in a fair and ade-
quate settlement or judgment that affords relief to the members of
the plaintiff class." 340 In the context of securities litigation in which
state court proceedings have not yet commenced, federal courts may
derive even broader authority from the All Writs Act.3 4 1 The Uniform
335 Id. at 542.
336 See Securities Act of 1933 § 22 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1994) (allowing a plaintiff to
bring an action in either federal or state court but prohibiting removal to federal court of a
case brought in a "State court of competent jurisdiction").
337 The Uniform Standards Act amends 1933 Act section 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a), by
inserting an exception into the provision that prohibited the removal of cases from state
court. See H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. § 101 (a) (3) (1998), reprinted in 144 CONG. REc. H6053
(daily ed. July 21, 1998) (amending section 22(a) of the 1933 Act). The exception refers
to section 16 in the 1933 Act which the Uniform Standards Act amends to read as follows:
"Any covered class action brought in any State court involving a covered security, as set
forth in subsection (b), shall be removable to the Federal district court for the district in
which the action is pending." Id. at § 101(a) (1) (emphasis added) (amending section
16(c) of the 1933 Act). Subsection (b), however, refers only to claims brought under the
statutory or common law of any state, meaning that an action based exclusively on 1933 Act
claims presumably still cannot be removed.
338 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994) (granting removal jurisdiction over "civil action[s]
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction"); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (authorizing removal from a state court to a federal
court of normally nonremovable state claims if joined with a removable federal claim).
339 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1994).
340 Miller, supra note 334, at 543. The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1996),
provides that "[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceed-
ings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
341 The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) (1994), states: "The Supreme Court and all
courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of
their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." Courts
have applied the All Writs Act in varied circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. New York
Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977) (finding that the All Writs Act "extends, under appropri-
ate circumstances, to persons who, though not parties to the original action or engaged in
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Standards Act reinforces this point by specifically providing that a fed-
eral court may stay discovery in any state court suit while a federal suit
is pending.3 42
Third, Professor Miller reiterated a suggestion that he and Profes-
sor Macey had made in 1991: that federal courts can "auction off"
class action claims to the highest bidder, who would then pay the class
members and prosecute the claim. 343 Several federal district court
judges already have experimented with auctioning off the lead coun-
sel position.344 Auctions provide "an additional consideration favor-
ing the centralization of overlapping class action cases in a single
federal forum,"3 45 and even absent preemption by the Uniform Stan-
dards Act, federal courts could have facilitated this centralization by
using lead counsel auctions to favor lawyers who present a workable
proposal to litigate federal and state claims together in federal
court.
3 4 6
wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the
proper administration of justice"); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 335-40 (2d
Cir. 1985) (upholding, under the All Writs Act, a federal district court's injunction barring
attorneys general in all fifty states from bringing lawsuits seeking restitution on behalf of
citizens because the same transactions were already the subject matter of over 100 federal
securities lawsuits that had been transferred and consolidated in a single federal district
court). As Professor Coffee observed, "federal courts have used this power sparingly, prin-
cipally because of the counterbalancing instruction of the Anti-Injunction Act that federal
courts may not (except in extraordinary cases) enjoin state court proceedings." Coffee,
Class Action, supra note 52, at 35.
342 See H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. § 101 (a) (2), reprinted in 144 CONG. Rac. H6053 (daily
ed. July 21, 1998).
343 See Miller, supra note 334, at 543-46 (citing Macey & Miller, supra note 161). Pro-
fessor Miller describes the proposed auction process as follows:
Upon the filing of a class action complaint, the judge would conduct an
initial investigation to determine whether the case would be appropriate for
auction. If the judge decided to go forward, he or she would conduct an
auction of the claim. Anyone, including the defendant, could bid for the
litigation; if the defendant made the high bid, the case would settle. The
judge would award the claim to the highest bidder, deduct expenses, and
distribute the remaining funds to the class members upon filing of proper
proofs of claim. Meanwhile, the winning bidder would prosecute the case
(unless the defendant submits the high bid) much like a standard class ac-
tion case.
Id. at 544 (footnotes omitted). For a critique of this proposal, see Randall S. Thomas &
Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis, 87 Nw.
U. L. REv. 423, 426 (1993) (pointing out that auctions are not always economical and that
in the "class of cases where bidders' costs in determining the value of the claim are low, we
believe that the benefits of eliminating agency costs exceed the costs of the auction
process").
344 United States District CourtJudge Vaughn Walker has experimented with an auc-
tion approach in several class actions. See, e.g., In re California Micro Devices Sec. Litig.,
No. C-94-2817-VRW, 1995 WL 476625 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 1995); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131
F.R.D. 688, 697 (N.D. Cal. 1990), modified by 132 F.R.D. 538, 539 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
345 Miller, supra note 334, at 543.
346 Federal courts may assume supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims. See
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994) ("[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original
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2. Benefits of a Dual-Forum Class Action Framework
A dual-forum class action framework has some benefits. Most of
these benefits result from the fact that the dual-forum framework al-
lows litigants the option, in appropriate circumstances, of having cor-
porate law and securities law questions resolved together under the
law of a single state. The source of these benefits, or "network exter-
nalities,"3 47 derives from the inherent connectedness of the law of cor-
porate fiduciary duties and securities law, despite a longstanding
effort by the federal courts to separate the two.
Many incidents of securities fraud also involve a breach of fiduci-
ary duty by corporate managers. Yet as discussed in Part I of this Arti-
cle, Congress has declined to enact a federal corporate law.
Furthermore, the federal courts have not developed a common law of
corporate fiduciary duty after Santa Fe Industries v. Green,348 in which
the Supreme Court held that breach of fiduciary duty does not consti-
tute "deception" under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.3 49 Therefore,
breach of fiduciary duty, standing alone, must be litigated under state
corporate law or possibly state securities law, while claims involving
"deception" of security holders also may be litigated under federal se-
curities law. Federal courts have struggled with Santa Fe's distinction
between fiduciary breach and deception in the context of both securi-
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims
that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy .. ").
347 See supra note 82. Professor Klausner and others have recognized that "[o]nejusti-
fication for mandatory disclosure in securities law is to promote standardization in the
disclosure format to facilitate comparisons across companies. This is essentially a network
externality argument." Klausner, supra note 82, at 836 n.240. Similar network externality
arguments could be made to justify standardization of the rules governing securities fraud
litigation and perhaps for preemption of state rules that differ markedly from federal rules.
Nonetheless, as the following discussion demonstrates, other network externalities besides
standardization of legal rules have become important to the effective functioning of our
system for pleading, litigating, and setting suits under corporate and securities law.
348 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
349 In Santa Fe Industries, the minority shareholders of Kirby Lumber Corporation sued
under section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, alleging that (1) Kirby's stock had been underval-
ued in a short-form merger of Kirby into its parent corporation Santa Fe Industries, and
(2) there was no business purpose for the merger. See id. at 466-67. The Second Circuit
held that a breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the purchase or sale of a security
would violate section 10(b), see id. at 470, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the words "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in section 10(b) require a
showing that the defendants manipulated the market, misrepresented a material fact, or
failed to disclose a material fact which they had a duty to disclose. See id. at 476 (noting
that there is no authority for "the proposition ... that a breach of fiduciary duty by major-
ity stockholders, without any deception, misinterpretation, or nondisclosure, violates the
statute and the Rule").
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ties sales35 0 and proxy solicitations.3 51 As Professor Henry Hart once
observed, "legal problems repeatedly fail to come wrapped up in neat
packages marked 'all-federal' or 'all-state."' 3 5 2
Under the dual-forum class action framework that preceded the
Uniform Standards Act, plaintiffs could sometimes opt into the net-
work externalities inherent in using a single body of law by filing class
actions for securities fraud under state corporate law and possibly also
by filing related securities law claims in the state of the issuer's incor-
poration. In those cases, courts were not forced to make sharp dis-
tinctions between "fiduciary" and "disclosure" claims and thus avoided
having to struggle with the fluid border that separates these two areas
of the law. This state law option would be particularly attractive in
cases involving securities fraud alleged to have been perpetrated
against existing stockholders, issuers that sold most of their securities
within their states of incorporation, and situations where economizing
on litigation costs is of particular importance.
Although early versions of the White-Eshoo and Gramm-Dodd
bills 353 would have obliterated these network externalities by forcing
all claims of misrepresentation connected to securities transactions
into federal court, the Uniform Standards Act incorporates a "Dela-
350 Some courts distinguish Santa Fe Industres and find a fiduciary liable under section
10(b) for failing to disclose her breach of duty if the plaintiff, as a result of the nondisclo-
sure, fails to pursue a remedy available under state law. See, e.g., Estate of Soler v. Rodri-
guez, 63 F.3d 45, 54 (1st Cir. 1995); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 211-12, 214-15 (2d
Cir. 1977). Other courts reject this reasoning. See, e.g., Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Ellis,
810 F.2d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that Goldbergand similar holdings "use the securi-
ties laws to redress substantive violations of state law").
351 See Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 972 F.2d 700, 707-10 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding
that although minority shareholders did not have votes sufficient to stop a cash-out
merger, they could meet the causation requirement for suit under 1934 Act section 13(e)
by showing that a deceptive proxy statement induced them to forego an appraisal remedy
under state law); Wilson v. Great Am. Indus., 979 F.2d 924, 931 (2d Cir. 1992). The Wilson
court stated the following:
Here loss causation may be established when a proxy statement prompts a
shareholder to accept an unfair exchange ratio for his shares rather than
recoup a greater value through a state appraisal. And transaction causation
may be shown when a proxy statement, because of material misrepresenta-
tions, causes a shareholder to forfeit his appraisal rights by voting in favor
of the proposed corporate merger.
Id. The Supreme Court specifically left this issue unresolved in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v.
Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1107 (1991) ("[T]here is no indication in the law or facts before
us that the proxy solicitation resulted in any ... loss [of a state remedy]."). See generally
Marc I. Steinberg, The Emergence of State Securities Laws: Partly Sunny Skies for Investors, 62 U.
CIN. L. Rxv. 395, 415-16 (1993) (discussing the more recent case law in light of the
Supreme Court's ruling in Virginia Bankshares).
352 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. Rxv.
489, 498 (1954).
353 See supra notes 260-74 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 84:1
UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT
ware carve-out."3 54 The carve-out seeks to preserve certain, specified
state law fiduciary duty claims in which misrepresentation may be an
issue-principally suits over statements made to obtain shareholder
approval of mergers and other transactions.355 However, plaintiffs
must file suits involving misrepresentation in transactions that fall
outside of this carve-out in federal court under federal law. This re-
quirement forces plaintiffs to litigate securities claims and fiduciary
duty claims, which will remain in state court, under separate bodies of
law, even if they would have preferred to file securities claims only in
the state of incorporation.
Most importantly, the Uniform Standards Act does not replace
these network externalities with the potentially more valuable network
externalities that would result from both securities and corporate law
being developed in the same jurisdiction. Congress could have con-
sidered Professor Gary's proposal that it establish a federal corporate
law erecting minimum standards that would make it less attractive for
corporations to organize in any one particular state.356 Alternatively,
Congress could have explored Professor Romano's suggestion that the
arguments in favor of leaving corporate law to the states357 also apply
to securities law and that issuers therefore should be allowed to opt
into the securities laws of a particular state (including their state of
incorporation). 35s Admittedly, each of these proposals could create
new costs and benefits for issuers and investors (an issue beyond the
scope of this Article). However, as it stands, the Uniform Standards
Act does not establish a uniform body of law governing the rights of
investors holding securities in a corporation or other business
organization.
354 See S. 1260, 105th Cong. § 101 (a) (1) (1998). The text of the Delaware carve-out
provision is quoted supra note 314.
355 The Delaware carve-out was adopted because of concerns expressed by SEC Chair-
man Arthur Levitt, see May 19, 1998, House Uniform Standards Act Hearings, supra note 2, at
21-22 (prepared statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC), and others, that earlier drafts
of the bills in both the House and the Senate threatened to dismember state corporate law
by forcing claims involving breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure to be filed in federal
court. For example, earlier versions of the bills probably would have preempted a class
action, under Delaware lav, against corporate directors for breach of the fiduciary duty of
disclosure to shareholders in connection with a merger or other change-in-control transac-
tion. See, e.g., Zirn v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1062 (Del. 1996) (accepting plaintiffs'
argument that breach of fiduciary duty occurred because disclosures made in a Schedule
14D-9, disseminated in connection with a tender offer, were materially misleading).
356 See Cary, supra note 56, at 701-02.
357 See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
358 See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation,
108 YALE LJ. 2359, 2361 (1998) (suggesting that mandatory federal securities regulation be
replaced with competing state law regimes and that competitive federalism would be as
viable an alternative in securities regulation as it is in corporate law).
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B. The Political Equation: Will a Dual-Forum Class Action
Framework Achieve the Right Balance Between
Issuers and Investors?
Even after passage of the 1995 Reform Act and the Uniform Stan-
dards Act, debate will continue over whether the securities litigation
system strikes the correct balance between investors' interest in facili-
tating meritorious lawsuits and deterring fraud and issuers' interest in
discouraging frivolous lawsuits and lawsuits that benefit lawyers more
than shareholders. Professor Lynn Stout has summarized this debate
as one in which two types of error are possible:
[S] cholars generally divide error into two categories. The first cate-
gory of legal error is called Type I error, or the "false positive." In
securities litigation, an example of a Type I false positive would be a
judicial finding that a defendant had fraudulently misrepresented
something, when in fact no fraud occurred. The second type of
error is called Type II error, or the "false negative." A Type II false
negative occurs when a court trying to decide whether the defen-
dant has committed fraud mistakenly finds there has been no fraud,
even though fraud actually occurred. 59
Professor Stout observed that in drafting the 1995 Reform Act, Con-
gress "was particularly concerned about a form of Type I error: the so-
called 'strike suit."' 360
Plaintiffs' advocates argue that the 1995 Reform Act went too far
in favoring defendants,3 61 and they point to statistical 62 and anecdo-
tal363 evidence that securities fraud is on the rise. Such an upswing, if
it does in fact exist, might be explained by the recent bull market or
by the proliferation of exemptions from both the registration and the
prospectus delivery requirements of the 1933 Act, which create oppor-
tunities for fraud. Providing further support for this side of the de-
bate, Professor Stout argues that the aggregate cost of Type I error is
disproportionately low (in the millions of dollars) relative to the im-
359 Stout, supra note 27, at 711.
360 Id.
361 See sources cited supra note 179.
362 See, e.g., William S. Lerach, Prevalence and Economic Impact of Securities Class Actions: Is
Reform Necessary?, in AVOIDING AND MANAGING SECURITIES LITIGATION AND SEC ENFORCE-
MENT INQUIRIES FOR IN-HOUSE COUNSEL (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. B-888, 1995) (discussing statistical data regarding fraud and class action litigation).
863 See, e.g., David Barboza, On the Shady Side of the Bull Market: Large Returns Are Now
Bringing in Stock Promoters with Rap Sheets, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1997, at 33 ("[T]he tangled
tale of [the Genesis fraud episode] suggests that the money to be made in the soaring stock
market has begun to attract a more dangerous kind of criminal to businesses that end up
fleecing investors"); Paul Beckett, Bull Market Adds to Regulators' Woes, WALL ST. J., March 3,
1997, at B7B ("Federal regulators note that stock market's recent bullishness has led to a
sharp rise in securities sales fraud....").
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pact of Type II error on U.S. capital markets (in which trillions of
dollars of securities are outstanding).364
However, those who support restricting private rights of action
point to statistical evidence of their own: courts eventually dismiss a
large number of class action suits; 3 65 the volume of filings correlates
with fluctuations in the market;3 66 issuers which use prestigious under-
364 Professor Stout writes:
Let us first talk about Type I error: the strike suit. If you listen to the
rhetoric coming from Capitol Hill, you will swiftly reach the conclusion that
the problem of strike suits is endemic and horribly costly. Indeed, it is
draining the life out of American enterprise.
When the proponents of securities litigation reform start to talk dollars
and cents, however, you very quickly get a better idea of the magnitude of
the social losses supposedly flowing from strike suits. Most often, corporate
losses from defending against meritless strike suits are described as running
in the millions or tens of millions of dollars. When the proponents of secur-
ities litigation reform get really ambitious, they will sometimes mention
figures in the hundreds of millions....
Now I want to talk about the cost of an increase in Type II error....
... In lay terms, fraud is bad for securities markets because it erodes
investor confidence. This occurs because fraud makes it difficult for inves-
tors to detect differences in the quality of the securities they buy. Compa-
nies issuing bad securities-poorly run firms that throw away money and do
a poor job for their investors-can sell their securities at about the same
price as well-managed firms, because fraud makes it impossible for investors
to easily distinguish between high-quality and low-quality firms.
Although the figure is constantly rising, the market value of publicly-
held equities issued by United States corporations presently exceeds $ 8
trillion. That's just stocks, of course. According to federal Flow of Funds
accounts, the market value of corporate bonds currently outstanding is an-
other $ 2 or $ 3 trillion. Throw in commercial paper, and some of the non-
bond debt forms corporations issue, and I think it safe and fair to say that
the market value of United States corporate securities outstanding today
significantly exceeds $ 10 trillion. That's $ 10,000,000,000,000.00.
When I look at Congress worrying about firms losing hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars from strike suits, I cannot help but think about the foolish-
ness of trading in hundreds of millions of dollars of Type I error costs for,
potentially, hundreds of billions of dollars of Type II costs....
Stout, supra note 27, at 712-14 (footnotes omitted). Professor Stout's point is clear,
although she does not give empirical support for the numbers she uses by way of illustra-
tion. Others might argue that Type I costs are significantly higher if one takes into account
issuers which never go to market out of fear of strike suits.
365 See NERA 1996 SrUny, supra note 15, at tbl.10b (showing dismissals as 17.84% of
the 998 total dispositions occurring during the sample period).
366 See id, at tbl.3 & fig.l. The average number of cases filed in a given month is nega-
tively correlated with the prior two months return on the Wilshire 5000 index. See id. The
study begins with the hypothesis that "if it is indeed fraud in the price of individual stocks
that determines whether a suit is filed, market movements would not be expected to signif-
icantly affect the number of suits filed in a given month." See id. at 7. This correlation of
class action suits with market fluctuations, however, could be due to the fact that critical
elements of a fraud claim, such as loss causation and damages, are difficult to prove in
situations in which plaintiffs only suffered minimal losses from buying the issuer's stock in
a sustained bull market. The damages provision of section 11 of the 1933 Act also specifi-
cally precludes liability if the price of the issuer's stock has gone up between the purchase
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writers with "deep pockets" are more likely to be sued;3 67 and a signifi-
cant number of suits settle for "nuisance value. '368 Type I error,
issuers and their allies will argue, far outweighs Type II error in a soci-
ety that has become obsessed with litigation.
Whether a dual-forum litigation framework creates or corrects
imbalance between these two types of error depends upon whether
bias in favor of one or the other exists in the state or federal political
systems. For example, states could be biased in favor of plaintiffs,
thereby upsetting the balance established by federal law. Such a bias
might result where state legislators or judges either have a naive un-
derstanding of what is good for shareholders or simply want to en-
courage litigation to generate fees for in-state lawyers (thereby causing
other states to bear principally the costs of Type I error). However, if
the federal regime incurs too much Type II error by precluding legiti-
mate claims for securities fraud, state lawsuits could help restore an
efficient trade-off between the two types of error. Indeed, the con-
gresses and courts that have constructed the federal securities regime
over the past sixty years have assumed that the federal trade-off be-
tween the two types of error was not the final word.
date and the date plaintiff filed suit. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11 (e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e)
(1994).
367 See James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on
Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 903, 952-55 (1996) (suggesting that IPO's handled
by high-reputation underwriters may be more likely to be the subject of class action securi-
ties fraud suits than IPO's handled by lower-reputation underwriters). But see James D.
Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 Aiuz. L. REv. 497, 507 (1997)
("[C] ontrary to [Bohn & Choi's] conclusion that the strike-suit thesis is suggested by their
finding that the higher underwriter quality, the higher the likelihood of suit, their overall
data merely confirms [sic] that larger offerings attract not only higher quality underwriters
but also cost-conscious class action lawyers.")
368 SeeJoseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HAtv. L. REv. 727, 743 (1995) (assum-
ing that settlements of less than $2 million generally involve "nuisance" suits, and citing
three studies suggesting "that from 22% to 60% of observed settlements are sufficiently low
that the merits may not have mattered at all in the resolution of the litigation"). The 1996
NERA Study tests Grundfest's hypothesis. See 1996 NERA STUDY, supra note 15, at 11-12; id.
tbl.8a (showing that nine out of 46, or 20%, of cases in the sample settled for less than $2
million); id. tbl.8b (showing that 86 out of 331, or 26%, of cases in another sample settled
for less than $2 million). By comparing each of these low settlement amounts to the total
losses incurred by investors during the class period, and identifying those cases that "settle
for an amount that is a much smaller fraction of total investor losses than the average for
the whole sample," NERA estimated "that at least 21 percent, and possibly 42 percent of
these low-value settlements may well be nuisance suits, and are likely settling for nuisance
value." Id. at 12. But see Cox, supra note 367, at 512 (citing Willard T. Carleton et al.,
Securities Class Action Lawsuits: A Descriptive Study, 38 ARuz. L. REv. 491, 494-99 & tbl.2 (1996)
and arguing that, with reasonable assumptions about investor behavior and reliable data,
83% of settlements occur within the range of expected damages); Joel Seligman, The Merits
Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest's "Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the
Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority," 108 HARv. L. REv. 438, 450-53 (1994)
(critiquing these types of studies as based on unreliable estimates of plaintiffs' potential
damage recoveries).
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1. Type I Error: Will the States Be Biased in Favor of Plaintiffs?
Might the states go too far in favoring plaintiffs over defendants,
thus making it impossible for Congress and the federal courts to main-
tain the right balance between the two? Some evidence suggests that
state blue sky laws treat plaintiffs more favorably than does the federal
civil liability regime. Some states have weaker scienter require-
ments,3 69 and most allow suits against aiders and abettors.370 A few
states allow punitive damages for securities fraud, 371 and others allow
for recovery of attorneys' fees.372
Professor Perino correctly has pointed out that the forces shaping
state securities laws differ sharply from those shaping corporate law.3 73
Corporate law is shaped by the market for corporate charters, in
which states compete with one another by offering laws with features
attractive to corporate management: predictability, efficient rules, and
other network externalities constructed around a comprehensive
369 See 9 Loss & SELGMAN, supra note 91, at 4133 n.3 (noting that "there is a possibility
of a weaker scienter requirement at common law than under Rule 10b-5, or perhaps none
at all," and citing several cases in support of this proposition); see also Campbell, supra note
150, at 201 n.141 (citing five state antifraud statutes applying a simple negligence standard:
IOWA CODE § 502.502 (1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1268 (1995); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 292.480 (Banks-Baldwin 1996); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:712 (West 1987); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, § 10,605 (West 1988)).
370 Section 410(b) of the Uniform Securities Act imposes joint and several liability on,
among others, every broker-dealer or agent "who materially aids in the sale" of securities in
violation of section 410(a). UNIF. SEC. Acr § 410(b) (1985). Section 410(a) contains lan-
guage substantially similar to that in section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, except that section
410(a) is not limited to statements made "by means of a prospectus," Securities Act of 1933
§ 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77(l) (2) (Supp. II 1996). See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,
584 (1995) (stating that the words "by means of a prospectus" in section 12 (2) require that
there be "a document that describes a public offering of securities by an issuer or control-
ling shareholder"). Sections 12 (1) and 12 (2) of the 1933 Act also impose liability only on a
person who "offers or sells" securities, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 77(0. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S.
622, 642-55 (1988) (finding no support in the language of section 12(1) for imposition of
primary liability on persons who do not offer securities for sale, solicit offers, or transfer
title to securities). Sections 12(1) and 12(2) thus contain no equivalent to section 410(b)
of the Uniform Securities Act reaching collateral participants. Similarly, private suits under
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act may be brought only against primary violators, not alders and
abettors. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 175-78 (1994).
371 Punitive damages are unavailable under the 1934 Act because section 28 limits re-
covery to actual loss. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77bb(a)
(1994). Although the Proposition 211 proposal to introduce punitive damages in Califor-
nia failed, see supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text, a few state courts have allowed
punitive damages in suits under state blue sky laws. See 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 91,
at 4133 n.3 (noting that Voskamp v. Arnoldy, 749 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. App. 1988), allowed
punitive damages of $3,750,000 when actual damages from securities fraud were
$1,001,850). Furthermore, federal courts have permitted plaintiffs to claim punitive dam-
ages in a pendent state law claim joined to a suit under the 1934 Act. See Flaks v. Koegel,
504 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir. 1974); Young v. Taylor 466 F.2d 1329, 1337-38 (10th Cir. 1972).
372 See 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 91, at 4133 n.3.
37-3 See Perino, supra note 14, at 324-26.
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body of interpretive case law. 374 Securities fraud law, by contrast, is
determined by the geographic location of the transaction in question,
not by the incorporators' voluntary forum selection: "Unlike the cor-
porate charter market, the securities fraud market has nothing
equivalent to the corporate internal affairs doctrine, which preserves
mobility by giving corporations the ability to opt in to one state's regu-
latory scheme simply by reincorporating there."375 Unlike corporate
law, state securities law also serves as a backdrop for a parallel federal
law, which plaintiffs can use at their option. Thus, once a cause of
action arises, the plaintiffs' counsel, not the issuer, chooses the juris-
diction or jurisdictions in which to sue, depending upon the size of
the plaintiff class that can be assembled and the substantive and pro-
cedural law of each jurisdiction. 376 The issuer, on the other hand, has
a very limited range of options. For the most part, the issuer must
make its jurisdictional choice during the time period before a cause of
action arises, by either avoiding securities sales in states where an-
tifraud laws are too onerous 377 or moving operations out of a state
that allows a nationwide class of plaintiffs to sue in its courts.
Nonetheless, competitive forces among states do shape the devel-
opment of state securities law. States compete to attract capital, and
states in which issuers choose to conduct business operations likely
favor those issuers over investors, particularly when most of the inves-
tors are out-of-state. Pro-plaintiff interests are likely to prevail only in
smaller, less industrialized states where issuers are few in number and
have relatively little political influence. Second, an issuer can, as a
practical matter, choose with a high degree of certainty the state in
which it is amenable to securities fraud class actions by choosing
where to base its operations and where to incorporate. For example,
out of the fifty-five state securities class action complaints that the SEC
reviewed in 1996, seventy-eight percent (forty-three complaints) were
filed in California, and only seven percent (four complaints) were
374 See supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
375 Perino, supra note 14, at 325 (footnote omitted). The internal affairs doctrine
'provides that most questions involving the operation of the corporation will be resolved
under the laws of the state of incorporation, regardless of where the corporation is head-
quartered or doing business." Id. at 325 n.215.
376 Economies of scale, however, would favor federal court if the class can be consider-
ably larger in a federal than a state action. See supra text accompanying notes 225-26.
377 However, "a corporation going public could not prevent leakage into other juris-
dictions in aftermarket trading. Thus, if companies want to avail themselves of the public
equity markets, they must at the same time forego any opportunity to choose the set of
state securities regulations that will apply to aftermarket securities fraud claims lodged
against them." Perino, supra note 14, at 325-26.
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filed in states in which the issuer was not incorporated or did not have
its principal place of business. 78
California's securities bar may have dreamed of making Sacra-
mento the Wilmington, Delaware of securities litigation, but such ef-
forts most likely would have failed even without the Uniform
Standards Act. States whose laws favor plaintiffs at the expense of issu-
ers will either drive capital formation efforts to other states or drive
down the rate of return that is offered to in-state investors. If state
courts expand the reach of their laws to include the sale of securities
by in-state businesses to plaintiffs in other states,3 79 users of capital
may respond by taking their businesses elsewhere. °80 Indeed, the
Silicon Valley high technology companies that have complained the
most about California's blue sky laws can take both the jobs and tax
revenues they generate to another state with more ease than most issu-
ers. If California's voters, judges, or legislators choose a liability re-
gime too biased against issuers, then Route 128 outside of Boston, the
high-tech community spinning off from Microsoft in Seattle, and the
network of companies developing around the University of Texas in
Austin, are all attractive places to relocate.381
A similar fate awaits any state choosing to supplant the federal
securities litigation scheme through measures similar to Proposition
211, particularly if coupled with the expansive jurisdictional reach
urged by the plaintiffs in Diamond Multimedia and StorMedia.38 2 Based
upon the market for corporate charters, the corporate federalists pre-
dicted that Delaware would not abandon shareholders in a race to the
bottom. 3 3 Likewise, one can predict that the even more powerful
378 See Oct. 21, 1997, House 1995 Reform Act Implementation Hearing, supra note 14, at 23-
24 (prepared statement of Arthur Levitt, Chariman, SEG).
379 One argument for allowing nationwide plaintiff classes is that otherwise in-state
shareholders might benefit from litigation carried out at the expense of all of the share-
holders, which in turn might encourage states to facilitate frivolous lawsuits filed by their
own residents. Single-state plaintiff classes, however, would make state law class actions
more expensive relative to potential attorneys' fees, presumably making weaker claims less
likely to be filed.
380 As Professor Perino has pointed out, issuers cannot entirely escape a state's securi-
ties laws by moving away, see Perino, supra note 14, at 325-26. However, the plaintiff class
will be much smaller in a state where the issuer does not conduct most of its operations,
and in. fact such suits against out-of-state issuers are rare.
381 -But see id. at 327 (observing that there are other costs of moving that an issuer
would have to take into consideration: "[I]nefficient rules might survive if the jurisdiction
provides a significant number of other benefits that limit the opportunity for citizens to
vote with their feet"). However, demonstrating California's ability to impose inefficient
rules on its citizens, who may stay nonetheless, does not refute the assertion that California
has political and economic incentives not to impose such inefficient rules. Finally, even if
a state were to impose inefficient pro-plaintiff rules, it is entirely possible that the federal
government could choose even more inefficient pro-defendant rules.
382 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
383 See supra text accompanying notes 61-66.
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market for capital will strongly discourage states from expanding the
jurisdictional reach of their securities laws, particularly if those laws
favor plaintiffs significantly more than do the federal laws. Anyone
hoping to create a new Wilmington, Delaware in Sacramento, or any
other state capital, by encouraging frivolous lawsuits against issuers
would be disappointed, regardless of whether federal law preempts
state class actions.38 4
Indeed, recent events in California and elsewhere reinforce the
conclusion that the alarm over securities fraud suits in state court has
been a false alarm. Although concerns persist that the plaintiffs' bar
could promote ballot measures similar to Proposition 211 once again,
it should be remembered that voters rejected that measure by a wide
margin. In retrospect, the $15 million spent to support Proposition
211 was a colossal waste of money, particularly in light of the fact that
issuers were willing to spend significantly more to defeat the mea-
sure.385 Efforts to sway California's judiciary have been equally unsuc-
cessful so far. Many California courts have not given plaintiffs one of
the strategic advantages that proponents of federal preemption fear
most: expanded discovery allowing plaintiffs to avoid the 1995 Reform
Act's heightened pleading and stay of discovery provisions.38 6 The
California Supreme Court has yet to rule on this issue and has yet to
approve a nationwide class of investors suing in California for fraud in
the sale of securities by a California-based issuer.38 7 Although the Cal-
ifornia legislature thus far has not amended the state's securities laws,
the legislatures of three other states-Arizona, Montana, and Ohio-
all have enacted reforms that limit private rights of action in much the
same manner as the 1995 Reform Act.38
There is, however, one problem that Congress ultimately might
have had to contend with if it had not passed the Uniform Standards
Act: the rogue state that prospers from a decidedly pro-plaintiff slant
in substantive law, particularly if the state's procedural law allowed for
nationwide classes to be formed in its courts. In most states, especially
large ones, the potential for generating revenue by attracting business
to the state outweighs the revenue potential from becoming a haven
384 But see Perino, supra note 14, at 326 ("[T]here can be little or no competition in
any meaningful sense and states have little or no incentive to adopt efficient rules.").
385 For a discussion of the campaign surrounding Proposition 211, see supra text ac-
companying notes 205-10.
386 See supra text accompanying notes 193-200.
387 See Diamond Multimedia, Inc. v. Superior Court, H016376 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 17,
1997), review granted, No. S058723 (Cal. 1997). For a discussion of this case, see supra text
accompanying notes 211-19.
388 See Oct. 21, 1997, House 1995 Reform Act Implementation Hearing, supra note 14, at 25
& n.27 (prepared statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC) (citing Aiuz. REv. STAT.
§§ 44-2081 to -2087 (Supp. 1997); 1997 MONT. LA-Ws §§ 30-10-315 to -323 (1997); OHIo
Rxv. CODE ANN. §§ [1707.43.2]-[.43.8] (Anderson 1997)).
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for litigation. However in a few states, such as Alabama,38 9 litigation
on behalf of nationwide classes against out-of-state companies selling
life insurance, tobacco, and other consumer products has become a
cottage industry.390 Congress unsuccessfully sought to deal with this
problem by preempting portions of state law in the area of product
liability.39' If the same problem had developed in securities litigation,
Congress might justifiably have narrowly preempted state private
rights of action or imposed limitations on nationwide classes. How-
ever, at the time Congress passed the Uniform Standards Act, this
problem was more theoretical than real-plaintiffs had filed almost all
state class actions for securities fraud in the defendant issuers' state of
incorporation or principal place of business.3 92
2. Type II Error: Will the Federal System Be Biased in Favor of
Defendants?
What about the concern that Congress or the federal courts will
incur too much Type II error because of bias in favor of defendants?
If this occurs, private causes of action for securities fraud under state
law could play an invaluable role in preserving both balance to the
system and confidence in U.S. securities markets.
a. Type II Error in the Legislative Branch
There are several reasons to believe that the federal government
will not favor defendant issuers over plaintiff shareholders to an exces-
sive degree. First, regardless of the influence that issuers, underwrit-
389 See Adams v. Robertson, 676 So. 2d 1265, 1268, 1270-74 (Ala. 1995) (holding that
under Alabama rules, the certification and settlement of a nationwide class action does not
allow for objectors to opt out of the settlement).
390 See generally Coffee, Class Actions, supra note 52, passim (discussing new methods by
which defense attorneys are fighting class action suits); Perino, supra note 14, at 318 (citing
Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996), and claiming that "[s]ecurities
litigation could begin to look more like tobacco litigation and other mass tort cases").
391 See The Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956,
104th Cong. (1996). This Act would have limited punitive damage claims in most product
liability cases to $250,000, or two times the compensatory damages, whichever is larger. See
id. § 108. However, President Clinton vetoed this bill. See Message to the House of Repre-
sentatives Returning Without Approval Product Liability Legislation, PUB. PAPERs 681 (May
2, 1996) (William J. Clinton). Congress then failed to override the veto. See 142 CONG.
REC. H4764 (daily ed. May 9, 1996) (noting Congress's failure to override the veto by a vote
of 258-163).
392 See supra note 378 and accompanying text. After the 1995 Reform Act, the plain-
tiffs' bar invested its resources in efforts to change California's securities laws. See supra text
accompanying notes 205-10. Because it is so impractical to sue only on behalf of in-state
plaintiffs, even in large states like California, the plaintiffs' bar has sought, through the
Diamond Multimedia and StorMedia cases, to expand the scope of the allowed class to in-
clude out-of-state investors. See supra Part III.B.2. By contrast, the securities laws of smaller
states, such as Alabama and Mississippi, have received little attention from the plaintiffs'
bar.
1998]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ers, and accountants have over the political process,3 93 proposals that
favor issuers too much are likely to suffer the same fate as California's
Proposition 201-rejection at the voting booth. 394 Second, there are
powerful interest groups on both sides of this debate, and pro-plaintiff
interest groups have strong support in at least one of the major polit-
ical parties. 395 Third, a legal framework that protects investors in-
creases the size and breadth of a country's capital markets., 96
Assuming Congress understands this point, it is unlikely that it would
risk diminishing the scope of U.S. capital markets by repealing laws
against fraud.
Nonetheless, there are reasons to be concerned that Congress
will be biased too much in favor the defendants. Expanding share-
holder rights is not a compelling populist issue, whereas issuers and
other participants in securities offerings care passionately about re-
ducing the amount of litigation.397 Furthermore, because there are
no national referenda voters have no opportunity to speak out directly
on federal securities law. Elected representatives make these deci-
sions, which makes it easier for politicians to sacrifice investor inter-
ests when it is expedient for them to do so. An examination of voting
records for both the successful override of President Clinton's veto of
the 1995 Reform Act and the unsuccessful override of the President's
veto of the Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of
1996 (limiting punitive damages in product liability cases) illustrates
this point. These voting records show that some members of Con-
gress, mostly Democrats, maximize their aggregate political support
from business interests and trial lawyers by favoring defendants in in-
393 See supra text accompanying notes 16, 163.
394 See supra text accompanying notes 201-04
395 See Glenn R. Simpson, Trial Lawyers, After Flirting with GOP in 1995, Are Sitting at
Democratic Party's Table Again, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1996, at A12; see also Douglas Frantz,
Trial Lawyers, Their Money and Their Influence Have Become Issues in the Campaign, N.Y. TiMEs,
Oct. 13, 1996, at 18 ("While the White House says that the President has done nothingjust
to please the lawyers, he and the Democratic Party have clearly benefitted from the polit-
ical largess of lawyers, receiving far more in contributions from them than have Mr. Dole
and the Republicans.").
396 See RAFAEL LA PORTA, LEGAL DETERMINANTS OF ExTERNAL FINANCE 1, 5 (Nat'l Bu-
reau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5879, 1997). This study demonstrates "that
countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules
and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets." Id. at 1.
Additionally, in studying how legal rules protecting investors affect the capital markets in
various countries, the authors assert that "because a good legal environment protects the
potential financiers against expropriation by entrepreneurs, it raises their willingness to
surrender funds in exchange for securities, and hence expands the scope of capital mar-
kets." Id. at 19. Leonard B. Simon of Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach LLP dis-
cussed this study in his testimony before the House. See Oct. 21, 1997, House 1995 Reform
Act Implementation Hearing, supra note 14, at 76 (prepared statement of Leonard B. Simon,
securities litigator).
397 See supra note 16.
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vestor lawsuits and plaintiffs in tort litigation. 398 This vote splitting is a
logical byproduct of the sheer volume of product liability and other
tort litigation in comparison to securities litigation.399 If the plaintiffs'
bar must choose to give up either tort or securities litigation, it will
sacrifice securities litigation. Similarly, a politician who votes in favor
of narrowing federal private rights of action for securities fraud will
unlikely lose political support from plaintiffs' lawyers, if she stands be-
side them in the tort reform arena.400
398 Sixty-five members of the House of Representatives (61 Democrats and four Repub-
licans) voted to override President Clinton's veto of the 1995 Reform Act, but also voted to
sustain the President's veto of the Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act.
Compare CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., CONGRESSIONAL ROLL CALL 1995, at H-252 to -253
(1996) [hereinafter 1995 RoLL CALL] (House Roll No. 870) (listing votes for the successful
override of President Clinton's veto of the 1995 Reform Act), with CONGRESSIONAL QUAR-
TERLY INC., CONGRESSIONAL ROLL CALL 1996, at H-54 to -55 (1997) [hereinafter 1996 RoLL
CALL] (House Roll No. 162) (listing votes for unsuccessful override of President Clinton's
veto of the Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996). Fifteen Senators
(12 Democrats and three Republicans), in like manner, took different sides in securities
litigation than in tort litigation, when they voted to pass the 1995 Reform Act but against
passage of the Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act. Compare 1995 RoLL
CALL, supra, at S-49 (Senate Vote No. 295) (listing votes in favor of the 1995 Reform Act),
with 1996 RoLL CALt, supra, at S-10 (Senate Vote No. 44) (listing votes against the Com-
mon Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act). One good example of this phenomenon
is Senator Ron Wyden (D-Or.). Senator Wyden, after graduating from law school, began
his political career by founding the Grey Panthers, a group dedicated to protecting social
security and Medicare benefits for the elderly. See Russell Sadler, Wyden and Smith/Senators
Trade Politics for Statesmanship, BULLETIN (Bend, Or.), Sept. 15, 1997, at A6. The Grey
Panthers opposed the 1995 Reform Act and opposed the Uniform Standards Act. See Gray
Panthers Letter, supra note 281. In 1995, however, then-Congressman Wyden (D-Or.) voted
to override President Clinton's veto of the 1995 Reform Act. See 1995 ROLL CALL, supra, at
H-252. Senator Wyden was also one of eight Democrats and seven Republicans that cos-
ponsored the Gramm-Dodd bill. Senator Wyden, by contrast, opposed the Common Sense
Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996. See 142 CONG. REc. S2590 (daily ed. Mar. 21,
1996) (recording Senator Wyden's "no" vote on the Conference Report on House Bill
956).
399 BetweenJanuary 1991 andJune 1996, approximately $3.9 billion was paid in settle-
ments for 475 federal class action securities suits. See NERA 1996 STUDY, supra note 15, at
ii. This represents "roughly 60% of all settlements, suggesting as much as $6.5 billion has
been paid out overall. On average, plaintiffs' attorneys have received one-third of the set-
tlement awards in each year." Id. These fees are substantial, but are dwarfed by the
amount of money that lawyers can make in product liability litigation. Attorneys' fees in
Texas's planned settlement with the tobacco industry alone could exceed $2 billion (15%
of the total settlement). See Texas Tobacco Settlement Questioned, UPI, Jan. 21, 1998, available
in LEXIS News Library, Wires File. The fees charged under Florida's retainer contract with
its tobacco litigation attorneys were also astronomical. See Stephen Gillers, Florida Backs
Out on a Dea4 N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1997, at A23 ("Five of the 11 lawyers have demanded
payment under the terms of the contract, which would amount to about $100 million per
lawyer. That may sound like a lot for legal fees, but Florida should honor the contract."
(emphasis added)).
400 Another example is Congress's passage of the Uniform Standards Act while two
bills that would preempt state court mass tort litigation remain delayed in committee. See
supra note 9 (discussing House Bill 3789 and Senate Bill 2083). This is particularly ironic
given the fact that the arguments in favor of preemption are more compelling in tort
1998]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Finally, while academics and perhaps the SEC may be concerned
with the eventual size and breadth of U.S. capital markets, entrepre-
neurs and politicians are concerned much more about developments
likely to occur in the next few fiscal years or before the next election.
Only a disaster such as the 1929 stock market crash likely would focus
attention on the broader structural problems of U.S. capital markets,
and even then, legislation would not necessarily respond to the under-
lying problems.40 1
Setting aside predictions about the future, it is obvious that Wash-
ington is not presently taking a pro-plaintiff stance in securities litiga-
tion. The 1995 Reform Act was controversial precisely because it
significantly altered the legal landscape of securities class actions in
favor of defendants. 40 2 It remains to be seen how the federal courts
will interpret the 1995 Reform Act's pleading requirements 40 3 and its
other critical provisions and whether these provisions will deny an
unacceptably large number of persons with legitimate claims their day
in court. If this occurs, Congress will need to amend the 1933 and
1934 Acts yet again to correct resulting imbalances, and until it can
pass new national legislation (if it can pass new national legislation),
state securities laws could provide an important remedy for these im-
balances. Indeed, the 1995 Reforms Act's legislative history contains
at least some discussion concerning the availability of state law reme-
dies as a safety net in the event that the 1995 Reform Act worked to
preclude plaintiffs from federal court. 40 4
b. The Supreme Court's Scaling Back of Private Rights of Action
In the judicial branch, twenty years of Supreme Court decisions
cutting back on the federal private right of action for securities fraud
preceded the 1995 Reform Act. These holdings are rooted in the
Supreme Court's hostility, beginning in the mid-1970s, to an implied
private right of action under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act-a right of
action that Congress never expressly bestowed 405 and that has little
litigation, in which plaintiffs' lawyers have brought suits on behalf of nationwide classes in
state court against defendants having minimal contacts with the forum state.
401 See Mahoney, supra note 158, at 1052-54 (arguing that Congress's objective in pass-
ing the 1933 Act was to curtail fraudulent conduct by promoters of new issues).
402 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 179.
403 See sources cited supra notes 181-82.
404 See Common Sense Legal Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin.
ofthe House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 109-10 (1995) (colloquy between Rep. Christo-
pher Cox and Prof. Daniel Fischel) (discussing how changing the federal law would create
more options for plaintiffs who would have a choice of forum between federal and state
court); see also Oct. 21, 1997, House 1995 Reform Act Implementation Hearing, supra note 14, at
82 (prepared statement of Leonard B. Simon) (discussing the aforementioned colloquy
and additional debates during the consideration of the 1995 Reform Act).
405 Neither the 1934 Act's section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder,
mention a private right of action. See supra note 47 (quoting the relevant text of section
[Vol. 84:1
UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT
support in the legislative history.40 6 Ironically, one reason the 1934
Congress did not think to include this private right of action in the
1934 Act may have been because Congress specifically preserved state
causes of action in section 28 of the Act.40 7 As the Supreme Court
stated in Marine Bank v. Weaver,40° "[w] e are satisfied that Congress, in
enacting the securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal
remedy for all fraud."40 9 Thus, both Congress, by declining to create
an express private right of action under section 10(b), and the Court,
by interpreting the provision narrowly, made their decisions against
the backdrop of section 28. Until passage of the Uniform Standards
Act, section 28 gave states an unrestricted opportunity to correct for
limitations imposed upon private lawsuits under federal law, and fed-
eral courts were well aware of this.
The Supreme Court's contraction of the private right of action
under section 10(b) began with Blue 'Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores,410 which held that a plaintiff must be a person who actually
bought or sold the security in question.411 The Court pointed out
10(b) and Rule 10b-5); see also Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 170-80
(1994) (discussing section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). The Central Bank Court noted:
In Blue Chip Stamps, we noted that it would be "anomalous to impute to
Congress an intention to expand the plaintiff class for ajudicially implied
cause of action beyond the bounds it delineated for comparable express
causes of action." Here, it would be just as anomalous to impute to Con-
gress an intention in effect to expand the defendant class for lOb-5
actions....
Id. at 180 (citations omitted) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 736 (1975)). The Blue Chip Court had previously pointed out that: "When we deal
with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from
little more than a legislative acorn." Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 737.
406 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (finding that "the exten-
sive legislative history of the 1934 Act is bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress'
intent" with respect to a private right of action under section 10(b)); Milton V. Freeman,
Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. LAw. 891, 922 (1967) (asserting that the SEC, in drafting
Rule lOb-5, never contemplated that the Rule would be used in private lawsuits); David S.
Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5:Judicial Revision of Legislative Intenti, 57 Nw. U. L. Rv.
627, 685 (1963) ("Congress did not intend to create an implied right of action for violation
of a Rule promulgated under Section 10(b).... ."); Steve Thel, The Original Conception of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 42 STAN. L. REv. 385, 432 n.209 (1990) (quoting
Ruder, supra).
407 See supra notes 120-24.
408 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (holding that a privately negotiated arrangement promising a
share of a borrower's profits in return for a loan guarantee was not a security for purposes
of 1934 Act section 10(b)).
409 Id. at 556.
410 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
411 See id. at 749-55. Blue Chip adopted the rule set forth in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir,. 1952), that a person who is neither a purchaser nor a seller of
securities may not bring an action under 1934 Act section 10(b) or Rule lob-5. See id. The
Blue Chip Court recognized that
A great majority of the many commentators on the issue before us have
taken the view that the Birnbaum limitation on the plaintiff class in a Rule
1998]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
that plaintiffs who refrain from buying or selling a security because of
fraudulent conduct can pursue state law remedies preserved under
section 28.412 Two years later, in Santa Fe Industries v. Green,413 the
Court held that section 10(b) does not encompass suits for breach of
fiduciary duty.4 14 Once again, the Court emphasized that adequate
remedies for breach of fiduciary duty existed under state law.415 Fi-
nally, in the 1991 case of Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbeyrtson 416 the Supreme Court held that federal courts hearing cases
brought under section 10(b) cannot borrow statutes of limitations
from analogous state laws in the relevant jurisdiction. 417 The Court
instead applied a limitations period borrowed from express private
rights of action elsewhere in the federal securities laws: one year from
the date the plaintiff discovered the alleged fraud and, regardless of
that date, three years from the date of the fraud itself.418 The Court
thus ruled that fraud occurring more than three years before the
plaintiff discovered it cannot be the basis for suits under section
10(b). However, the Court made this seemingly harsh decision know-
ing that plaintiffs could still resort to private rights of action under the
typically longer state statutes of limitations.
Other cases interpreting section 10(b) have not specifically re-
ferred to state law remedies but nonetheless have chosen narrower
10b-5 action for damages is an arbitrary restriction which unreasonably pre-
vents some deserving plaintiffs from recovering damages which have in fact
been caused by violations of Rule 10b-5.
Id. at 738.
412 The Court responded to criticisms of the Birnbaum rule by pointing out that:
Obviously this disadvantage is attenuated to the extent that remedies
are available to nonpurchasers and nonsellers under state law. Thus, for
example, in Birnbaum itself, while the plaintiffs found themselves without
federal remedies, the conduct alleged as the gravamen of the federal com-
plaint later provided the basis for recovery in a cause of action based on
state law. And in the immediate case, respondent has filed a state-court
class action held in abeyance pending the outcome of this suit.
Id. at 738 n.9.
413 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
414 See id. at 477-80.
415 See id. at 478 ("Of course, the existence of a particular state-law remedy is not dis-
positive of the question whether Congress meant to provide a similar federal remedy, but
... we conclude that 'it is entirely appropriate in this instance to relegate respondent and
others in his situation to whatever remedy is created by state law.'" (quoting Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975))).
416 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
417 See id. at 361-62.
418 See id. at 364. The Court applied this holding retroactively to require dismissal of
plaintiffs' suits that were believed to be timely before the decision. In 1991 Congress re-
sponded by amending the 1934 Act to reinstate these claims that Lampf had barred. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §27A, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (1994). In 1995 the Supreme
Court then responded by holding in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995), that
"[s] ection 27A(b) is unconstitutional to the extent that it requires federal courts to reopen
final judgments entered before its enactment." Id. at 240.
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remedies than those that exist under state law. In Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,419 the Court held that a plaintiff asserting a cause of action
under section 10(b) must show that the defendant acted with scien-
ter.420 Additionally, in the 1994 case of Central Bank v. First Interstate
Bank,421 the Supreme Court refused to allow private suits against aid-
ers and abettors of securities fraud under section 10(b).422 Therefore,
a plaintiff cannot name as defendants in federal suits, accountants,
lawyers, and other collateral participants in a securities offering, un-
less the plaintiff can establish that they were in fact primary partici-
pants in the alleged fraud, as opposed to aiders and abettors-an
ambiguous distinction at best.423 In circumstances in which plaintiffs
would have difficulty showing that a collateral participant was in fact a
primary participant, Central Bank substantially reduces the settlement
value of a securities class action brought under the 1934 Act.424
419 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
420 See id. at 193. The courts of appeals uniformly have held that a showing of reckless-
ness suffices to meet this scienter requirement, although there is some uncertainty as to
whether the 1995 Reform Act now precludes a plaintiff from pleading mere recklessness.
See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
421 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
422 See id. at 176-77.
423 See, e.g, In re Software Toolvorks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir.
1994) (discussing evidence that an accounting firm "played a significant role in drafting
and editing" issuer's misleading letters to the SEC and how this evidence supported a claim
of primary liability); SECv. United States Envtl., Inc., 897 F. Supp. 117,119 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(holding that conspiring to violate the Securities Acts is not a valid theory of liability after
Central Bank) ; In re Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. Mass.
1994) (finding that accountant's "review and approval" of quarterly reports did not consti-
tute primary liability); Vosgerichian v. Commodore Int'l, 862 F. Supp. 1371, 1378 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (asserting that plaintiff's allegation that a defendant accounting firm "advised" and
"guided" a client issuer in making fraudulent misrepresentations did not state a claim for
primary liability).
Several law review articles have focused on the confusing case law that has emerged in
this area since Central Bank. See generally Robert A. Prentice, Locating that "Indistinct" and
"Virtually Nonexistent" Line Between Primary and Secondaiy Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C.
L. REv. 691 (1997) (arguing that Central Bank should not significantly affect professionals'
liability in securities fraud cases and that collateral participants should be held liable);
Ameena Y. Majid, Diminishing the Expected Impact of Central Bank of Denver v. First Inter-
state Bank of Denver: Secondary Liability Masquerading as Prmary Liability Under Section 10(b),
28 Lov. U. Cm. L.J. 551 (1997) (examining federal court interpretations of Central Bank);
Broady R. Hodder, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank and Its AJermath: Securities Profes-
sionals'Ever-ChangingLiabilities, 39 Auz. L. REv. 343 (1997) (discussing Central Bank's effect
on claims against secondary parties); Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Primary Liability of
Securities Laryers, 50 SMU L. Rxv. 383 (1996) (concluding that attorneys whose behavior
deviates from applicable standards for preparing documents are primary violators of Rule
10b-5); David J. Baum, Comment, The Aftermath of Central Bank of Denver: Private Aiding
and Abetting Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1817 (1995) (ana-
lyzing the changes to compensation for injured private investors and the accountability of
secondary participants in fraud cases as established by Central Bank).
424 See NERA 1996 STuDv, supra note 15, at iii-iv, 24-25, tbl.20. This study explains that
"[i]nclusion of accounting firms as codefendant adds over 70 percent to the expected
settlement value of a shareholder class action for the period January 1991 to June 1996.
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By refusing to analogize the 1934 Act to causes of action for fraud
against aiders and abettors that exist at common law, the Central Bank
Court's narrow interpretation of section 10(b) also rejected over-
whelming precedent in the courts of appeals. 425 Although many state
securities fraud statutes permit actions against aiders and abettors,426
Central Bank reaffirms that federal courts must interpret federal securi-
ties laws with a view to the text of the federal statute, not to common
law fraud.427 Plaintiffs in search of common law remedies for securi-
ties fraud or the remedies afforded by state statutes must sue under
state law.
The Court also has scaled back on private rights of action under
provisions of the federal securities statutes other than section 10(b).
For example, in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries,428 the Court held that a
tender offeror does not have a private right of action against a com-
peting offeror for fraudulent or deceptive practices under section
14(e) of the 1934 Act.429 The Court referred to its prior decision in
Cort v. Ash,430 which held that one factor in determining whether Con-
gress intended to create a private cause of action is whether "the cause
This finding is again consistent with the notion that available assets, especially insurance,
are a major factor in explaining settlement amounts." Id. at iii-iv. The 1995 Reform Act's
proportionate liability provisions, see Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 201,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(f), 78u-4(g) (Supp. II 1996), may have led to a decrease in this "advisor
effect" for cases settled in early 1996. See 1996 NERA STUDY, supra note 15, at 26.
425 As the Court explained:
Aiding and abetting is an ancient criminal law doctrine....
The Restatement of Torts, under a concert of action principle, accepts
a doctrine with rough similarity to criminal aiding and abetting. An actor is
liable for harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of
another "if he ... knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of
duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other. .. "
The doctrine has been at best uncertain in application, however....
More to the point, Congress has not enacted a general civil aiding and
abetting statute-either for suits by the Government (when the Govern-
ment sues for civil penalties or injunctive relief) or for suits by private par-
ties. Thus, when Congress enacts a statute under which a person may sue
and recover damages from a private defendant for the defendant's violation
of some statutory norm, there is no general presumption that the plaintiff
may also sue aiders and abettors.
Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 181-82 (citations omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 876(b) (1977)).
426 See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
427 See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 182; see also Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern
Publ. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 250 (1951) ("If [Petitioner's] cause of action arises from
fraud and deceit, it is a common-law action of which a federal court has no jurisdiction
428 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
429 See id. at 41-42. See also Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985)
(holding that misrepresentation or nondisclosure is a necessary element of a violation of
§ 14(e) of the 1934 Act).
430 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Court in Cort noted that "[c]orporations are creatures of
state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding
that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with
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of action [is] one traditionally relegated to state law."43 ' In Virginia
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,432 the Court held that minority sharehold-
ers cannot sue for a misleading proxy statement under section 14(a)
of the 1934 Act if their vote was not needed to consummate the un-
derlying transaction. 43 3 In Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,43 4 the Court sur-
prised most of the securities bar by holding that the express private
right of action in section 12(a) (2) of the 1933 Act only extends to
securities sold in public offerings.43 5 Lower federal courts, taking the
signal from the Supreme Court, also have narrowly construed even
the express private rights of action in the federal securities laws.43 6
respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation." Id. at
84.
431 Id. at 78, quoted in Piper, 430 U.S. at 40. The Court impliedly has abrogated much of
Cort's holding. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), the Court noted that
when assessing whether a statute implies a private remedy even though it does not ex-
pressly provide for one, the four factors it used in Cort do not end the inquiry. See id. at
575. Instead, the "central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either
expressly or by implication, a private cause of action." Id. Cart simply lays out some factors
that can help discern congressional intent. See id. at 575-76; see also Asch v. Philips, Appel &
Walden, Inc., 867 F.2d 776, 777 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Since Cart, the Supreme Court has fo-
cused upon congressional intent and stated that Cort's first three factors elucidate that
intent.").
432 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
433 See id. at 1107-08. The Virginia Bankshares Court expressed discomfort with the im-
plied private right of action under 1934 Act section 14(a) for misleading proxy statements
thatJ.L Case Co. v. Borak had created, see 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964), and observed that:
Borak's probe of the congressional mind, however, never focused squarely
on private rights of action, as distinct from the substantive objects of the
legislation, and one Member of the Borak Court later characterized the "im-
plication" of the private right of action as resting modestly on the Act's
"exclusively procedural provision affording access to a federal forum."
Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1103 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 403 n.4 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment)); see also Virginia
Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1110 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) ("[TIhe federal cause of action at issue here was never enacted by Congress and
hence the more narrow we make it (within the bounds of rationality) the more faithful we
are to our task." (citation omitted)). Although Professor Louis Loss agreed with the result
in Borak, even he criticized the Court which, as he puts it, "reached the right result not for
the wrong reason but for no reason at all." Louis Loss, 5 SacuarriEs REGULATION 2882 (2d
ed. Supp. 1969). Congress's neglect of express private rights of action in much of the 1934
Act thus did not deter the relatively liberal Court of the 1960's from implying a private
right of action. However, the Court's logic was vulnerable to criticism and eventually to
attack by the more conservative Court of the 1980's and 1990's.
434 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
435 See id. at 584 (construing the term "prospectus" in section 12(a) (2) to be a "term of
art referring to a document that describes a public offering of securities by an issuer or
controlling shareholder").
436 See, e.g., Versyss Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 982 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1992) (narrowly
construing section 11 of the 1933 Act while making specific reference to broader remedies
possibly available under state law). In Versyss, Continental Telecom, Inc. ("Contel") ac-
quired Northern Data Systems, Inc. ("NDS") in a merger and then sued NDS's accountants
and others under section 11, alleging that Contel had agreed to the terms of the merger
on the basis of misleading statements in a registration statement filed eleven months ear-
lier for a public offering of NDS stock. See id. at 654-55. In holding that Contel received
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Regardless of whether these decisions reflect genuine concern
over substantive notions of federalism or merely a desire to reduce the
amount of litigation in federal courtS,43 7 courts have rendered these
decisions against a backdrop in which Congress expressly preserved
state statutory and common law remedies for securities fraud. By now
preempting state causes of action, the Uniform Standards Act leaves
investors with substantially less protection than they might have had if
the Congresses of 1933 and 1934, and the courts since then, had
known that the federal law would become the sole remedy for securi-
ties fraud.
c. Proposals To Scale Back Private Rights of Action Even Further
Furthermore, some proponents of litigation reform believe that
the courts have not done enough to cut back on private rights of ac-
tion, and accordingly have asked the SEC to use its authority under
section 10(b) to reduce the scope of the implied private right of ac-
tion under Rule 10b-5. Before passage of the 1995 Reform Act, Pro-
fessor Grundfest urged the SEC to use its powers to abolish (or
"disimply") critical elements of the implied private right of action
under section 10(b) that the courts had created. Ironically, he explic-
itly mentioned state private rights of action as a limit on the SEC's
power to reduce private remedies for securities fraud:
the assets and liabilities of NDS in the merger and did not receive "securities" within the
meaning of section 11, the First Circuit specifically mentioned state remedies for securities
fraud:
As the Supreme Court has reminded us, the federal securities laws
were not designed to provide "a broad federal remedy for all fraud," let
alone for all negligence. If Coopers & Lybrand has been careless in certify-
ing the registration statement and Contel relied on that statement in set-
ting the terms of the merger, then state law might or might not provide a
remedy, depending on how the state court approached issues of negli-
gence, foreseeability, and standing. Section 11, by contrast, is remarkably
stringent where it applies, readily imposing liability on ancillary parties to
the registration statement (like accountants) for the benefit even of pur-
chasers after the original offering. Its very stringency suggests that, whatever
the usual rule about construing remedial securities legislation broadly ....
some care should be taken before section 11 is extended beyond its normal
reading.
Id. at 657 (quoting Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982)).
437 See Alison Grey Anderson, The Meaning of Federalism: Interpreting the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 70 VA. L. REv. 813 (1984). According to Anderson:
[A]lthough the Supreme Court, as well as other courts and commentators,
has appeared to rely in part on substantive notions of federalism in decid-
ing whether to imply private rights of action under the securities laws, it has
not in fact provided any coherent view of the appropriate relationship be-
tween federal and state law. Instead, courts and commentators frequently
use the language of federalism to justify decisions based on unarticulated
policy choices or a general political preference for less federal regulation
and adjudication.
Id. at 814.
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Although the Commission's authority to disimply may be sub-
stantial, it cannot be used to rework the entire securities law land-
scape. As described below, state law, express federal remedies, and
limits on the scope of the Section 10(b) delegation itself, place ma-
terial limitations on the changes that can be wrought through ad-
ministrative disimplication....
As an initial matter, whatever decision the Commission may
reach regarding disimplication under Rule 10b-5, the federal securi-
ties laws specifically provide for concurrent state regulation. Com-
mission rulemaking therefore cannot affect the remedies available
to private parties under state "blue sky" laws, state common law, or
other state statutory regimes. However, none of the securities litiga-
tion reforms now pending before Congress would preempt state
causes of action, and no amendment to the federal securities laws
since their enactment in 1933 has limited the states' authority to
regulate securities transactions. Thus, although Congress certainly
has the power to oust state regulation from the field, that power has
not been exercised, and Congress has given no indication that it
intends to exercise it.
43 8
Three years after publishing this observation, Professor Grundfest
helped draft legislation that would have preempted all state private
rights of action for securities fraud had Congress passed it instead of
the more narrowly drafted Uniform Standards Act.439
So far, the SEC has not taken Professor Grundfest's disimplica-
tion suggestion. Nonetheless, the SEC is under substantial political
pressure to lighten the impact of the securities laws on issuers.440 The
1933 Act registration and prospectus delivery requirements are rid-
dled with new exceptions, 44 1 some of which have increased the oppor-
438 Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARv. L. REv. 963, 1008-09 (1994) [hereinafter
Grundfest, Commission's Authority]; see also Grundfest, supra note 368, at 744 (responding to
Seligman's critique of Grundfest's previous article, see supra, Grundfest notes "[the Sec-
ond Circuit... called for guidance from Congress or the Commission, implying that the
SEC might make a more detailed attempt at rule making than [it did with] Rule 10b-5...
[-this] is precisely what disimplication is all about").
439 See supra note 2. The Uniform Standards Act instead only preempts class actions.
Professor Grundfest also assisted Representative Bliley with preparation of a thoroughly
researched and well footnoted speech stating that unintentional conduct is not sufficient
for liability under section 10(b). See supra note 323. This speech appears in the Congres-
sional Record immediately following the Statement of Managers for the Uniform Stan-
dards Act. See supra note 323.
440 See Michael Schroeder, Guess Who's Gunning for the SEC, Bus. Wyt, Aug. 14, 1995, at
40 (describing congressional attacks on the SEC).
441 These exceptions include the 1990 exemption for offshore offerings under Regula-
tion S, see 17 C.F.R. § 230.901-.904 (1998); the 1992 "testing the waters" exception to Regu-
lation A's prohibition on offers to sell securities before an offering statement is filed, see 17
C.FR. § 230.254(d); the 1997 amendment of Rule 144 to shorten the holding period
before resale of restricted securities, see 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d); the allowance of an institu-
tional market in unregistered securities that has developed since 1990 under Rule 144A, see
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tunity for fraud.442 The SEC has now made proposals to ease further
the burden of the 1933 Act's registration requirements. 443 If the SEC
later turns to the 1934 Act and decides to narrow the private right of
action under Rule lOb-5, or some later Congress chooses to eliminate
the section 10(b) private right of action altogether, state securities
fraud statutes would be the only correcting mechanism available to
address potentially massive Type II error in the federal system.
C. Federalism Concerns
Congress has shown a strong commitment to federalism in a wide
range of areas, including abolition of unfunded mandates444 and wel-
fare reform.445 Meanwhile, in areas in which either the President or
17 C.F.R. § 230.144A, and the SEC's abandonment in 1992 of solicitation restrictions
under Rule 504 of Regulation D, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502(c), 230.504.
442 See How to Avoid Fraud, AM. BANKER-BOND BUYER, July 1, 1996, at 1, available in
LEXIS, News Library, American Banker-Bond Buyer Newsletters File ("Moreover, the in-
stances of fraud and alleged fraud have recently increased as structures developed for
large, established issuers have, in some cases, been misapplied to smaller less experienced
issuers, particularly in private and Rule 144A transactions.");Jaye Scholl, Easy Money: How
Foreign Investors Profit at the Expense of Americans. An Invitation to Scamsters?, BARRON's, Apr.
29, 1996, at 31, 31 ("Reg. S created a shady source of cash for hundreds of questionable
companies. It also allowed company insiders to sell their shares without informing the
public, and it gave rise to a trove of opportunities for scamsters."); Michael Schroeder,
Despite Reforms, Penn-Stock Fraud Is Roaring Back, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 1997, at A12 (report-
ing use of Rule 504 exemption under Regulation D by a promoter, who has been charged
three times in the past two years with civil and criminal fraud, to sell unregistered stock in a
failing company to more than 200 investors in 26 states).
443 See SEC Releases 33-7606 and 34-40,632 (Oct. 15, 1998) (setting forth a package of
proposed rules, commonly dubbed the "aircraft carrier" proposal, that would modernize
the regulatory system for securities offerings and waive, for some issuers, mandatory pro-
spectus delivery requirements); see also Report of the Task Force on Disclosure Simplification (last
modified Mar. 5, 1996) <http://wvw.sec.gov/news/studies/smpl.htm> [hereinafter Task
Force Report]. The SEC appointed this Task Force under the leadership of Philip Howard, a
New York lawyer whom SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt described as "an outspoken advocate
of regulatory common sense." Letter of Arthur Levitt (Mar. 5, 1996), available in Task Force
Report, supra. The SEC made the Task Force Report public in March 1996, three months
after passage of the 1995 Reform Act, and the SEC has implemented some of the Task
Force's recommendations. See Phase One Recommendations of Task Force on Disclosure
Simplification, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7271 & 34-36,922, 61 Fed. Reg. 9848 (1996)
(proposing elimination and simplification of various 1933 and 1934 Act rules); Phase One
Recommendations of Task Force on Disclosure Simpliciation, Exchange Act Release Nos.
33-7300 & 34-37,262, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,397, 30,397 (1996) (eliminating various rules and
forms deemed "no longer necessary or appropriate"); Phase Two Recommendations of
Task Force on Disclosure Simplification, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7301 & 34-37,263,
61 Fed. Reg. 30,405 (1996) (proposing elimination of two forms and one rule).
444 See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995)
(codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) (prohibiting new unfunded mandates from
Congress to the states).
445 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); see also Hon. Terry E. Branstad, Balancing the Budget: What Washing-
ton Can Learn from the States, HERrrAGE FOUNDATION REPORTS 4 (1997) ("Injust a little over
two years, this Republican Congress has shifted the discussion in Washington, D.C., toward
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Congress has sought to expand the reach of federal power, the other
almost always has successfully resisted the initiative. For example,
President Clinton's proposal to restructure the nation's health care
system through federal legislation 44 6 was a colossal political failure. In
contradistinction, when Congress departed from federalist principles
in 1996 and passed a bill seeking to curtail product liability lawsuits
under state law, supporters of the legislation were unable to garner
enough votes to override President Clinton's veto.44 7 In his veto
message, the President specifically referred to federalism concerns
raised by preempting state law.448 Thus, both the President and Con-
gress have cited federalism successfully in recent years as a powerful
rationale for refusing to enact federal legislation that interferes with
local autonomy. Texas Governor George W. Bush summed up this
rationale quite well in his popular campaign slogan: "Let Texans run
Texas."449
The Supreme Court also has moved toward favoring state and lo-
cal autonomy, although often on narrow grounds. The Court recently
struck down a portion of the Brady gun control law that required local
a balanced budget-something what [sic] was a rarity during the years of Democrat con-
trol. Furthermore, a debate over federalism and returning power to the states was unheard
of in the past.").
446 See Health Security Act, S. 1757, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993).
447 See Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 104th
Cong. (1996). This Act would have limited punitive damage claims in most product liabil-
ity cases to $250,000 or two times the compensatory damages, whichever is larger. See id.
§ 108. For a discussion of the President's veto and Congress's unsuccessful attempt to
override the veto, see supra notes 9 and 398. For commentary on the various other 1995
and 1996 tort reform bills that would have preempted state law, see Betsy J. Grey, Make
Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REv. 559, 588-603
(1997); Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation and the Dilemma of Federalization, 44 DEPAUL
L. REV. 755, 763-79 (1995). Limited federalization of tort litigation was accomplished with
the General Aviation Revitalization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (1994) (restricting lawsuits in-
volving airplanes used in general aviation).
448 The President stated:
This bill inappropriately intrudes on State authority, and does so in a
way that tilts the legal playing field against consumers. While some Federal
action in this area is proper because no one State can alleviate nationwide
problems in the tort system, the States should have, as they always have had,
primary responsibility for tort law. The States traditionally have handled
this job well, serving as laboratories for new ideas and making needed re-
forms. This bill unduly interferes with that process in products cases; more-
over, it does so in a way that peculiarly disadvantages consumers. As a rule,
this bill displaces State law only when that law is more favorable to consum-
ers; it defers to State law when that law is more helpful to manufacturers
and sellers. I cannot accept, absent compelling reasons, such a one-way
street of federalism.
Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval Product Liability
Legislation, PUB. PAPERs 681 (May 2, 1996) (William J. Clinton).
449 Margaret Kriz, Feuding With the Feds, 29 NAT'LJ. 1598, 1601 (1997) ("Nothing said it
better than Texas Gov. George W. Bush's popular campaign slogan: Let Texans run
Texas.").
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authorities to make background checks on gun purchasers,450 unani-
mously upheld a state's right to regulate physician assisted suicide,451
allowed states to confine violent sex offenders in mental institutions
following completion of their sentences, 452 and struck down an act of
Congress that forbade state and local governments from interfering
with religious observances. 453 Although the Court will probably not
strike down the Uniform Standards Act, some critics have raised con-
stitutional objections.454
An account of the jurisprudential merits and demerits of federal-
ism in areas other than securities fraud litigation is beyond the scope
of this Article. However, aside from the political posturing that sur-
rounds many discussions of federalism, normative values underlie the
deep appeal that federalist arguments have for courts, legislators, and
voters. In their treatise on federal jurisdiction, Hart and Wechsler ob-
served that:
Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature.... Federal
legislation, on the whole, has been conceived and drafted on an ad
hoc basis to accomplish limited objectives. It builds upon legal rela-
tionships established by the states, altering or supplanting them
only so far as necessary for the special purpose. Congress acts, in
short, against the background of the total corpusjuris of the states in
much the way that a state legislature acts against the background of
the common law .... 455
The history of the enactment and subsequent judicial interpretation
of the federal securities laws illustrates this point profoundly.456 Fur-
thermore, to the extent that California issuers' hostility to lawsuits
450 See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2383-84 (1997).
451 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997).
452 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2073, 2086 (1997).
453 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997).
454 Professor Manning Warren wrote an intriguing paper exploring the constitutional-
ity of preempting state causes of action for securities fraud. See Manning Warren, Congres-
sional Disregard of Corporate Misconduct Through Preemption and the Necessity for
Constitutional Restraint (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Professor Warren
observed that a majority of the Supreme Court has "focused not on preemption under the
supremacy clause, but rather, on the limitations federalism imposes on Congressional
power under the Commerce Clause." Id. at [3]. Professor Warren further argued that
.predominant federalism postulates should foreclose .. . intrusion into investors' reme-
dies in tort traditionally afforded by the states." Id. Finally, Professor Warren proposed
.supplementation of the traditional 'rational basis' scope of review of commerce power
legislation with a 'strict scrutiny' review where federal legislation, like the uniform stan-
dards legislation, seeks to veto or significantly abrogate regulation in areas of traditional
state concern." Id Because the federal courts have yet to apply such a strict scrutiny test
for preemption, at this point it appears unlikely that legislation preempting state securities
fraud causes of action will be declared unconstitutional. For this reason, the subject is not
explored further in this Article.
455 PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WAECHSLER'S, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FED-
ERAL SYSTEM 470-471 (2d ed. 1973).
456 See supra Part II.B and Part V.B.2(b).
[Vol. 84:1
UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT
brought by California lawyers under California law motivated the Uni-
form Standards Act-as testimony before the House and Senate Sub-
committees amply illustrates457-Congress has gone to great lengths
to take sides in a political dispute among Californians. Although class
action litigation on behalf of state and local governments and pension
funds can still be brought under California law, the debate in Califor-
nia over Propositions 201 and 211, and the California Supreme
Court's impending decisions in Diamond Multimedia and StorMedia, are
of substantially less importance than before.458 Sweeping federal pre-
emption of state law has thus eroded representative democracy and
civic republicanism 459 by devaluing debate among Californians con-
cerning problems created by California state law.
VI
How SHOULD CONGRESS HAVE PREEMPTED STATE
SECURITIES LIGATION?
A. Tailored Preemption
The foregoing discussion suggests that Congress should have pre-
empted state securities fraud causes of action, if at all, far more nar-
rowly than it did in the Uniform Standards Act. Most of the problems
that a dual-forum class action framework presents are surmountable,
and the drastic step that Congress took by mandating sweeping pre-
emption under the Uniform Standards Act was simply unnecessary.
More appropriately, Congress should have addressed the rare cir-
cumstance in which a small number of in-state investors sue an out-of-
state issuer.460 Take, for example, an issuer incorporated in Delaware,
headquartered in California, and which sells only a small fraction of
its securities in Oregon. A private cause of action in Oregon would
only benefit the relatively small number of shareholders allowed to
sue in Oregon's courts, and even then, only to the extent that Oregon
457 See July 24, 1997, Senate Uniform Standards Act Hearing, supra note 13, at III (witness
list) (revealing that of the six witnesses called to testify, three out of the four testifying in
support of preemption were from California); Oct. 21, 1997, House 1995 Reform Act Imple-
mentation Hearing, supra note 14, at III (witness list) (revealing that of the five witnesses
called to testify, both of the two testifying in support of preemption-Michael A. Perino,
Stanford University School of Law, and Bruce G. Vanyo, Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich and
Rosati-were from California).
458 See supra Part III.B.
459 See S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L.
REv. 685 (1991). As Hoke observes:
Civic republicanism, at its core, emphasizes individuals' direct voice and
participation in political processes. The normative good in civic republican
theory rests in an active community of citizens debating issues and forming
solutions to problems. Preemption of state and local law severs the connec-
tion between citizens and their value choices.
Id. at 690 n.18.
460 See supra text accompanying notes 389-92.
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law provides substantially more relief than federal law.46 1 Indeed, the
economics of class action litigation usually would dictate against suing
in Oregon in such circumstances, and plaintiffs' lawyers in fact filed
very few such suits even prior to the Uniform Standards Act.462 Fur-
thermore, in the rare case in which plaintiffs' lawyers would try to use
the Oregon forum to extract a quick settlement of a meritless suit, the
Oregon cause of action would be costly to issuers and investors alike.
Because in such a case the Oregon cause of action would combine
relatively little legitimate purpose with a high potential for mischief,
federal preemption of this type of suit may be justified. If Oregon, or
some other state, decided to allow plaintiffs to form nationwide classes
in its courts in suits against out-of-state issuers, plaintiffs certainly
would find a state securities fraud cause of action more useful than if
the state only allowed class actions by in-state investors. However, the
potential for abuse would increase correspondingly, particularly if the
forum has little incentive to treat the issuer fairly.463
Therefore, Congress should have considered preempting state se-
curities class actions in a narrow range of circumstances. For exam-
ple, Congress could have preempted class actions in states where none
of the following three connections exists: (1) The issuer is incorpo-
rated in the state; (2) The issuer has its principal place of business or
more than fifty percent of its operations in the state; and (3) Twenty
percent or more of the securities purchased or sold by the issuer or
other named defendants during the class period were purchased or
sold within the state. Alternatively, Congress could have provided that
shareholders who file a class action suit against an issuer having none
of the above three connections with the state in which they file also
may not sue that issuer in a federal cause of action arising out of the
same transaction or occurrence, and further, must be excluded from
461 For example, it is easier to sue collateral participants such as lawyers and account-
ants under Oregon law than under federal law. Compare Prince v. Brydon, 764 P.2d 1370,
1371-72 (Or. 1988) (holding that a lawyer who assisted an issuer by drafting legal docu-
mentation materially participates in the security offering and can be liable under Oregon
law unless he establishes lack of knowledge as an affirmative defense), with Pinter v. Dahl,
486 U.S. 622 (1988) (finding no support in 1933 Act's section 12(1) for imposition of
primary liability on persons who do not pass title to a security, offer the security for sale, or
solicit offers to buy the security).
462 See supra text accompanying notes 378, 392 (observing that plaintiffs file very few
class actions in jurisdictions where the defendant issuer is neither incorporated nor has a
principal place of business). Indeed, the Oregon plaintiffs would probably be better off
joining other plaintiffs in federal court. Such a combined class would be large enough in
number to prosecute the litigation fully, because litigation expenses would be spread over
a larger class.
463 The Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution
would probably impede formation of nationwide classes in cases in which the defendant
has minimum contacts with the forum state. See supra note 224 (discussing Phillips Petro-
leum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)).
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any class that brings such a federal cause of action against that issuer.
Unlike preempting state law, employing such an election of remedies
as an instrument for discouraging undesirable state suits preserves
state causes of action for those circumstances in which investors would
truly benefit from them.
If studies could show that state securities litigation undermined
the federal' safe harbor for forward-looking statements (an argument
often made but hardly proven in the hearings preceding the Uniform
Standards Act),464 Congress could have preempted substantive state
law that conflicts with the safe harbor. Narrowly crafted measures
thus could have provided that a forward-looking statement that com-
plies with the federal safe harbor would not be grounds for civil liabil-
ity in any suit under state law. This approach would have done far
more to establish the federal safe harbor as a national standard than
does the Uniform Standards Act, which leaves state law standards en-
tirely intact for suits not falling within the definition of a "class action"
or filed by exempt state and local governments and pension funds.4 65
At least some Califomia courts have prevented plaintiffs from us-
ing state suits to circumvent the 1995 Reform Act's discovery stay.4 66
Nonetheless, Congress was probably right to enact the provision of the
Uniform Standards Act that gives federal courts authority to stay dis-
covery in state proceedings to protect their jurisdiction in a federal
case.467 This provision, standing alone, addresses one of the most
compelling arguments against the dual-forum class action litigation
framework.
Most importantly, Congress should have postponed enacting any
legislation preempting state securities fraud causes of action until it
knew more about how the 1995 Reform Act altered the securities liti-
gation landscape. First, Congress enacted the Uniform Standards Act
without knowing whether a significant number of suits had migrated
from federal to state courts after the 1995 Reform Act.468 The data
presented on this point were inconclusive. 469
464 See supra Part IV.B.
465 An unsatisfactory alternative would be for Congress to preempt all state causes of
action. Congressman Campbell actually proposed this option in House Bill 1653. See supra
notes 270-71 and accompanying text.
466 See supra text accompanying notes 193-200.
467 But cf. text accompanying supra notes 340-41 (suggesting that federal courts may
have been able to protect their jurisdiction in securities class actions under the All Writs
Act and the Anti-Injunction Act).
468 See supra text accompanying notes 230-44.
469 Although Stanford's Class Action Clearinghouse has kept detailed records only of
post-1995 Reform Act litigation in state court, "[t]he Grundfest-Perino Study speculated
that these figures represented an increase in state court filings, based on anecdotal reports
that securities class action litigation was rarely filed in state court prior to the [1995] Re-
form Act." Perino, supra note 14, at 303 (emphasis added).
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Second, Congress's underlying concern was presumably frivolous
state court suits that a federal court would have dismissed, not legiti-
mate claims for securities fraud that plaintiffs choose to bring in state
court. If frivolous state suits were indeed Congress's concern, the
question of whether suits filed in state court have less merit than suits
filed in federal court should have been of primary importance. Pro-
fessor Perino has observed that "[s]tate court litigation is associated
with a lower frequency of allegations of misrepresentations or omis-
sions in financial statements and with smaller price drops around the
end of the class period,"470 and has argued that "[t] hese data are con-
sistent with the hypothesis that plaintiffs are filing 'weaker' cases in
state court. '471 However, plaintiffs who allege misrepresentations or
omissions outside of financial statements are not necessarily asserting
frivolous claims, regardless of their possible preference for state
courts.472 Furthermore, although a correlation may exist between
small price drops toward the end of a class period and meritless
claims, small price drops also may correlate with meritorious claims
involving relatively small damages, and it also may make economic
sense to file these claims in state court. Data on judgment and settle-
ment amounts as a percentage of damages claimed in post-1995 Re-
form Act state court suits would provide a more reliable indicator of
whether such suits were frivolous-though such data would only be
meaningful if compared to similar data for pre-1995 Reform Act state
court suits and post-1995 Reform Act federal court suits. 473 Congress
did not undertake such an evaluation of the merits of state court
litigation.
Third, Congress should have waited to learn how state and fed-
eral judges would respond to plaintiffs' use of parallel state court liti-
gation to circumvent the procedural strictures of the 1995 Reform
470 Id. at 278. However, with respect to the incidence of pleading fraud in financial
statements "[t]he Grundfest-Perino Study did not analyze complaints against companies
sued in state court proceedings." Id. at 304. The SEC Staff Report, however, did find that
complaints filed solely in state court allege irregularities with financial reports less fre-
quently than federal complaints. See id. at 304 & n.144 (citing StaffRepor; supra note 179,
at 73-74).
471 Id. at 278.
472 As Professor Perino observes:
A number of pre-Reform Act [federal] cases found a strong inference of
fraud when the complaint alleged either some sort of misrepresentation or
omission in the issuer's financial statements, or unusual or suspicious trad-
ing by officers or directors while the fraud was alive in the market. All
things being equal, it is reasonable to expect that cases with these kinds of
facts are more likely to be filed in federal court after the [1995] Reform Act
and that plaintiffs might have increased incentives to pursue state court
litigation in cases without these facts.
Id. at 295 (footnote omitted).
473 See supra note 368 (discussing similar studies comparingjudgments and settlements
as a percentage of claimed damages).
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Act. Will state courts allow plaintiffs to obtain discovery that is unob-
tainable in federal court? Alternatively, state courts may choose to
stay discovery while parallel litigation is pending in federal court, or
federal courts may enjoin state court litigation directed at obtaining
discovery for use in a pending federal action (even prior to the Uni-
form Standards Act, the All Writs Act arguably authorized such an in-
junction in aid of a federal court's jurisdiction 474). Thus, at the time
Congress rushed to pass the Uniform Standards Act, important proce-
dural developments at the federal and state levels had not yet been
discerned.
Fourth, Congress should have watched for substantive law devel-
opments at the state level. The plaintiffs' bar had proposed ballot ini-
tiatives and other measures to accommodate plaintiffs under state law,
but without success. 475 Moreover, the three states that have signifi-
cantly changed their securities fraud statutes since passage of the 1995
Reform Act have followed the decidedly pro-defendant direction of
the federal system.476 Would these trends have continued, or would
the plaintiffs' bar have succeeded in steering state laws toward the
race to the bottom that preemption proponents feared? Congress
should have waited to find out.
Fifth, Congress did not know whether state courts or legislatures
will allow plaintiffs' lawyers to bring nationwide classes of plaintiffs
into state court and under what circumstances. If one or more states
do permit nationwide classes, then class action litigation in state court
could become far more profitable than it is today.477 On the other
hand, issuers sued in such actions presumably would have substantial
operations in the state in question, making it unlikely that the state's
political process would tolerate a judicial system allowing plaintiffs to
extract value from these issuers through frivolous litigation.
None of these factors is alone determinative of whether preemp-
tion of state law is appropriate, nor of how far preemption should go.
Rather, certain combinations of factors could cause state securities
fraud litigation to take an unproductive turn that benefits lawyers at
the expense of both issuers and investors. Alternatively, state law ac-
tions could reduce Type II error, and with it the incidence of fraud, by
providing a useful supplement to federal rights of action. Before Con-
gress set out to fix the dual-forum litigation framework, it should have
identified exactly what, if anything, was wrong with it.
474 See supra notes 34041 and accompanying text.
475 See, e.g., supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text (discussing plaintiffs' bar at-
tempt to pass Proposition 211).
476 See supra text accompanying note 388.
477 Nationwide classes in state court presumably are still a viable option for suit6
brought by state and local governments, and their pension funds, which are exempted
from the Uniform Standards Act.
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Finally, the Uniform Standards Act could foreclose alternatives
that Congress may want to consider in the future: further restricting,
or "disimplying,"478 the federal private right of action for securities
fraud under section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act; devoting federal resources
that would otherwise be spent on litigation to increase the enforce-
ment budget of the SEC; and allowing most securities fraud litigation
to be carried out in state courts under state law.479 An analysis of
these proposals involves a set of issues entirely different from those
raised in this Article480 and depends upon both the effectiveness of
state law remedies for securities fraud and the ability of the SEC to
deter fraud without plaintiffs acting as private attorneys general in the
federal forum. Nonetheless, such a bifurcation of federal and state
responsibilities might make sense for several reasons. For example, as
discussed previously, state fiduciary duty claims and securities claims
are often not easy to distinguish.4 1 Furthermore, federal courts are
not necessarily better equipped than state courts to hear securities
fraud claims, and the law created by Congress and the federal courts is
not necessarily preferable.
By abolishing most state law class actions, and thereby forcing al-
most all securities litigation to federal court, Congress has eroded the
valuable network externalities that have developed around state law
causes of action.482 Stunting the growth of state securities law will
make it difficult, if not impossible, for state courts to take over if Con-
gress decides to abolish implied causes of action in the federal system.
Congress should not have foreclosed its future options by preempting
state law and turning securities fraud class actions over to the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the federal courts.
B. Preempting Settlement of Federal Claims in State Court
Because the vast majority, approximately eighty percent, of share-
holder class actions settle,483 the manner in which they are settled is
478 See Grundfest, Commission's Authority, supra note 438.
479 See Romano, supra note 358, at 2361 (suggesting that mandatory federal securities
regulation be replaced with competing state law regimes and that competitive federalism
would be as viable an alternative in securities regulation as it is in corporate law).
480 Whether replacing federal causes of action with state causes of action would pro-
vide a net benefit depends in part upon whether the states would provide sufficiently
strong private rights of action to assure the optimal level of deterrence of securities fraud.
Part V.B.1 of this Article asked whether state law would be biased in favor of plaintiffs. The
converse question, whether the states would be biased in favor of defendants, must be
asked, and answered in the negative, before Congress should consider abolishing federal
private rights of action.
481 See supra text accompanying notes 347-52.
482 See supra text accompanying notes 347-58.
483 In NERA's sample of 998 shareholder class actions that were dismissed, settled, or
resolved by a jury verdict from January 1991 to June 1996, 80% were resolved through
settlement. See NERA 1996 STUDY, supra note 15, at ii. This study further noted that
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probably more important to capital markets than the manner in
which they are litigated. Furthermore, related federal and state causes
of action, whether filed in the same or in separate courts,484 often go
through the settlement process together. Thus, two issues are rele-
vant to evaluating the effects of the dual-forum class action framework
on settlements. First, is the unified settlement of federal and state
claims in a single forum desirable? Second, what impact, if any, will
preemption of state securities class actions have on existing mecha-
nisms for settling state corporate law claims and federal securities
claims together in a single forum?
1. Matsushita and Unified Settlements
In 1996, the United States Supreme Court expedited the settle-
ment process by holding, in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Ep-
stein,485 that federal courts must extend full faith and credit to state
court settlements, including settlements that affect securities law
claims over which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. 486 As
Chairman Levitt noted, Matsushita "allow[s] defendants to obtain a
global settlement in state court, [and it thereby] made state court class
actions more advantageous for plaintiffs. '487 The holding thus argua-
bly creates strategic incentives for plaintiffs to file parallel claims in
state and federal court to obtain advantages in settlement.488 Matsu-
shita, however, also makes state court class actions advantageous for
defendants who can settle state fiduciary duty and federal securities
claims together in state court.
In Matsushita, the plaintiffs were former shareholders of MCA,
Inc. who surrendered their stock to Matsushita in a tender offer.489 In
a suit brought in California Federal District Court, the plaintiffs al-
leged that Matsushita's offer violated 1934 Act Rule 14d-10 49 0-a
claim over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. The fed-
eral district court awarded summary judgment to the defendants, and
the plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit.49 1 Meanwhile, the plain-
"[e]ven cases that were dismissed, reached trial or received a jury verdict often settled
before an appeal was resolved." Id.
484 The federal court may hear the state claims byway of supplementaljurisdiction. See
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1994).
485 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
486 See id. at 386-87. For an excellent discussion and critique of the Matsushita holding,
see Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of State Courts in Class
Actions Involving Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 219.
487 Oct. 21, 1997, House 1995 Reform Act Implementation Hearing, supra note 14, at 24
(prepared statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
488 See GRuNDFEsr & PERINO, supra note 14, at 4.
489 See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 369-70.
490 See id. at 370.
491 See id.
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tiffs filed a separate class action against MCA and its directors in the
Delaware Court of Chancery alleging breach of fiduciary duty under
state law for failing to maximize shareholder value and wasting corpo-
rate assets. 4 92 The plaintiffs later added Matsushita as a defendant in
the Delaware action on the grounds that it had conspired with MCA's
directors to violate their fiduciary duties to shareholders.493 Perhaps
most important to the present analysis, the plaintiffs based their Dela-
ware action solely on fiduciary duty claims, and that action contained
no claims under state securities law.
While the federal suit was on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the
parties settled the Delaware suit on terms that included a release of
the federal securities claims by all persons who had not opted out of
the Delaware plaintiff class. 494 The Ninth Circuit refused to give full
faith and credit to the Delaware settlement, in part because section 27
of the 1934 Act gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over 1934
Act claims.495 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion. The Court held that the 1934 Act's grant of exclusive jurisdic-
tion did not create an exception to the general rule that state court
judgments, including judgments that preclude further litigation of
federal claims, are entitled to full faith and credit under the Full Faith
and Credit Act.49 6 Although the Delaware complaint did not contain
state securities law claims, Justice Thomas, writing for the majority,
observed that the 1934 Congress had left state causes of action for
securities transactions intact. He went on to explain that this parallel
framework of federal-state litigation, preserved in section 28 (a) of the
1934 Act, provided support for the Court's interpretation of section
27:
Furthermore, other provisions of the Exchange Act suggest
that Congress did not intend to create an exception to [the Full
Faith and Credit Act] for suits alleging violations of the Act. Congress
plainly contemplated the possibility of dual litigation in state and federal
courts relating to securities transactions.49 7
492 See id.
493 See id.
494 See id. at 370-71.
495 See id. at 386. For a brief discussion of the criticism surrounding the 1934 Act's
exclusive jurisdiction provision, see supra note 121.
496 See Matshushita, 516 U.S. at 380-86. The Full Faith and Credit Act provides:
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings [of any State court] or
copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as
they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession
from which they are taken.
28 U.S.C. § 1738(c) (1994).
497 Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 383 (emphasis added) (citing 15 U.S.C § 77bb(a) which
preserves "all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity").
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Having concluded that the Full Faith and Credit Act applies to state
court settlements of 1934 Act claims, the Supreme Court remanded
the case to the Ninth Circuit for a determination as to whether the
class members had received constitutionally adequate representation
from Delaware class counsel. 498
After a detailed scrutiny of the settlement negotiations, the Ninth
Circuit on remand recognized that adequate representation would be
extremely difficult when no common issues of fact exist between the
state fiduciary duty claims and the federal securities claims.499 The
Supreme Court's ruling notwithstanding, the Ninth Circuit insisted it
had properly rejected the settlement:
The Supreme Court accepted Matsushita's statement of the
question presented even though that statement mischaracterized
our holding. We did not withhold full faith and credit "simply" be-
cause the Delaware judgment released exclusively federal claims.
Rather, we withheld full faith and credit because the great disparity
between the state and federal claims-there were no overlapping
issues of fact whatsoever-meant that a judgment based upon an
adjudication of the state claims could have no issue preclusive effect
on the federal claims.500
The Ninth Circuit recognized on remand that the lack of common
issues of fact between the federal and state claims also could affect the
Delaware class counsel's ability to properly represent the Delaware
plaintiff class. The Delaware class counsel's lack of knowledge about
the federal claims had handicapped negotiations with Matsushita
from the very beginning: "[I]ndeed, the Delaware plaintiffs probably
were unable to conduct any discovery on the federal claims because
the facts relevant to those claims had no apparent relevance to the
subject matter of the state law claim that the MCA directors had
breached their fiduciary duties."501 This dearth of knowledge not
only made the overall negotiations difficult but also rendered the fed-
eral claims relatively worthless as a bargaining chip in state court.
Thus, absent common issues of fact underlying the state and federal
498 See id. at 386-87.
499 See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 126 F.3d 1235, 1238 n.4, 1249-50 (9th Cir. 1997).
500 Id. at 1238 n.4 (citation omitted).
501 See id. at 1249 (emphasis omitted). Although plaintiffs' Delaware counsel assured
class members that they had conducted an extensive investigation of the federal claims, the
Ninth Circuit did not believe this claim:
It is hard to imagine what Delaware counsel meant by an "extensive investi-
gation," since the record shows no discovery at all on the facts underlying
the federal claims. Indeed, this lack of discovery is hardly surprising....
Delaware counsel were probably disabled from developing the federal
claims through traditional discovery, since discovery in state court was lim-
ited to matters relevant to the subject matter of the state claims-that the
MCA directors had violated their fiduciary duty....
Id. at 1251-52.
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claims, it is difficult to imagine how plaintiffs' counsel could have pro-
vided, with respect to the federal claims, the thorough investigation
and aggressive negotiation that was required for their representation
of the class to be adequate.
The Supreme Court's holding in Matsushita thus legitimatized a
process for settling federal and state claims in a single forum-state
court. Nonetheless, this process is vulnerable to abuse,50 2 as recog-
nized by the Ninth Circuit's holding on remand that Delaware class
counsel had inadequately represented the plaintiff class with respect
to the federal claims. 5° 3 Federal securities claims rarely touch on the
same issues as state fiduciary duty claims, although they do share many
of the same issues as state securities law claims. When a plaintiff class
files only fiduciary duty claims in state court, class counsel's discovery
opportunities and negotiating leverage with respect to the federal se-
curities claims rarely will be adequate. In sum, there are several rea-
sons to believe that the unified settlement of federal and state claims
within state court is very problematic for the class members who may
not be adequately represented, as well as for the lawyers who repre-
sent them.
2. The Uniform Standards Act's Impact on Unified Settlements
The Uniform Standards Act could exacerbate the problem of in-
adequate settlements of federal securities claims in state courts. 50 4
First, because plaintiffs cannot file preempted securities law claims in
state court, state courts will rarely have an opportunity to review issues
in a case remotely similar to those raised by the federal securities law
claims that parties can propose to settle as part of state court proceed-
ings. Although Justice Thomas observed in Matsushita that "Congress
plainly contemplated" dual litigation of securities claims in state and
federal courts,505 after the Uniform Standards Act, class action litiga-
tion of securities claims in state court will be rare. Courts contemplat-
ing Matsushita-style settlements will almost always confront the
502 See Coffee, Class Actions, supra note 52, at 5 (discussing a strategy whereby class
action defendants encourage a different group of plaintiffs' attorneys to file an overlap-
ping class action in a second jurisdiction and then cheaply dispose of all of the pending
claims through a global settlement in the second jurisdiction).
503 See Epstein, 126 F.3d at 1255.
504 Matsushita type state court claims probably would not be preempted even if they
allege misrepresentations of material fact in connection with a securities transaction. The
"Delaware carve out" in the Uniform Standards Act applies to any litigation that "involves"
a recommendation, position, or other communication by the issuer to its equity sharehold-
ers. See supra note 314 and accompanying text (discussing and quoting the carve-out provi-
sion). Suits brought against third persons who aid and abet a misrepresentation by the
issuer, as well as suits against the issuer itself, would thus presumably be saved by the carve
out. See Coffee, State Securities Preemption, supra note 52, at 7.
505 Matshushita, 516 U.S. at 383.
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situation that led the Ninth Circuit to reject the Matsushita settlement
on remand: a state court proceeding in which the plaintiffs only allege
corporate law claims, but within which the parties intend to settle fed-
eral securities claims as well. Second, the effectiveness of the settle-
ment mechanism approved of in Matsushita depends upon the
general knowledge and appreciation state courtjudges have of securi-
ties law (in addition to corporate fiduciary duty law). Preemption of
state securities fraud class actions will make state courts even more ill-
equipped to evaluate the settlement value of federal claims for misrep-
resentation in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.506
The Uniform Standards Act could, and perhaps should, have pro-
hibited Matsushita-type settlements. At a minimum, Congress should
have addressed the fact that the Matsushita holding, as it now stands,
makes it more difficult for federal courts to block state court settle-
ments in which plaintiffs' counsel collude with defendants in order to
appropriate the value of federal securities claims from the federal
plaintiff class. 507 The Supreme Court's decision could allow plaintiffs'
lawyers with no real interest in the federal claims of the class mem-
bers, and who have obtained no discovery with respect to such claims,
to trade in those claims in a binding settlement in state court. This
possibility is indeed a glaring loophole in the dual-forum litigation
framework and one that the Uniform Standards Act ignores. Entirely
apart from the preemption issue, Congress should either bar federal
securities law claims filed in federal court from being settled in paral-
lel state court proceedings, or at the very least, make it clear that fed-
eral judges should carefully review such settlements for adequate
representation of the parties concerned.
CONCLUSION
Congress should not have passed the Uniform Standards Act un-
til it knew more about critical developments that would have deter-
mined whether preemption was truly necessary. Furthermore, having
decided to preempt state law, Congress should have considered the
precise method of preemption more carefully. Before eradicating
state private rights of action that have existed for almost a century,
Congress should have known, and simply did not know: (1) whether
the 1995 Reform Act had in fact caused a significant number of suits
to migrate from federal to state courts; (2) whether these state suits
had less merit than suits filed in federal court; (3) whether state courts
will allow plaintiffs to use parallel state court litigation to circumvent
506 Conversely, settlements along the lines contemplated in Matsushita would be more
effective if Congress allowed state courts to hear 1934 Act claims by repealing its grant of
exclusive jurisdiction over 1934 Act claims to the federal courts.
507 See Coffee, Class Actions, supra note 52, at 5.
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limitations on discovery in federal court; (4) whether federal courts
will temporarily enjoin state suits that unduly interfere with the fed-
eral stay on discovery; (5) whether pro-plaintiff ballot initiatives and
other initiatives would succeed, or whether most states would con-
tinue the trend of conforming state law to the pro-defendant changes
that have been made to federal law; and (6) whether state courts or
legislatures will endorse efforts to create nationwide classes of plain-
tiffs in state court, and if so, whether the defendants in these suits will
be required to have significant contacts with the state in question. Fi-
nally, Congress should have addressed one problem that thus far it
has completely ignored: inadequate disposition of federal securities
claims in settlements of corporate law claims in state court.
The federal securities laws that Congress enacted in 1933 and
1934, and amended in 1995, were part of a framework that included
state private rights of action. The federal courts have interpreted the
federal securities laws knowing, and sometimes specifically relying on
the fact, that state law provided alternative remedies for fraud. De-
frauded investors have been told that if they found federal procedural
or substantive rules unfavorable, they can turn to state court. Absent
pervasive abuses of state causes of action that the states refuse to rem-
edy themselves, Congress should not have foreclosed this well-estab-
lished source of relief by changing the rules of the game.
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APPENDiX A
THE PRICE WATERHOUSE STUDY
In January 1998 Price Waterhouse L.L.P. released a quantitative
study of federal and state securities litigation ("Price Waterhouse
Study"). This study showed "little to no change" in the average com-
bined number of federal and state class action suits filed after the
1995 Reform Act and only a small increase in state court suits in 1996
followed by a decline in 1997.508
TABLE Al
FILING TRENDS OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LAwsuITs
Year filed Federal cases State cases Federal & state cases
PRE-1995 REFORM Acr
1991 156 46 .202
1992 194 31 225
1993 154 47 201
1994 219 67 286
1995 164 52 216
POST-1995 REFORM Acr
1996 112 66 178
1997 171 44 215
SOURCE: PRICE WATERHOUSE L.L.P., PRICE WATERHOUSE SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY
(1998).
Price Waterhouse later revised this study in a letter, dated Febru-
ary 20, 1998, to Senator D'Amato ("February 20 Letter"). 509 Senator
Phil Graham distributed the February 20 Letter to witnesses at the
February 23, 1998 hearing before the Senate's Subcommittee on Se-
curities shortly after the author of this Article recited statistics from
the Price Waterhouse Study in his testimony.510 The February 20 Let-
ter sought to recast the data used in the Price Waterhouse Study to
show a more significant increase in state court securities litigation af-
ter the 1995 Reform Act. Price Waterhouse accomplished this revi-
sion by focusing on two specific categories of state court suits: (1)
cases filed in tandem in both state and federal court ("parallel fil-
ings"); and (2) cases filed only in state court in which the plaintiffs
508 PRICE WATERHOUSE STUDY, supra note 32, at 1.
509 See Price Waterhouse Letter, supra note 296.
510 See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
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raised claims equivalent to those that they could have brought in fed-
eral court ("state-federal equivalent claims").511
TABLE A2
THE EFFEar OF PARALLEL FILINGS AND STATE-FED EQUiVALENT CLAIMs
ON ANALYSIS OF SECURITIES CLAss ACTION LAWsUITS
State-Fed
Year filed Parallel filings equivalent claims Total
PRE-1995 REFORM ACT
1991 3 13 16
1992 4 8 12
1993 5 12 17
1994 6 15 21
1995 5 7 12
POST-1995 REFORM ACT
1996 46 25 71
1997 22 17 39
SOURCE: Letter from Daniel V. Dooley, Partner, Price Waterhouse L.L.P. to Senator
Alphonse [sic] M. D'Amato (Feb. 20, 1998) (on file with author).
State court suits not falling into one of these two categories presuma-
bly contained primarily fiduciary duty claims. Therefore, Price
Waterhouse reasoned that they should not be counted as state securi-
ties suits for purposes of evaluating whether claims filed only in fed-
eral court before the 1995 Reform Act were now being filed in state
court.
The discrepancy between the totals reported in the Price
Waterhouse Study and in the February 20 Letter can be attributed to
two factors. First, the February 20 Letter explained that the data used
for the Price Waterhouse Study, compiled by Securities Class Action
Alert ("SCAA"), counted only the number of defendants sued, and
thus did not "report on parallel filings. '5 12 Thus, the Price
Waterhouse Study could have counted a small number of parallel fil-
ings as federal cases.5 13 If so, the number of state filings reported in
511 See Price Waterhouse Letter, supra note 296. Parallel filings are only a portion of
the state court filings that proponents of preemption legislation claim plaintiffs filed to
avoid the strictures of the 1995 Reform Act. Proponents of preemption also premise their
arguments on statistical data purportedly showing that plaintiffs filed, in state court, claims
that the 1995 Reform Act made difficult to litigate in federal court (the "substitution ef-
fect"). See GRUNDFEST & PERINO, supra note 14, at ii, 3. These apparently come under Price
Waterhouse's definition of "state-fed equivalent" claims.
512 Price Waterhouse Letter, supra note 296 (emphasis omitted).
513 In many parallel filings (approximately 90%), the state suit is filed first. When the
state suit is filed first the SCAA data bank accounts for it as a state filing. If, however, the
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the Price Waterhouse Study could be too low for some years, although
this apparently was the case only with the 1996 data. Second, and
more significantly, the February 20 Letter suggested that the Price
Waterhouse Study overreported the number of state cases in other
years.514 Cases filed only in state court should not have been counted
as state securities cases unless they raised claims equivalent to claims
that could have been brought in federal court. Otherwise, these state
cases more closely resembled fiduciary duty claims under state corpo-
rate law. 515 Taking into account both factors, as shown in the above
charts, the February 20 Letter showed an increase in the total number
of state court class actions after 1995, whereas the Price Waterhouse
Study did not.
However, the February 20 Letter did not address a number of
suspicious characteristics of the data it used. In the Price Waterhouse
Study, the overcounting of state cases (those that were neither parallel
cases nor state-federal equivalent cases) disproportionately affected
the years before the 1995 Reform Act. Most (about two-thirds on aver-
age) of the state cases reported in the Price Waterhouse Study from
1991 to 1995 were not included in the totals reported in the February
20 Letter, presumably because they were filed only in state court and
principally contained fiduciary duty claims. The February 20 Letter,
however, reported five more state cases in 1996 (seventy-one) than did
the Price Waterhouse Study in the same year (sixty-six) and only five
fewer for 1997 (thirty-nine as compared to forty-four). The February
20 Letter gave no explanation for why so many state fiduciary duty
claims were accounted for as state suits in the Price Waterhouse Study
in the years before the 1995 Reform Act and so few in the years after-
wards. Additionally, the SCAA data, and consequently the Price
Waterhouse Study, most likely only incorrectly counted as federal suits
a small portion of parallel filings.516 It is curious that 1996 (the year
immediately following the 1995 Reform Act) is the only year for which
this purported undercounting of state suits in the Price Waterhouse
Study outweighed the purported overcounting of fiduciary duty suits
as state suits, causing the total reported in the Price Waterhouse Study
to be less than that reported in the February 20 Letter.517
federal suit is filed first, the SCAA data bank accounts for the suit only as a federal filing.
See Telephone Interview with James M. Newman, Publisher and Editor, SCAA (March 5,
1998).
514 See Price Waterhouse Letter, supra note 296.
515 See id. at exhibit A n.2.
516 See supra note 513 (explaining that a parallel filing is only counted by SCAA as a
federal filing if the federal action is filed first, which only happens in 10% of the cases).
517 There is also incongruity between the 1996 parallel filings reported in the February
20 Letter and the 1996 filings reported by Professors Grundfest and Perino, who also use
the SCAA data. Compare Perino, supra note 14, at 302 tbl.1 (reporting that 30 companies
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Even accepting the statistics reported in the February 20 Letter at
face value, Price Waterhouse does not make a particularly strong case
that there was a significant and sustained increase in state court litiga-
tion following the 1995 Reform Act. Comparing the years 1994, 1996,
and 1997,518 it is clear that almost all of the significant increase is in
"parallel filings" (six in 1994, forty-six in 1996, and twenty-two in
1997). These statistics appear to tell us that in 1996, immediately after
Congress passed the 1995 Reform Act, plaintiffs rushed to file parallel
cases in state court, but in 1997 some found that their "state court
gambit" had failed.519 By 1997 a substantial number of plaintiffs had
abandoned parallel filings, causing the number to drop to less than
half of its 1996 level. Whether this drop would have continued absent
federal preemption would have depended, in part, on how the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court defined the parameters of discovery in state
actions when a parallel federal action is pending. In short, one would
have to wait and see.
By contrast, the "state-federal equivalent" statistic (fifteen in 1994,
twenty-five in 1996, and seventeen in 1997) essentially returned to
1994 levels by 1997. The so-called "substitution effect," whereby plain-
tiffs file in state court instead of federal court believing the state fo-
rum to be better, seems to have disappeared.
In summary, the February 20 Letter, prepared in haste to charac-
terize the Price Waterhouse Study in a light more favorable for pre-
emption proponents,520 does not suggest a substantial and sustained
increase in state court litigation after the 1995 Reform Act. The com-
bined total number of parallel claims and state-federal equivalent
claims was thirty-nine in 1997, making the number of state lawsuits in
that year less than the number of state statutes that Congress pre-
empted in 1998.521
were sued in both federal and state court in 1996), with Price Waterhouse Letter, supra
note 296 (reporting 46 parallel cases in 1996).
518 It is not helpful to use 1995 data in comparison to other years. In the year Con-
gress passed the 1995 Reform Act, aberrations, including a rush by plaintiffs to file in
federal court before the new law took effect, may have influenced both state and federal
filings. Similar distortions have occurred in 1998 after it became clear that the Uniform
Standards Act would become law.
519 See Feldman, supra note 259.
520 Perhaps indicative of the carelessness underlying many of the empirical arguments
that have been made about state court litigation, the February 20 Letter, written on the
letterhead of Price Waterhouse's NewYork City office, was addressed to "Senator Alphonse
M. D'Amato." See Price Waterhouse Letter, supra note 296. This misspelling of the Com-
mittee Chairman's name is best attributed not to lack of knowledge, but to the haste with
which Price Waterhouse prepared the February 20 Letter-Price Waterhouse prepared it
on a Friday so it would be ready in time for the following Monday's hearing.
521 See May 19, 1998, House Uniform Standards Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 72 (state-
ment of Richard W. Painter, Professor of Law) ("We are pre-empting the law in 50 States
over 39 lawsuits. I don't think that's what federalism is all about. I don't think that's what
the Contract with America was all about.").
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APPENDIX B
SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT AS
ENACTED ON NOVEMBER 3, 1998
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as the "Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act of 1998".
SECTION 2. FINDINGS
The Congress finds that-
(1) the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 sought
to prevent abuses in private securities fraud lawsuits;
(2) since enactment of that legislation, considerable evidence
has been presented to Congress that a number of securities class
action lawsuits have shifted from Federal to State courts;
(3) this shift has prevented that Act from fully achieving its
objectives;
(4) State securities regulation is of continuing importance, to-
gether with Federal regulation of securities, to protect investors and
promote strong financial markets; and
(5) in order to prevent certain State private securities class ac-
tion lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objec-
tives of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, it is
appropriate to enact national standards for securities class action
lawsuits involving nationally traded securities, while preserving the
appropriate enforcement powers of State securities regulators and
not changing the current treatment of individual lawsuits.
TITLE I- SEcuRrrras LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS
SECTION 101. LIMITATION ON REMEDIES
(a) AmMEnvf rs To THm SECuRms ACT op -1933.-
(1) Amendment.-Section 16 of the Securities Act of 1933 (15
U.S.C. 77 p) is amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 16. ADDITIONAL REMEDIES; LIMITATION ON
REMEDIES.
"(a) Remedies Additional.-Except as provided in subsection
(b), the rights and remedies provided by this title shall be in addi-
tion to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or
in equity.
"(b) Class Action Limitations.-No covered class action based
upon the statutory or common law of any State or subdivision
thereof may be maintained in any State or Federal court by any pri-
vate party alleging-
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"(1) an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or
"(2) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security.
"(c) Removal of Covered Class Actions.-Any covered class ac-
tion brought in any State court involving a covered security, as set
forth in subsection (b), shall be removable to the Federal district
court for the district in which the action is pending, and shall be
subject to subsection (b).
"(d) Preservation of Certain Actions.-
"(1) Actions under state law of state of incorporation.-
"(A) Actions preserved.-Notwithstanding subsection (b)
or (c), a covered class action described in subparagraph (B) of
this paragraph that is based upon the statutory or common law
of the State in which the issuer is incorporated (in the case of a
corporation) or organized (in the case of any other entity) may
be maintained in a State or Federal court by a private party.
"(B) Permissible actions.-A covered class action is de-
scribed in this subparagraph if it involves-
"(i) the purchase or sale of securities by the issuer or an
affiliate of the issuer exclusively from or to holders of equity
securities of the issuer; or
"(ii) any recommendation, position, or other communi-
cation with respect to the sale of securities of the issuer that-
"(I) is made by or on behalf of the issuer or an affili-
ate of the issuer to holders of equity securities of the is-
suer; and
"(II) concerns decisions of those equity holders with
respect to voting their securities, acting in response to a
tender or exchange offer, or exercising dissenters' or ap-
praisal rights.
"(2) State actions.-
"(A) In general.-Notwithstanding any other provision of
this section, nothing in this section may be construed to pre-
clude a State or political subdivision thereof or a State pension
plan from bringing an action involving a covered security on its
own behalf, or as a member of a class comprised solely of other
States, political subdivisions, or State pension plans that are
named plaintiffs, and that have authorized participation, in
such action.
"(B) State pension plan defined.-For purposes of this par-
agraph, the term 'State pension plan' means a pension plan
established and maintained for its employees by the govern-
ment of the State or political subdivision thereof, or by any
agency or instrumentality thereof.
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"(3) Actions under contractual agreements between issuers
and indenture trustees.-Notwithstanding subsection (b) or (c), a
covered class action that seeks to enforce a contractual agreement
between an issuer and an indenture trustee may be maintained in
a State or Federal court by a party to the agreement or a successor
to such party.
"(4) Remand of removed actions.-In an action that has been
removed from a State court pursuant to subsection (c), if the Fed-
eral court determines that the action may be maintained in State
court pursuant to this subsection, the Federal court shall remand
such action to such State court.
"(e) Preservation of State Jurisdiction.-The securities commis-
sion (or any agency or office performing like functions) of any State
shall retain jurisdiction under the laws of such State to investigate
and bring enforcement actions.
"(f) Definitions.-For purposes of this section, the following def-
initions shall apply:
"(1) Affiliate of the issuer.-The term 'affiliate of the issuer'
means a person that directly or indirectly, through one or more
intermediaries, controls or is controlled by or is under common
control with, the issuer.
"(2) Covered class action.-
"(A) In general.-The term 'covered class action' means-
"(i) any single lawsuit in which-
"(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50
persons or prospective class members, and questions of law
or fact common to those persons or members of the pro-
spective class, without reference to issues of individualized
reliance on an alleged misstatement or omission,
predominate over any questions affecting only individual
persons or members; or
"(II) one or more named parties seek to recover dam-
ages on a representative basis on behalf of themselves and
other unnamed parties similarly situated, and questions of
law or fact common to those persons or members of the
prospective class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual persons or members; or
"(ii) any group of lawsuits filed in or pending in the
same court and involving common questions of law or fact,
in which-
"(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50
persons; and
"(II) the lawsuits are joined, consolidated, or other-
wise proceed as a single action for any purpose.
"(B) Exception for derivative actions.-Notwithstanding
subparagraph (A), the term 'covered class action' does not in-
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clude an exclusively derivative action brought by one or more
shareholders on behalf of a corporation.
"(C) Counting of certain class members.-For purposes of
this paragraph, a corporation, investment company, pension
plan, partnership, or other entity, shall be treated as one per-
son or prospective class member, but only if the entity is not
established for the purpose of participating in the action.
"(D) Rule of construction.-Nothing in this paragraph shall
be construed to affect the discretion of a State court in deter-
mining whether actions filed in such court should be joined,
consolidated, or otherwise allowed to proceed as a single
action.
"(3) Covered security.-The term 'covered security' means a
security that satisfies the standards for a covered security specified
in paragraph (1) or (2) of section 18(b) at the time during which
it is alleged that the misrepresentation, omission, or manipulative
or deceptive conduct occurred, except that such term shall not
include any debt security that is exempt from registration under
this title pursuant to rules issued by the Commission under sec-
tion 4(2)."
(2) Circumvention of stay of discovery.-Section 27(b) of the Securities
Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77z-1 (b)) is amended by inserting after paragraph (3)
the following new paragraph:
"(4) Circumvention of stay of discovery.- Upon a proper
showing, a court may stay discovery proceedings in any private
action in a State court as necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments, in an action subject to a stay
of discovery pursuant to this subsection."
(3) Conforming amendments.-Section 22(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77v(a)) is amended-
(A) by inserting "except as provided in section 16 with respect
to covered class actions," after "Territorial courts,"; and
(B) by striking "No case" and inserting "Except as provided in
section 16(c), no case".
(b) AMEArDAvvF s To Ta- SECU'RITiS EXCHANGE AcT op 193.-
[This section substantially mirrors the amendments to the 1933
Act]
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